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Market delineation is a critical stage in the structural analysis employed
in many antitrust cases to help assess actual or potential market power.1
Market delineation plays a central role in cases involving mergers and ac-
quisitions challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act2 and in many
cases arising under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.3 This Article
* Economist, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department. The views expressed herein are not pur-
ported to reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice. The discussion benefitted from com-
ments by Morris Adelman, Frederick Rowe, and especially Phillip Areeda.
1. U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 13,103 (June 14,
1984) [hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines] define market power as the "ability of one or more
firms profitably to maintain prices above the competitive levels for a significant period of time."
Id. § 1.0; see also FTC v. Promodes S.A., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,688, at 61,625 (N.D. Ga.
1989). For similar definitions, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 n.46
(1984); Flip Side Prods., Inc. v. Jam Prods., Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989); see also United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242,
246 (8th Cir. 1989); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases,
94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 937 (1981).
Antitrust case law uses the term "monopoly power" more often than the term "market
power." "Monopoly power" is most usefully defined as "a high degree of market power." Landes
& Posner, supra, at 937. This is a refinement of the traditional legal definition: "Monopoly power
is the power to control prices or exclude competition." United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
2. See, eg., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 335 (1962) ("[T]he proper defini-
tion of the market is a 'necessary predicate' to an examination of competition that may be affected
by the horizontal aspects of [a] merger."); see also United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418
U.S. 602, 618 (1974) (similar for potential competition mergers); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (same for vertical mergers).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988), prohibits mergers and acquisitions the
effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition ... in any line of commerce.., in any
section of the country."
3. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), prohibits monopolization, attempts to
monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. Market delineation plays an important part in cases
involving either of the former two allegations. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
570 (1966) (stating that one element of the "offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act
[is] the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market"); Walker Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) ("Without a definition of [the] market
there is no way to measure [the defendant's] ability to lessen or destroy competition.").
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), prohibits agreements that unreasonably
restrain trade, including certain vertical restraints. Market delineation plays an important part in
cases involving vertical restraints. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
45 (1977) (nonprice vertical restraints assessed under the Rule of Reason "in light of the competi-
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
presents a history of antitrust market delineation, with special focus on
merger analysis.'
This is an appropriate time for historical reflection on antitrust market
delineation because last year was an important anniversary for three mile-
stones in the history of antitrust market delineation. It was the fortieth
anniversary of the first explicit articulation in the economic or legal litera-
ture of cross-elasticity of demand as the test for market delineation.' It was
the thirtieth anniversary of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,6 the most often
cited Supreme Court case on market delineation. Finally, it was the tenth
anniversary of the promulgation of new Merger Guidelines by the United
States Department of Justice,7 which ushered in a new era of antitrust mar-
ket delineation. 8
For the most part, the discussion proceeds chronologically. Section I
begins with a brief prehistory of antitrust market delineation, covering the
period through 1950. It then traces the emergence of market delineation
and the development of the cross-elasticity-of-demand test between 1952
and 1955. Section I concludes with the Supreme Court's landmark decision
in United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. (the Cellophane case).9
Section II discusses the case law and commentary that emerged between the
tive situation in 'the product market as a whole' "); Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 13-14, 17
(tying is per se illegal if the seller has market power over the tying product); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953) (in tying cases, market power is assessed
in "the whole and not part of a relevant market").
4. Nonmerger cases are cited and occasionally discussed below because market delineation
principles and precedents are used interchangeably in merger and nonmerger cases. See infra note
303 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
6. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
7. These Merger Guidelines were released on June 14, 1982. See U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,102 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Merger
Guidelines]. They replaced guidelines which were released on May 30, 1968. See id. T 13,101
(May 30, 1968) [hereinafter 1968 Merger Guidelines]. A slightly revised version of the 1982
Guidelines was released on June 14, 1984. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1; see infra
notes 332-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1968 Merger Guidelines and notes
449-516 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines; see also
U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (April 2, 1992)
[hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines].
A more extensive revision of the Merger Guidelines was released on April 2, 1992. See infra
notes 450, 456-58, 462 & 562 for references to this latest revision.
8. See infra notes 517-40 and accompanying text.
9. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). This case will be referred to throughout the remainder of this Article
as the Cellophane case. It should not be confused with the Supreme Court's decision a year later
involving the same parties. Compare United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586 (1957) (the du Pont-General Motors case), supra note 2, with United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (the Cellophane case), supra note 1; see also infra note 92.
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Cellophane case and Brown Shoe, concentrating on market delineation in
merger cases. Section III considers Brown Shoe and relevant Supreme
Court cases between 1962-70. Featured as well is market delineation under
the original 1968 Merger Guidelines. Section IV discusses relevant cases in
the lower courts, particularly those applying Brown Shoe, and the scholarly
literature on market delineation between 1962 and 1982. Section V presents
the 1982 Merger Guidelines' approach to market delineation and compares
and contrasts that approach with the prior case law and scholarly literature.
Also discussed are the major criticisms of the Guidelines' approach. Sec-
tion VI discusses the post-1982 Guidelines' case law and briefly reviews
empirical approaches to market delineation advocated over the past twenty
years. The final section contains a few concluding words.
Much of the intellectual development of the concepts relating to anti-
trust market delineation took place in classrooms and seminar halls at law
schools and economics departments,10 in judges' chambers, and in the of-
fices of enforcement agencies, law firms, and economic consultants. The
written record of reported case decisions, articles, and books incompletely
reflects this development. Thus, it is often impossible to assign credit, or
blame, to those who deserve it. I apologize in advance to those I may slight.
I. ANTITRUST MARKET DELINEATION THROUGH THE
CELLOPHANE CASE
A. A Prehistory of Antitrust Market Delineation
In economics, the notion of a market-or "industry" as economists
have often termed itn"-was fairly well developed before there were any
antitrust laws. In 1942, George Stigler expressed the classical economic
notion: "A market for a commodity is the area within which the price
tends to uniformity, allowance being made for transportation costs .... ."1 2
Stigler was paraphrasing Alfred Marshall's path-breaking Principles of Eco-
10. In the late 1940s and 1950s, a critical period in the development of the concepts involved
in antitrust market delineation, active discussions of antitrust matters occurred at the University
of Chicago Law School under the leadership of Aaron Director and Henry Simons and also at
Harvard University's Department of Economics under the leadership of Edward S. Mason. Par-
ticipants published many articles, but those articles are unlikely to reflect fully the insights on
market delineation that came out of these discussions. The concepts in many court opinions
surely migrated to the courts from Chicago and Harvard via law clerks.
11. Some economists have distinguished between a "market" and an "industry." John Night-
ingale, On the Definition of 'Industry' and 'Market, '27 J. INDUS. ECON. 31 (1978); Joan Robinson,
The Industry and the Market, 66 ECON. J. 360 (1956). The distinctions are not important for
present purposes.
12. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE PRICE 92 (1942).
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nomics, 13 originally published in 1890, and Marshall was elaborating on the
work of Augustin Cournot. 14 The idea behind this definition is that trade
occurs freely throughout a market, so actual or potential arbitrage pre-
cludes price differentials exceeding transportation costs. Until fairly re-
cently, however, it does not appear that any economists attempted to
convert this single-price property of a market into a test for antitrust mar-
ket delineation.15
Among economists, there actually has been a tradition of hostility to
reliance on market shares in assessing market power and thus a tradition of
hostility toward the whole idea of antitrust market delineation.6 Hostility
to market delineation was particularly intense from the early 1930s to the
mid-1950s, when the new theories of "monopolistic competition" were pop-
ular. Those theories revolved around the idea that significant differentia-
tion among products made every seller a monopolist, in at least a limited
sense, over its particular product.17
Joan Robinson, one of two leading proponents of the monopolistic com-
petition theories, argued that the classical concept of an industry generally
did not correspond very closely to the real world. She went on to add:
But in some cases, where a commodity in the real world is bounded
on all sides by a marked gap between itself and its closest substitutes,
the real-world firms producing this real-world commodity will con-
13. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 325 (8th ed. 1920) (originally pub-
lished in July 1890, the month in which the Sherman Act was signed into law).
14. AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
THEORY OF WEALTH 51-52 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus H. Kelley reprint, 1971)
(1838).
15. Over the last 20 years, economists have gone back to their roots and proposed empirical
methods for market delineation based on this notion. See Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F.
Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST
BULL. 45 (1973) (proposing a method based on shipments data); George J. Stigler & Robert A.
Sherwin, The Extent of the Market, 28 J.L. & ECON. 555 (1985) (proposing a method based on
price data).
16. The first substantial discussion of monopoly power in the economic literature cautioned
that market shares and concentration are not necessarily good indicators of market power. See
Abba P. Lerner, The Concept and Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157,
166 (1934). In two classic law review articles, economist Edward S. Mason made essentially the
same point in addressing the reliance on market shares in antitrust cases. See Edward S. Mason,
The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1274
(1949); Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 47-48 (1937).
Another economist familiar with antitrust law added that market shares "may be arbitrarily en-
hanced or reduced by redefinition of the industry." CORWIN D. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COM-
PETITION 124-25 (1949).
17. See EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed.
1948) (originally published in 1933); JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPE-
TITION (2d ed. 1969).
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form to the definition of an industry sufficiently closely to make the
discussion of industries in this technical sense of some interest.18
Edward Chamberlin, the other leading proponent of the monopolistic com-
petition theories, went much further than Joan Robinson in attacking the
concept of an industry. He argued:
"Industry" or "commodity" boundaries are a snare and a delu-
sion-in the highest degree arbitrarily drawn, and, wherever drawn,
establishing at once wholly false implications both as to competition
of substitutes within their limits, which supposedly stops at their
borders, and as to the possibility of ruling on the presence or absence
of oligopolistic forces by the simple device of counting the number of
producers included.9
There were economists who disagreed with Robinson and Chamberlin, 0
but they were less influential until roughly the late 1950s, and they gener-
ally did not make any contributions to antitrust market delineation.
One notable early contribution21 was an idea expressed by perhaps the
three most eminent economists in the field of economics concerned with
antitrust-industrial organization. That idea was offered in response to the
18. ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 17. Mrs. Robinson's view continues to have its adherents.
E.g., Richard Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1789, 1799-800
(1982).
19. Edward H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 AM. ECON. REV.
(PAPERS & PROC.) 85, 86-87 (1950); accord CHAMBERLIN, supra note 17, at 201; ROBERT TRIF-
FEN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY 78-89 (1940). Some
economists continue to believe that market delineation is an artificial construction created by
antitrust litigation, drawing a "meaningless" distinction between firms that are in and out of the
market. E.g., Franklin M. Fisher, Horizontal Mergers: Triage and Treatment, 1 J. ECON. PER-
SPECTIVES 23, 27 (1987).
There is merit to this view. Delineated markets rarely, if ever, consist of a single homogeneous
product, produced at a single location, and for which there are no substitute products or locations
just outside the market. Nevertheless, a structural merger policy-built on market delineation
and market shares-finds support in economic theory and empirical research, and, in industries
with relatively undifferentiated products, a structural approach to mergers is probably the best we
can do given our current state of knowledge. See George A. Hay & Gregory J. Werden, Horizon-
tal Mergers: Law, Policy and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 173, 176 (1993).
Differentiated products industries, however, present quite a different situation, and a combination
of estimation and simulation is likely to offer a far better prediction of the competitive effects of a
merger. Id. at 176-77.
20. E.g., FRITZ MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS' COMPETITION 213-14 (1952);
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 210-12 (2d ed. 1946); Clair Wilcox, Discussion, 40
AM. EON. REv. (PAPERS & PROC.) 85, 86-87 (1950) ("Whatever the theoretical difficulties,
criteria for the guidance of policy must and will be devised, if not by the economist, then by the
lawyer and the engineer. If economics does not eventually contribute to the task, then so much
the worse for economics.").
21. Perhaps another notable contribution was the general notion that substitute goods should
be in the same market. This notion was expressed in discussions concerning the definition of
industries for statistical purposes. See G. WARREN NUTTER, THE EXTENT OF ENTERPRISE MO-
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assault on the market concept, which was part of the monopolistic competi-
tion revolution. The idea was that the market for any firm consists of the
group of firms it views as its significant competitors.
As expressed by Edward S. Mason, who is generally credited with
founding the field of industrial organization:
The market and market structure must be defined with reference to
the position of a single seller or buyer. The structure of a seller's
market, then, includes all those considerations which he takes into
account in determining his business policies and practices. His mar-
ket includes all buyers and sellers, of whatever product, whose ac-
tion he considers to influence his volume of sales.22
Similar views were expressed by Mason's student Joe Bain,23 who was gen-
erally considered Mason's successor as the leading industrial organization
economist, and by George Stigler, 24 the only industrial organization econo-
mist to win a Nobel Prize.
The case law has not hesitated to delineate markets and rely, to a signifi-
cant extent, on market shares. The notion of a relevant market is at least
implicit in the early monopolization cases.25 Such cases, however, barely
mention the underlying substitutability issues that are the concern of mar-
ket delineation.26 The analysis of these cases probably was not very sensi-
NOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1899-1939, at 12-14 (1951); Clair Wilcox, On the Alleged Ubiq-
uity of Oligopoly, 40 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 67, 69 (1950).
22. Edward S. Mason, Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale Enterprises, 29 AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 61, 69 (1939). Although Mason published several important
articles on antitrust, see supra note 16, this article did not address antitrust.
The idea of delineating a market around each particular firm traces back to Nicholas Kaldor,
Mrs. Robinson's "Economics of Imperfect Competition," 1 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 335, 339-40 (1934).
23. JOE S. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND EMPLOYMENT 16-18 (1948).
24. STIGLER, supra note 20, at 282-83.
25. A famous antitrust law dictum is Learned Hand's statement that while ninety percent "is
enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be
enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent [sic] is not." United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (certified to the Second Circuit in the absence of a quorum of six
Supreme Court justices). The percentages represented the defendant's shares in various alterna-
tive markets.
On market delineation in early monopolization cases, see G.E. HALE & ROSEMARY D. HALE,
MARKET POWER: SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 97-103, 113-16 (1958); Donald
F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281, 286-97 (1956); Wil-
liam F. Upshaw, The Relevant Market in Merger Decisions: Antitrust Concept or Antitrust Device?,
60 Nw. U. L. REV. 424, 428-41 (1965).
26. See, e.g., Milton Handler & Stanley D. Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Cel-
ler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 641-42 (1961).
The one notable exception was Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Corn Prods. Ref.
Co., 234 F. 964, 975-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919). Judge Hand
stated that one maltose product is not in the relevant market for a second if the second sells at a
significantly lower price. This is a rather sophisticated argument not grasped by all modern
[Vol. 76:123
1992] THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST MARKET DELINEATION 129
tive to the choice of the market. Moreover, exclusionary conduct, and not
market structure, was the focus of these monopolization cases.2 7
In merger cases, the analysis of market structure plays a more promi-
nent role. In fact, earliest usage of the term "relevant market" in a reported
federal antitrust decision was in a merger case, the Supreme Court's 1948
decision United States v. Columbia Steel Co.28 Although the Court used the
term "relevant market," it "recognize[d] the difficulty of laying down a rule
as to what areas or products are competitive, one with another" and made
no attempt to lay down such rules.2 9 The Court ultimately held that the
challenged acquisition did not violate the Sherman Act.3"
Congressional dissatisfaction with the outcome of this case helped
prompt passage3 1 of the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950,32 amending Section 7
of the Clayton Act.3 3 The original Section 7 prohibited the acquisition by
one corporation of the stock of another if the effect "may be to substantially
lessen competition between such corporations. ' 34 The Celler-Kefauver Act
changed the prohibition to that of acquisitions of stock or assets the effect of
which "may be substantially to lessen competition ... in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country.",35 The latter phrase was equated with
judges. See United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 695 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1987),
rev'd, 866 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989).
27. See, eg., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920) ("[Ihe law
does not make mere size an offence or the existence of unexerted power an offence."); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (stating that there is no "direct prohibition against
monopoly in the concrete").
28. 334 U.S. 495, 508 (1948). The term "relevant competitive market" also was used. See id.
at 519, 520, 527.
29. Id. at 511. The Court did suggest that supply substitutes must be included in the relevant
market. See id. at 510.
30. Id. at 527-31. For a discussion of the Columbia Steel case, see Sergei S. Zlinkoff & Rob-
ert C. Barnard, Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws: The Columbia Steel Case, The Supreme Court
and a Competitive Economy 1947 Term, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 151 (1948).
31. The role of Columbia Steel in motivating Congress is discussed in United States v. Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342 n.20 (1963), and Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 318-19 n.33 (1962). Another motivating factor was the desire to close the "asset loophole"
whereby acquiring firms could avoid the Clayton Act prohibition by acquiring the assets of the
target firm. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 312-14, 316 & n.29. The importance of Columbia Steel
is best illustrated by the fact that Congress considered legislation to close the asset loophole for
years before that decision without result. See idl at 311-12 & n.19; see also Comment, Corporate
Consolidations and the Concentration of Economic Power: Proposals for Revitalization of Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 57 YALE L.J. 613, 621-27 (1948).
32. Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)).
33. Ch. 1184, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125, 1126 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)).
34. Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731, 732 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)). Also
prohibited were acquisitions of stock that would "tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce." Id.
35. Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125, 1126 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988)).
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"relevant market," thereby explicitly introducing market delineation into
the process.36
B. The Emergence of Antitrust Market Delineation, 1952-55
In economics, the effect of a change in the price of one product on the
sales of a second product is measured by the cross-elasticity of demand. In
particular, the cross-elasticity of demand is the proportionate change in the
quantity sold of the second product divided by the proportionate change in
the price of the first product.37 The earliest use of cross-elasticity of de-
mand to assist in market delineation was in the Supreme Court's 1953 opin-
ion in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.3' Before that time, it
appears there was no articulation of the cross-elasticity test in the legal liter-
ature, and the first explicit articulation of the test in the economic literature
appears to have been just a year earlier.39
In 1952, Joe Bain defined the "industry" for a product as consisting of
"close substitutes" identified on the basis of cross-elasticity of demand. He
began by discussing the industry concept applied to a group of products
that are "perfect substitutes for each other," and that have only "distant
36. See MARK S. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
264 (1962); see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (equating "line of
commerce" with "relevant product or service market" and "section of the country" with "rele-
vant geographic market"); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 729, 732 (E.D.
Mo. 1959), aff'd, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576,
588 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (stating that "'line of commerce' signifies a product market and 'section of
the country' refers to the geographic market"). See generally REPORT OF THE ATr'Y GEN.'S
NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 118-19 (1955) (Stanley N. Barnes & S. Chester-
field Oppenheim, co-chairpersons) [hereinafter COMMITrEE REPORT].
37. The magnitude of the cross-elasticity of demand depends on the magnitude of the price
change considered and whether price is increased or decreased. In addition, for any pair of prod-
ucts, there are two cross-elasticities of demand, because either product can be the one for which
price is varied. These two cross-elasticities may be very different.
38. 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953).
39. I am fairly confident that the first published, explicit proposals to base market delineation
on cross-elasticity of demand appeared in JOE S. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 25-26, 50-53 (1952) and
MACHLUP, supra note 20, at 213-14. However, I am also fairly confident that the basic idea went
back further and was not first conceived by either Bain or Machlup. For an earlier passing refer-
ence to the use of cross-elasticity of demand for market delineation, see NUTTER, supra note 21, at
13.
Cross-elasticities of demand also were a central focus of an essentially unrelated literature in
economics on market structure classification (that is, the definition of monopoly and other market
structures), and much of that literature came before 1952. E.g., Edward H. Chamberlin, Measur-
ing the Degree of Monopoly and Competition, in MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION AND THEIR REG-
ULATION 255 (Edward H. Chamberlin ed., 1954); WILLIAM J. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG
THE FEW 50-54 (1949); TRIFFIN, supra note 19, ch. 3; Robert L. Bishop, Elasticities, Cross-Elas-
ticities, and Market Relationships, 42 AM. ECON. REV. 779 (1952); Andreas G. Papandreou, Mar-
ket Structure and Monopoly Power, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 883 (1949).
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substitutes" outside the market. Then, much like Robinson 4° and
Chamberlin,41 he noted that in the real world, products often are "imper-
fect substitutes" for each other and that substitutability is a matter of de-
gree.4 2 Quite unlike Robinson and Chamberlin, he went on to explain:
This phenomenon requires an adaptation of an industry. Each seller
of a slightly different good should not be put in a separate "indus-
try" when his price changes in fact tend strongly to influence the
sales of a number of close substitute products. The definition of an
industry is thus conveniently expanded so that an industry may in-
dude not only identical or perfect substitute products but alterna-
tively close substitute products. The general criterion for inclusion
of products in an industry becomes close substitutability, of which
perfect substitutability is a special and extreme case. A group of
products are close substitutes if a reduction in the price of any of
them will significantly or noticeably affect the quantity purchased of
the others at given prices-if a significant proportion of the buyers
of the others may be "stolen" by such a move. The industry in-
cludes a range of close-substitute products so defined; it excludes any
product the demand for which is not significantly influenced by the
industry's price changes.43
The concept of cross-elasticity of demand is explicit in this statement, even
though the term itself is not used. Bain, however, did use the term in later
elaboration on the identification of close substitutes: "The magnitude of
[the] cross-elasticity indicates the degree of substitutability. A low cross-
elasticity indicates poor substitutes; a high cross-elasticity indicates close
substitutes."'
Also in 1952, Fritz Machlup articulated a concept much like that of
Bain. Machlup, however, added cross-elasticity of supply as a factor for
determining market boundaries. The cross-elasticity of supply is defined as
the proportionate change in the quantity supplied of one product divided by
the proportionate change in the price of a second product that induced the
supply response by the first product. Machlup also emphasized that mar-
kets are merely convenient analytical tools, a point perhaps more telling in
antitrust law than in economics. He wrote:
The economist's concept of the industry is an abstraction for the
purpose of limiting the scope of problems of interdependence. In the
40. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 17, 19 and accompanying text.
42. BAIN, supra note 39, at 23-24.
43. Id at 24-25. Similar language can be found in BAIN, supra note 23, at 16, but with no
reference to cross-elasticity of demand.
44. BAIN, supra note 39, at 52. See generally id. at 50-53.
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last analysis, everything in the economy hangs together; but not all
interdependence is substantial or even definite as to its direction....
[T]he concept of the industry is nothing but an expedient device for
ruling out negligible or too uncertain interdependence.
Interdependence is conveniently expressed by cross-elasticities of
demand and supply (or cost).... Using the term cross-elasticity for
both types of relationships we might advance the following state-
ment as something approaching a definition of an industry. Firms
related through cross-elasticities of the demands for their products or
of the supplies of their factors may be said to constitute an "industry"
if these cross-elasticities are either so important or so definite that they
could not be neglected without impairing the considerations of the
firms or the analysis of the economist.15
As noted above, the Supreme Court first mentioned the use of cross-
elasticity of demand in the Times-Picayune case. The Court did not discuss
market delineation at length in that case, but it did for the first time offer
some principles for market delineation. First, the Court noted that the
" 'market,' as most concepts in law or economics, cannot be measured by
metes and bounds."" In a footnote, the Court added:
For every product, substitutes exist. But a relevant market cannot
meaningfully encompass that infinite range. The circle must be
drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to which, within rea-
sonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will
turn; in technical terms, products whose "cross-elasticities of de-
mand" are small.a7
There are two important principles in this brief statement. One is that close
substitutes should be identified using cross-elasticities of demand. The
other is that markets should be narrowly delineated. The Court cited
neither precedent nor scholarly authority for either principle." We will
45. MACHLUP, supra note 20, at 213-14 (definitions of cross-elasticity of demand and supply
omitted from second paragraph).
46. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953).
47. Id. at 612 n.3 1. This dictum had little relevance to the case. The defendant owned the
Times-Picayune, the only morning newspaper in New Orleans, and one of two evening papers. It
required advertisers to purchase advertising in both of its papers. The district court found this to
be an illegal tying arrangement. Id. at 596-98, 601. However, the Supreme Court found that the
relevant market for the advertising in the morning paper included advertising in the afternoon
paper, and the Times-Picayune was not dominant in that market. Thus, there was not an illegal
tie. Id. at 611-13. The Court also found that the challenged practice did not otherwise violate the
antitrust laws. Id. at 614-28.
48. This is especially notable because the opinion contains numerous citations to economic
and newspaper literature. In all likelihood these citations were supplied by the clerks of Justice
Clark, who signed the opinion. Those clerks were Frederick M. Rowe, who worked on the opin-
ion, and Bernard Weisberg.
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never know from where the Court got the idea of cross-elasticity of demand
as a test for market delineation.
Shortly before Times-Picayune was decided, an important district court
opinion came down in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.4 9 That
case made no significant contributions to market delineation, but it was re-
sponsible for several minor contributions by economists in 1954. One was a
restatement of the traditional skepticism of economists of the utility of the
market delineation-market share approach to antitrust.5" The other was a
defense of that approach and a general endorsement of market delineation
by the courts.51 This is particularly notable because it was made by Carl
Kaysen, who served as a law clerk on the United Shoe Machinery case even
though he was an economist.52
The first two law review articles on antitrust market delineation also
appeared in 1954. One was a student note that appeared in the Columbia
Law Review, and the other was a student comment that appeared in the
Michigan Law Review. 3 The Columbia note appears to have introduced
the terms "product market" and "geographic market."15 4 It drew on Times-
Picayune in arguing: "It is essential.., to narrow the market concept so
that in each instance only like products with a considerable cross-elasticity
of demand will be included in a particular market."5 5 The note also advo-
49. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
50. See Lucile Sheppard Keyes, The Shoe Machinery Case and the Problem of the Good Trust,
68 Q.J. ECON. 287, 297-301 (1954).
51. See Carl Kaysen, Market Definition in Anti-Trust Law Proceedings, THE GROWING ROLE
OF ECONOMIC DATA IN JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 18 (1954). Kaysen ex-
plained that "a market includes all those commodities which are substitutes in use from the point
of view of buyers, at or around the current level of prices." Id. at 18.
52. See CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION
vii-viii (1956).
53. Note, The Market: A Concept in Anti-Trust, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 580 (1954); David Mac-
donald, Comment, Product Competition in the Relevant Market Under the Sherman Act, 53 MICH.
L. REV. 69 (1954).
54. Note, supra note 53, at 585. These two terms are convenient and very commonly used in
antitrust; however, they can be misleading. There is but one relevant market with product and
geographic dimensions-not separate product and geographic markets. The product and geo-
graphic dimensions of relevant markets must be delineated in the context of each other, and the
separation into product and geographic dimensions is an oversimplification. Transportation, for
example, cannot be sensibly separated along such lines. In addition, the separation can be prob-
lematic when the products differ in both physical and geographic dimensions. It may be clear that
a distant, different product is not in a relevant market but not so clear whether the reason should
be attributed to its product or its geographic differences. While the terms "product market" and
"geographic market" are inescapable in discussing the case law and some of the commentary, they
will not otherwise be used below.
55. Id. at 585-86.
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cated the delineation of product markets on the basis of "reactive inter-
changeability," a concept closely resembling cross-elasticity of demand.16
The Michigan comment provided a useful summary of the case law,57
including discussions of Times-Picayune and the district court's decision in
the Cellophane case,5 8 and it proposed a test for market delineation. Under
the test proposed in the Michigan comment, a product is in the relevant
market for a defendant's product if "the average customer [can] change
without substantial difficulty from the product of the defendant to" the
other product.59 The Michigan comment also provided useful discussions
of some relevant economic literature and of the concept of cross-elasticity of
demand.60
The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws, a large group of prominent lawyers and economists, submitted its
report to the president in 1955. It attempted to go further than the courts
had in laying out principles for market delineation:
For our purposes, a market is an economic relationship among sell-
ers and buyers, whose boundaries are not necessarily defined by geo-
graphical area alone, nor by conventional product classifications. To
ascertain whether a firm or group of firms acting in concert has mo-
nopoly power, "the market" should include all firms whose produc-
tion has so immediate and substantial an effect on the prices and
production of the firms in question that the actions of the one group
cannot be explained without direct and constant reference to the
other. One should include in a market all firms whose products are
56. Id. at 586.
57. Macdonald, supra note 53, at 70-80.
58. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd,
351 U.S. 377 (1956). For purposes of consistency and clarity, this opinion, along with the
Supreme Court's ultimate opinion in this case, will both be referred to as the Cellophane case. See
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
59. MacDonald, supra note 53, at 82.
60. Id. at 82-84 & nn.61, 63-67. The discussion cites two economic treatises: JOE S. BAIN,
PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND EMPLOYMENT (2d ed. 1953) and TIBOR SCITOVSKY, WELFARE
AND COMPETITION (1951). They are cited, however, almost exclusively for the definition of cross-
elasticity of demand and not at all for the idea of using cross-elasticity of demand in market
delineation. Macdonald, supra note 53, at 75 n.30, 83 nn.63 & 66. The relevant portions of Bain's
book are quite literally identical to those of BAIN, supra note 39. Not only did Bain discuss cross-
elasticity of demand at length, but he also proposed cross-elasticity as the test for market delinea-
tion.
While the comment's scholarship was considerable, it totally misperceived a statement quoted
from Chamberlin, supra note 19, at 101, and erroneously credited Chamberlin with the idea of
basing market delineation on cross-elasticities of demand. Macdonald, supra note 53, at 82 &
n.61. The quoted passage referred to market structure classification (see supra note 39) rather
than market delineation. Chamberlin did not "inadvertently" substitute one phrase for another as
the comment asserts. Macdonald, supra note 53, at 82 & n.61.
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in fact good and directly available substitutes for one another in
sales to some significant group of buyers, and exclude all others.
Where the products of different industries compete directly as alter-
natives for the same use, the market for that class of products should
include the rival goods supplied by different industries. One should
combine into one market two or more products (or two or more
areas) if an appreciable fall in the price of one product (or in one
area) will promptly lead to a relatively large diversion of purchasers
from the other product (or area). 6 '
This statement incorporates both the cross-elasticity-of-demand test and the
Mason-Bain-Stigler notion of a market. The cross-elasticity-of-demand test
surely was taken from Times-Picayune. The other notion most likely was
the result of George Stigler being a member of the Committee.
C. The Cellophane Case
In a 1953 opinion occupying 192 pages of the Federal Supplement,6 2 the
Delaware District Court held that du Pont had not "monopolize[d] inter-
state trade in cellophane, ' ' 3 even though it accounted for three-quarters of
the sales of cellophane in the United States." The district court found that
cellophane faced substantial competition in its various uses from a variety
of other products.65 Thus, it held that the "relevant market for determining
the extent of du Pont's market control is the market for flexible packaging
materials. '66 Ultimately, the court concluded: "Competitive influences in
the flexible packaging markets, place limitations upon du Pont's pricing
policies and procedures. They force reduction of du Pont's prices and deny
it power to raise prices in the manner of a monopolist."67 The court did not
use the term "cross-elasticity of demand" in explaining its reasoning, but
the concept certainly played an important part.
The district court's analysis was severely criticized in an oft-cited article
written by economists George Stocking and Willard Mueller.68 They ar-
gued at length that du Pont was exercising market power over cellophane.
Indeed, it was the fact that du Pont had raised prices to the monopoly level
that brought other products into competition with cellophane. They con-
61. COMMrrrIE REPORT, supra note 36, at 322.
62. Cellophane, 118 F. Supp. at 41-233.
63. Cellophane, 351 U.S. at 378-79 and n.l.
64. Id. at 379; Cellophane, 118 F. Supp. at 115-16.
65. Cellophane, 118 F. Supp. at 197-207.
66. Id at 60.
67. Id. at 207.
68. George W. Stocking & Willard F. Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competi-
tion, 45 AM. ECON. REv. 29 (1955).
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cluded that "cellophane is so different from other flexible packaging materi-
als that its cross elasticity of demand gives du Pont significant and
continuing monopoly power. ' 69
The government appealed,70 contending "that cellophane and other
wrapping materials are neither substantially fungible nor like priced. 7 1
Thus, argued the government, "the market for other wrappings is distinct
from the market for cellophane and.., the competition afforded cellophane
by other wrappings is not strong enough to be considered in determining
whether du Pont has monopoly powers. ' 72 In 1956, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court by the slimmest of majorities,7" establishing one
of its most important market delineation precedents.
The Court began by framing the issue presented:
Market delimitation is necessary ... to determine whether an al-
leged monopolist violates § 2 [of the Sherman Act]. The ultimate
consideration in such a determination is whether the defendants
control the price and competition in the market for such part of
trade or commerce as they are charged with monopolizing. Every
manufacturer is the sole producer of the particular commodity it
makes but its control in the above sense of the relevant market de-
pends upon the availability of alternative commodities for buyers:
i.e., whether there is a cross-elasticity of demand between cellophane
and the other wrappings. This interchangeability is largely gauged
by the purchase of competing products for similar uses considering
the price, characteristics and adaptability of the competing
commodities.74
After posing this issue, the Court reviewed the facts of the case and the
relevant law. The Court then explained that market delineation would de-
termine whether du Pont had monopoly power: "If cellophane is the 'mar-
69. Id. at 63. Stocking and Mueller referred to cross-elasticity of demand as the test else-
where as well. See id. at 54, 56.
70. From 1903 to 1974, Department of Justice cases could be appealed directly to the
Supreme Court under the Expediting Act, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), which was amended
by the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 1706, 1709
(1974).
71. Cellophane, 351 U.S. at 380.
72. Id. The government's phrasing is also quoted by the Court. Id. at 394.
73. The majority opinion was written by Justice Reed and joined by Justices Burton and
Minton, with Justice Frankfurter concurring. Id. at 377-414. Justice Warren filed a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Black and Douglas. Id. at 414-26. Justices Clark and Harlan took no
part in the consideration of the case. Id. at 377.
74. Id. at 380-81.
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ket' that du Pont is found to dominate, it may be assumed it does have
monopoly power over that 'market.' 7"
These two observations by the Court identify the essential relationship
between market delineation and market power. Markets are delineated for
the purposes of assessing market power. It would be silly to consider mo-
nopolization of a "market" over which even a monopolist (protected from
entry) would not possess significant market power because products outside
the delineated market were good substitutes.
The Court then tackled the market delineation question, beginning with
basic principles. The Court rejected the government's "substantially fungi-
ble" test, holding that "monopoly does not exist merely because the product
said to be monopolized differs from others. 7 6 The Court then expressed its
test in two ways. The first formulation was cross-elasticity of demand:
"What is called for is an appraisal of the 'cross-elasticity' of demand in the
trade.""17 Later in the opinion, the Court elaborated on the cross-elasticity
formulation:
An element for consideration as to cross-elasticity of demand be-
tween products is the responsiveness of the sales of one product to
price changes of the other. If a slight decrease in the price of cello-
phane causes a considerable number of customers of other flexible
wrappings to switch to cellophane, it would be an indication that a
high cross-elasticity of demand exists between them; that the prod-
ucts compete in the same market.7 8
The second formulation was "reasonable interchangeability": "In con-
sidering what is the relevant market.., no more definite rule can be de-
clared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for
the same purposes make up" the relevant market.7 9 In the conclusion of its
opinion, the court restated this formulation to hold that the relevant market
"is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the
purposes for which they are produced-price, use and qualities
considered." 8
75. d at 391.
76. Id at 394.
77. Id The court cited a note in the Columbia Law Review for this proposition. See Note,
supra note 53. It should be recalled, however, that the Columbia note merely repeated what the
Court had held in Times-Picayune. See supra text accompanying note 55.
78. Cellophane, 351 U.S. at 400 (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote is a citation to
BAIN, supra note 60, at 52, and ScrrovsKy, supra note 60, at 396. The citation to Bain and
Scitovsky also appears in Macdonald, supra note 53, at 83 n.68.
79. Cellophane, 351 U.S. at 395.
80. Id. at 404.
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The Court's second formulation reflects the fact that market delineation
presents complicated factual questions that must be addressed in a real-
world context. If products have differing attributes and prices, the effects of
those differences must be carefully analyzed. As the Court explained: "The
selling price between commodities with similar uses and different character-
istics may vary, so that the cheaper product can drive out the more expen-
sive. Or, the superior quality of higher priced articles may make dominant
the more desirable."81
The Court then examined the factual record established by the district
court. The Court viewed these facts as demonstrating that, "despite cello-
phane's advantages, it has to meet competition from other materials in
every one of its uses.... Moreover, a very considerable degree of func-
tional interchangeability exists between these products."82 Thus, the Court
found "that cellophane's interchangeability with the other materials men-
tioned suffices to make it a part of this flexible packaging material
market."
83
The dissent argued that the record showed "conclusively that cello-
phane is the relevant market."' 84 They found ample evidence supporting the
argument of economists Stocking and Mueller that du Pont had been exer-
cising substantial market power for many years.8 5
Cellophane precipitated much comment in law journals, most of it criti-
cal.86 Perhaps the one notable point was George Stocking's argument that
the concept of cross-elasticity of demand "cannot be of much use in anti-
trust cases and that its use by those not trained in economics will lessen the
effectiveness of Section 2 of the Sherman Act."87 In essence, he made two
points. One was that it is essential to know how high the cross-elasticity is,
and such information will not be available. The other was that cross-elas-
ticities of demand are not a sufficient basis for delineating markets.88
81. Id. at 396.
82. Id. at 399. See generally id. at 397-404.
83. Id. at 400.
84. Id. at 425 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 418-23 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Stocking & Mueller, supra note 68, are cited
throughout Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion. Cellophane, 351 U.S. at 415 n.2, 418 n.4,
421 n. 15 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
86. E.g., Joel B. Dirlam & Irwin M. Stelzer, The Cellophane Labyrinth, 1 ANTITRUST BULL.
633 (1956); Gerhard A. Gesell, Legal Problems Involved in Proving Relevant Markets, 2 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 463 (1957); George W. Stocking, Economic Tests of Monopoly and the Concept of
the Relevant Market, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 479 (1957); Turner, supra note 25.
87. Stocking, supra note 86, at 484.
88. Id. at 488. Stocking's rationale for the latter point was not entirely clear, but the point
was correct. See infra notes 491-93 and accompanying text.
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Cellophane made significant contributions to antitrust market delinea-
tion, and it continues to be followed by the lower courts.8 9 However, there
is now a consensus that the Court reached the wrong conclusion on market
delineation for the reasons first articulated by Stocking and Mueller.9° The
Court's error was to evaluate the cross-elasticity of demand at the monop-
oly price, and this mistake has come to be known as the "Cellophane fal-
lacy."9' A rational monopolist raises price until competition from other
products makes further increases unprofitable. At that point, there are
likely to be significant cross-elasticities of demand with other products, but
they are entirely irrelevant to the question of whether the firm possesses
market power. The relevant question for assessing the firm's market power
is whether the cross-elasticities of demand were so great near competitive
price levels as to prevent a significant elevation of prices above the competi-
tive level in the first instance.
II. ANTITRUST MARKET DELINEATION FROM THE CELLOPHANE CASE
TO BROWN SHOE
A. The Du Pont-General Motors Case92
In 1957, the Supreme Court considered market delineation in the con-
text of a vertical merger case. Between 1917 and 1919, du Pont acquired a
89. Since the issuance of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, all of the regional circuit courts of
appeals have cited Cellophane as a market delineation precedent. See Murrow Furniture Gal-
leries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 1989); United States
Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1361 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1071 (1990); Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988);
Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 849 F.2d 1336, 1341-42
(11th Cir. 1987); Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1342 (8th Cir. 1987); Fishman v. Estate
of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 531 (7th Cir. 1986); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d
1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987);
Doomed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1984); Ameri-
can Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854
(1984); White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir. 1983);
Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274, 280 (Ist Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983).
90. The consensus is demonstrated by 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 398-400 (1978); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW 63-64 (1985); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 360-62 (2d
ed. 1981); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 53-58 (1977).
91. See, eg., Gene C. Schaerr, Note, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department's
Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 94 YALE L.J. 670 (1985).
92. 353 U.S. 586 (1957). This case will be referred to throughout the remainder of this
Article as the du Pont-General Motors case. It should not be confused with the Supreme Court's
decision a year earlier involving the same parties. Compare United States v. E.I. du Pont de
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twenty-three percent interest in General Motors.93 Thirty years later, the
government brought suit under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,94 seeking di-
vestiture. The government contended that du Pont's ownership interest
had lessened competition in the sale of automotive finishes and fabrics to
General Motors.95 In a lengthy opinion, the district court found that the
feared effects had not materialized in thirty years, so there was no Section 7
violation.96
On appeal to the Supreme Court, appellees argued that du Pont's sales
to General Motors were too small to have been of competitive significance if
the relevant markets were delineated to include all industrial finishes and
fabrics. However, the Court held "that automotive finishes and fabrics
have sufficient peculiar characteristics ... to make them a 'line of com-
merce' within the meaning of the Clayton Act."'9 7 The Court did not dis-
cuss the meaning of this test and only briefly discussed its application,
primarily by citing the discussion of the record in the district court opin-
ion.98 In this relevant market, du Pont's share was considerable, and de-
spite a lack of direct evidence of an anticompetitive effect, the Supreme
Court reversed the district court's decision.99 Justice Burton, in a sharp
dissent, argued that there was no basis in the record for the relevant market
found by the majority.1°
The relevant market found by the Court was considered "exceedingly
narrow" by one prominent commentator,10 ' who was not alone in question-
ing the basis for limiting the market to automotive uses when du Pont's
product was also used in other industries. 10 2 Other commentators suggest
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (the du Pont-General Motors case) with United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (the Cellophane case); see also supra note 9.
93. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235, 238-40 (N.D. Il.
1954), rev'd, 353 U.S. 586 (1957). For purposes of consistency and clarity, this opinion, along
with the Supreme Court's ultimate opinion in this case, will both be referred to as the du Pont-
General Motors case.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
95. Du Pont-General Motors, 353 U.S. at 588-89.
96. Du Pont-General Motors, 126 F. Supp. at 335.
97. Du Pont-General Motors, 353 U.S. at 593-94.
98. Id. at 594 n.12, (citing du Pont-General Motors, 126 F. Supp. at 288-92, 296-300).
99. Du Pont-General Motors, 353 U.S. at 596, 607.
100. Id. at 648-52 (Burton, J., dissenting).
101. Jesse W. Markham, The Du Pont-General Motors Decision, 43 VA. L. REV. 881, 887-88
(1957).
102. See id. at 887; Henry G. Manne, The Perplexing Du Pont Case: Additional Confusion in
the Law of Mergers, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 385, 395-96 (1958); see also 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 90, at 418.
The dissenters suggested that du Pont sold a considerable portion of the relevant finishes
outside the automotive industry. Du Pont-General Motors, 353 U.S. at 650-51 & n.36 (Burton, J.,
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that the Court may have reached the correct result on the market delinea-
tion issue."13 Whichever is the case, the Court certainly did not provide a
cogent rationale for the narrow markets of automotive finishes and fabrics.
Given the broad market found in Cellophane almost exactly a year before,
more explanation was very much needed.
The Court's decision is remarkable in that it made no reference to the
extensive discussion of market delineation in Cellophane a year earlier.
This omission created confusion" 4 and led to a debate in the law reviews
and in the courts as to whether the Court had abandoned the market de-
lineation principles it articulated in Cellophane.
One side in this debate based its case on arguments advanced by Donald
Turner in discussing the Cellophane case. Turner reasoned that "the Clay-
ton Act requires less of a showing of probable harm than does the Sherman
Act," so "definition of the market in 'monopolizing' cases is not appropriate
for most merger cases." ' ' The clear implication, not explicitly stated by
Turner, was that markets in Section 7 cases should be smaller than markets
in Section 2 cases.1 0 6 Turner also argued that under Section 7:
No single definition of market would be appropriate for all cases, or
even for a single case in some instances. Assume, for example, that
there were three cellophane producers and three glassine producers
in this country, and no other close substitutes. It would seem appro-
priate to test a merger of two cellophane producers for its effect on
the cellophane market (competition among producers of cellophane)
as well as for its effect on the broader flexible-packaging-materials
market and to hold the merger illegal if there were probable ill ef-
fects on either market. Similarly, a merger between a cellophane
and a glassine producer would be tested for its effects on both mar-
kets; i.e., the merger would not be upheld solely because it involved
companies producing different commodities. 107
dissenting). A relevant market limited to automotive uses, thus, is not plausible unless du Pont
could price discriminate, charging a different price for its product in automotive uses than in other
uses. There is no indication in the opinions or commentary that such was the case.
103. E.g., Joel B. Dirlam & Irwin M. Stelzer, The Du Pont-General Motors Decision: In the
Antitrust Grain, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 24, 41 (1958); Guy B. Maseritz, The Relevant Market-A
Case Study of the DuPont-General Motors Decision, 6 ANTITRUST BULL. 487 (1961).
104. See The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HARV. L. REy. 83, 168-69 (1957).
105. Turner, supra note 25, at 315.
106. See generally supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
107. Turner, supra note 25, at 315 n.80.
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Turner's second argument was echoed by several economists, 108 and
both of his arguments were adopted by a Justice Department official in
commenting immediately after the du Pont-General Motors decision on the
possible differences in approach to market delineation between it and Cello-
phane. 10 9 Several years later, another Justice Department official went even
further, arguing in essence that du Pont-General Motors gave license for
arbitrary market delineations." 0 While not going nearly that far, several
lower courts agreed that market delineation under Section 7 was different
from that under Section 2.111 On the other hand, two courts 1 2 and several
commentators 1 3 disagreed, contending that the two cases were entirely
consistent.
Of paramount importance in evaluating the conflicting arguments about
the interpretation of the du Pont-General Motors case is that no justice in
the Cellophane majority was in the du Pont-General Motors majority. 14
Justice Reed, who wrote the Cellophane opinion, retired after du Pont-Gen-
eral Motors was argued but before it was decided. He was replaced by Jus-
tice Whittaker, who was sworn in before the case was decided but took no
part in the consideration of the case. Justice Minton, who joined in the
four-justice majority in Cellophane, retired shortly before du Pont-General
Motors was argued. Justice Brennan replaced him the next day through a
recess appointment and went on to write the d Pont-General Motors opin-
108. E.g., Irston R. Barnes, Competitive Mores and Legal Tests in Merger Cases: The Du
Pont-General Motors Decision, 46 GEo. L.J. 564, 603 n. 119, 605 (1958); Dirlam & Stelzer, supra
note 103, at 39-40; Manne, supra note 102, at 410.
109. Robert A. Bicks, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Government Lawyer's Views, 11 ABA AN-
TITRUST SEC. REPT. 20, 29-31 (1957). At the time, Bicks held the number two position in the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.
110. George D. Reycraft, Recent Developments Under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act and
Other Aspects of the Program of the Antitrust Division, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 395, 407-09 (1960).
Reycraft was the chief of one of the litigating sections in the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department. It appears that the Department of Justice argued this position in several cases. See
Handler & Robinson, supra note 26, at 644-45.
111. See Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 730 (E.D. Mo. 1959),
aff'd, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588, 592-93
n.34 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
112. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd,
374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
113. E.g., Handler & Robinson, supra note 26, at 643, 648; Thomas M. Lewyn & Stephen
Mann, Ten Years Under the New Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to
the Case Law, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1079, 1110 (1961); M.A. Adelman, Comment, The Du
Pont-General Motors Decision, 43 VA. L. REv. 873, 879 (1957).
114. This fact has been emphasized by some prior commentators. See, e.g., MASSEL, supra
note 36, at 272-73.
[Vol. 76:123
1992] THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST MARKET DELINEATION 143
ion."' Justice Brennan was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Black and Douglas, who were the three dissenters in Cellophane.
11 6
In retrospect, it seems clear that du Pont-General Motors marked a sig-
nificant shift in ideology on the Court, which was to prove decisive over the
remainder of Chief Justice Warren's tenure. It also seems likely that the
majority in du Pont-General Motors intentionally avoided the language of
Cellophane. On the other hand, it is not so clear that any important sub-
stantive difference was intended. The question is of no more than historical
interest, however, because of Brown Shoe's reformulation of the test for
market delineation. I7
B. The Bethlehem Steel Case
After the amendments to the Clayton Act in 1950,18 the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice slowly began to chal-
lenge mergers. In the first three years, the government enforcement agen-
cies challenged only one merger.1 19 Beginning in 1955, however, the pace
of merger challenges quickened, 20 and, between 1957 and 1958, FTC ad-
ministrative decisions and court decisions in government cases began
appearing.
1 21
The first government horizontal merger case brought under the
amended Section 7 to be decided by a court was United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp. 22 in 1958. The Government sought to enjoin Bethlehem, the
second-largest steel producer in the United States, from acquiring Youngs-
town Sheet and Tube Company, the sixth largest. I23 Both companies pro-
duced many different steel products.
115. See 352 U.S. iv (explaining Justice Brennan's appointment as well as Justice Whittaker's
nomination and confirmation as a Supreme Court Justice).
116. Justices Burton and Frankfurter, who joined the majority in Cellophane, dissented, and
Justices Clark and Harlan again took no part in the consideration of the case.
117. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
119. A complete list of government filings and their dispositions is provided by STAFF OF
HOUSE ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., 1ST SEss., THE CEL-
LER-KEFAUVER ACT: SIXTEEN YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT, at app. B, C (Comm. Print 1967)
(written by Willard F. Mueller).
120. In 1954, the government enforcement agencies challenged two mergers; in 1955, they
challenged eight; and in 1956, they challenged 18. Id.
121. The first published decision in a post-Celler-Kefauver merger case was in a private case
in which one firm sought to prevent a takeover by the other. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).
122. 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
123. Bethlehem Steel, 168 F. Supp. at 580, 585-86.
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The Government alleged both broad and narrow relevant markets and
used as its market delineation standard the "peculiar characteristics and
uses" test of du Pont-General Motors. Defendants alleged markets broader
than the government's narrow markets, relying on the test in Cellophane
and on substitutability in supply.124 The court basically sided with the gov-
ernment, holding that "the peculiar characteristics and uses standard is
sound and should be adopted," and rejected supply substitutability as a ba-
sis for market delineation.125 The court also held that the market delinea-
tion principles in Cellophane were irrelevant under Section 7:
The issue under § 7 is whether there is a reasonable probability of
substantial lessening of competition. There can be a substantial les-
sening of competition with respect to a product whether or not there
are reasonably interchangeable substitutes. The merger of two pro-
ducers of a product may substantially lessen competition... for that
product even though it does not substantially lessen competition...
in the broader market embracing all the products which are reason-
ably interchangeable with that product.126
The court's reasoning is obscure. The most charitable reading is that the
court adopted Donald Turner's argument.127 The least charitable reading is
that the court held that market delineation under Section 7 was entirely
arbitrary.
Ultimately, the court found eleven different relevant product markets,
including the "iron and steel industry as a whole." '128 The whole industry
was said to be a relevant market because it was "commonly recognized by
its members as well as the community at large as a separate industry."' 129
The court followed the suggestion of the government and delineated both
broad and narrow geographic markets.1 3 ° For four different products, the
court delineated five levels of concentric geographic markets: the United
States as a whole; the "northeast quadrant of the United States"; the states
of Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania as a group; the states of
Michigan and Ohio together; and the states of Michigan and Ohio individu-
124. Id. at 589-90, 593.
125. Id. at 592-93 & n.34.
126. Id. at 594 n.36.
127. See Turner, supra note 25, at 315 n.80; see also supra text accompanying note 105.
128. Bethlehem Steel, 168 F. Supp. at 595.
129. Id. at 594.
130. Id. at 596-600.
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ally."' Based on the shares in these markets, the court had no difficulty in
finding that the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition.
132
The court's analysis was subject to penetrating criticism by economist
Morris Adelman. He strongly objected to the use of markets within
markets:
It is a pathetic illusion that the market is whatever the courts choose
to call it. The market, like the weather, is simply there, whether we
only talk about it or do something: apply to it the standards of Clay-
ton, or of Sherman, or of any law, or none. This confusion between
the legal standard and the economic fact is writ large in the Bethle-
hem Steel opinion,... .[which] sinks below error into chaos. If the
northeast quadrant is a market area-is the locus of supply-demand
forces that determine the price-then the other two areas are not.
The evidence that sustains any one of the three market concepts nec-
essarily condemns the others.
1 33
He also explained how he thought courts should, in principle, determine the
single relevant market for analysis:
No matter how the boundaries may be drawn in terms of products
or areas, there is a single test: if, within this purported market,
prices were appreciably raised or volume curtailed, would supply
enter in such amounts as to restore approximately the old price and
output? If the answer is "yes," then there is no market, and the
definition must be expanded. If the answer is "no," the market is at
least not wider. If it would be "no" even on a narrower definition,
then the narrower definition must be used.
1 34
Adelman also took the court to task for refusing to consider supply sub-
stitutability in delineating markets.1
35
Economist Lucile Sheppard Keyes criticized the court for abandoning
the sensible principles of Cellophane that properly focused on monopoly
power. If Section 7 calls for a different standard than Section 2, she argued,
the difference should manifest itself in market share thresholds. She also
131. Id. at 600-03. For the other seven product markets, the single relevant geographic
market was the United States. Id. at 603.
132. Id. at 603-11.
133. Morris A. Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 236, 237 (1961) (citations omitted); M.A. Adelman, Comment, Economic Aspects of the
Bethlehem Opinion, 45 VA. L. REV. 684, 688, 691-94 (1959). This view was later adopted by 2
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 90, at 411.
134. Adelman, Economic Aspects of the Bethlehem Opinion, supra note 133, at 688. Professor
Adelman's views undoubtedly were heavily influenced by his experience working for du Pont on
the Cellophane case.
135. Id. at 690-91. This point was later made by 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 90, at
427-28.
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suggested, as Adelman had argued, that there should be but one relevant
market for all purposes.13
6
C. Other Merger Cases Between Du Pont-General Motors and
Brown Shoe1
37
Several other merger cases from the late 1950s and very early 1960s are
of note. In the late 1950s, the cases tended to follow the lead of Bethlehem
Steel and looked mainly to du Pont-General Motors for guidance on market
delineation. The one important exception was American Crystal Sugar Co.
v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 138 which was decided before Bethlehem
Steel. That case arose when one sugar producer acquired a substantial
block of stock in another, and the latter sought an injunction against efforts
by the former to gain control. 139 The injunction was granted by the district
court, and it was affirmed on appeal.' 4°
The plaintiff sold beet sugar, and the defendant sold cane sugar in the
same general area.' The defendant argued that beet and cane sugar
traded in separate markets because customers preferred cane sugar and it
had a higher price.'42 The district court largely rejected the factual predi-
cate for this argument and went on to state that beet and cane sugar could
be shown to be in separate markets only by evidence "that within a given
range of prices consumers would not shift from one to the other."' 143 This
appears to have been a rendition of the Cellophane test. Citing transporta-
tion costs as a critical factor, the court found that a ten-state area in which
the two firms "concentrate their principal sales efforts" was the relevant
geographic market.'"
The court of appeals generally affirmed the district court's opinion, in-
cluding its determination of market delineation. The court cited "evidence
136. Lucile Sheppard Keyes, The Bethlehem-Youngstown Case and the Market-Share Crite-
rion, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 643, 645-46 (1961).
137. For additional detailed discussion of the market delineation aspects of these cases, see
BETTY BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW 42-67
(1960) [hereinafter BOCK (1960)]; BETTY BOCK, MERGERS AND MARKETS: A GUIDE TO
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW ch. 5 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter BOCK (1962)]; MASSEL,
supra note 36, ch. 8; Handler & Robinson, supra note 26, at 641-51. For additional details on
other aspects of the cases, see BOCK (1962), supra, ch. 6; Lewyn & Mann, supra note 113.
138. 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
139. Id. at 389, 393-94.
140. Id. at 400; American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524,
531-32 (2d Cir. 1958).
141. American Crystal, 152 F. Supp. at 390-91.
142. Id. at 398.
143. Id. at 399.
144. Id. at 397-98.
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that in certain areas the [price] differential no longer exists." 145 The court
then went on to emphasize:
There was evidence that a change in the price of one produces an
equivalent and corresponding change in the price of the other. Sen-
sitivity to price change, not price differential, is usually regarded as a
proper element to measure cross-elasticity of demand. Although
there was some evidence that soft drink manufacturers are reluctant
to use beet sugar, almost all the testimony supported the trial court's
finding of substantially complete functional interchangeability,
under the tests laid down in the [Cellophane] case, as the defendant
conceded. 1
46
Thus, the court of appeals clearly adopted the Cellophane test and applied it
in a sensible manner. The court affirmed the geographic market determina-
tion primarily on the basis of transportation cost advantages. 47
Another decision predating Bethlehem Steel was the FTC's administra-
tive decision in In re Crown Zellerbach Corp. 148 The case arose from the
merger of two producers of various types of papers-Crown Zellerbach and
St. Helens Pulp & Paper. 4 9 With only a brief and cryptic explanation,
adopting the test of neither Cellophane nor du Pont-General Motors, the
Commission found that the relevant market was a group of coarse papers in
eleven western states.150 The Commission also found the merger unlawful
and ordered divestiture.' 5 '
The case was decided on appeal by the Ninth Circuit after the Bethle-
hem Steel decision.' 52 Petitioner urged the court to adopt a broader market
because the paper-making machines operated by St. Helens could easily be
used to produce papers not in the Commission's market. 153 The court re-
jected the use of supply substitutability to enlarge the product market, rely-
ing on Bethlehem Steel.'" The court also followed Bethlehem Steel in
distinguishing market delineation under Section 7 from market delineation
145. American Crystal, 259 F.2d at 529-30.
146. Id at 530 (citation to Cellophane omitted).
147. Id at 529.
148. 54 F.T.C. 769 (1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937
(1962). For a discussion of the market delineation issues in this case, see Stephen Mann &
Thomas M. Lewyn, Comment, The Relevant Market Under Section 7 o the Clayton Act: Two New
Cases--Two Different Views, 47 VA. L. REv. 1014 (1961).
149. Crown Zellerbach, 54 F.T.C. at 769-75, 798-99.
150. Id. at 800-02.
151. Id. at 808-09.
152. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937
(1962).
153. Id. at 812-14.
154. Id. at 812-13.
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under Section 2, citing the result in du Pont-General Motors to illustrate the
point.155 In the end, the court affirmed the Commission's product market
on two grounds. One was that it followed the grouping of products used by
the Census in compiling statistical data.1 56 The other reason was customer
oriented:
[T]he customers of St. Helens, and the customers of Crown, in or-
dering and purchasing papers designated as wrapping paper, ship-
ping sack paper, bag paper, envelope paper, etc., by that very fact,
demonstrate and create a market for those specific products so that
they collectively may properly identify the relevant market here
involved. 157
This statement, however, does not begin to explain either why these coarse
papers were grouped in a single relevant market or why other coarse papers
were excluded from it.
The court of appeals found that the geographic market was limited to
the three Pacific Coast states because mills there could supply customers
more promptly than mills outside the area and because St. Helens sold pri-
marily in that area. 58 The court of appeals also affirmed the divestiture
order. 159
In four cases decided after Bethlehem Steel, the FTC relied on du Pont-
General Motors but not Cellophane.161 In In re Erie Sand & Gravel Co.,1 6'
the Commission held that "lake sand is a sufficiently distinct product to be
considered a 'line of commerce' within the meaning of Section 7." '162 The
Commission did not cite du Pont-General Motors, but its reliance is self
evident.
In In re Reynolds Metals Co.,1 63 the Commission relied on du Pont-
General Motors in holding that decorative aluminum foil sold to the florist
155. Id. at 814-15.
156. Id. at 813.
157. Id. at 815.
158. Id. at 817-18.
159. Id. at 833. The Commission had suggested that this smaller area was a relevant market,
but ultimately adopted the larger area. In re Crown Zellerbach Corp., 54 F.T.C. 769, 802 (1957),
aff'd 296 F.2d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
160. In remanding another case to the hearing examiner before Bethlehem Steel, the Commis-
sion also adopted the du Pont-General Motors test. See Brillo Mfg. Co., 54 F.T.C. 1905, 1906
(1958).
161. 56 F.T.C. 437 (1959), vacated and remanded, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
162. Id. at 453. The court of appeals had some difficulty with this holding in light of Cello-
phane but found that lake sand and pit sand were separated by sufficient distance to be in separate
markets. Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 281-83 (3d Cir. 1961). For a discussion
of the market delineation issues in this case, see Mann & Lewyn, supra note 148.
163. 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960), aff'd, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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trade was the relevant market.' The Commission also noted that the price
of this product was lower than that of, and fluctuated independently of,
similar foil sold for other uses.165 This may be the first time that price
discrimination was explicitly relied upon as a basis for market delineation,
although commentators had twice previously made the point.'6 6
In In re A.G. Spalding & Bros., Inc.,'6 7 the Commission found that the
relevant markets were various price ranges for baseballs, basketballs, foot-
balls, and boxing gloves.1 68 The different price ranges were separate mar-
kets because the price differences reflected quality differences and related to
differences in use.169 In addition, the Commission found that "the athletic
goods industry as a whole constitutes a line of commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 7," citing and adopting the reasoning of Bethlehem Steel.17 0
In a lengthy but not very insightful discussion, the court of appeals affirmed
all of the market delineations.' 7 1 The court found both that there was "no
such interchangeability" between the different price ranges for individual
products and that "there were significant competitive interrelationships be-
tween athletic products as a group to justify the recognition of the athletic
goods industry as a line of commerce."' 17 2 The reasoning is dubious. It
suggests that baseballs selling for less than $9 per dozen were not good
substitutes for baseballs selling for $9 to $16.80 per dozen, but baseballs
were good substitutes for footballs.
Finally, in In re Union Carbide Corp.,'7 3 the Commission confronted the
argument that polyethylene film could not be a relevant market because,
under Cellophane, it was just one of the many flexible packaging materi-
als. "'7 4 The Commission held otherwise, relying primarily on du Pont-Gen-
eral Motors.175 The Commission presented a plausible argument that
polyethylene film had physical characteristics superior to those of substi-
tutes and generally was also lower in price, so it constituted a relevant mar-
164. Id at 770-71.
165. Id at 772. In an opinion rendered after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown Shoe,
the court of appeals affirmed. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The
appellate court relied on the criteria established by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe and on the
fact that foil was sold to florists at a lower price. Id. at 226-29.
166. See Barnes, supra note 108, at 610-11; Turner, supra note 25, at 311.
167. 56 F.T.C. 1125 (1960), aff'd, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962).
168. Id at 1157-60.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1160.
171. A.G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 591-606 (3d Cir. 1962).
172. Id at 601, 605.
173. 59 F.T.C. 614 (1961).
174. Id. at 653.
175. Id
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ket even though there was some competition with other flexible packaging
materials. 1 76
Four Justice Department cases decided during this period also deserve
mention. In United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 17 7 the district court 178
adopted the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test of du Pont-General Mo-
tors. 179 After reviewing relevant precedent on market delineation, the court
concluded that relevant markets "cannot be determined by any process of
logic and should be determined by the processes of observation.... In other
words, determine how the industry itself and how the users, the public,
treat the shoe product."' 180 Ultimately, the court settled on men's, wo-
men's, and children's shoes as relevant markets, holding that this was a
classification "understood and recognized by the entire industry and the
public."'' The court also found significant the fact that these three catego-
ries of shoes were manufactured in separate plants, apparently rejecting on
this basis any expansion of the markets because of supply substitutability.18 2
The court rejected defendants' argument for narrower markets based on
price and quality because the broader market met the "peculiar characteris-
tics and uses" test.' 83 This is an entirely inadequate basis, and the court
cited no reason for rejecting the narrower markets. The court found that
the relevant geographic market for shoe manufacturing was the United
States and that the relevant geographic markets for shoe retailing were cit-
ies of over ten thousand population plus the "immediate and contiguous
surrounding area."' 84 In these markets, the court found Section 7 to be
violated. 85
In United States v. Koppers Co.,' 86 the government challenged the acqui-
sition of a firm that produced disc-type flexible couplings by a firm that
produced gear-type flexible couplings, both of which were used to join to-
gether rotating shafts in machinery. 187 The defendants contended that their
couplings did not actually compete with one other and could not sensibly be
176. Id. at 654-55.
177. 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff'd, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
178. The Supreme Court's treatment of this case on appeal is discussed in detail below. See
infra notes 241-62 and accompanying text.
179. Brown Shoe, 179 F. Supp. at 729.
180. Id. at 730.
181. Id. at 732.
182. Id. at 731.
183. Id. at 732.
184. Id. at 732-35.
185. Id. at 735-41.
186. 202 F. Supp. 437 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 856 (1962).
187. Id. at 437-38.
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placed in the same market.18 The court agreed that defendants' products
did not compete with one another. Nevertheless, the court illogically held
that all flexible couplings were recognized as a distinct class of products and
had "sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses... to make them a line of
commerce within the meaning of the Clayton Act."' 18 9
In United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,l"' the district court rejected
the government's alleged market for distribution of feature films to televi-
sion.' 9 1 The court also held that the market delineation test of Cellophane
and du Pont-General Motors were "but different verbalizations of the same
criterion."' 9 2 The court went on to explain that the issue is the "degree of
competition between products which must be found to exist before they
may be considered in the same line of commerce."' 193 According to the
court, that issue should be decided by considering: "(1) degree of price
sensitivity, (2) cross-elasticity of demand, (3) extent to which substitution
occurs, (4) the manner in which the products are sold, and (5) the manner
in which purchasers choose and buy. Statistical evidence can rarely, if ever,
supply all the facts needed for a definitive judgment."'19 4 Measured against
these criteria, the government's evidence of "peculiar characteristics and
uses" was found wanting.' 9 5
Finally, in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 96 the govern-
ment brought suit to enjoin the merger of two commercial banks. 197 The
government advocated the market delineation test of du Pont-General Mo-
tors, while the defendants advocated the Cellophane test. 19' Relying on Co-
lumbia Pictures, the district court' 99 held that the two tests were "nothing
more than expressions of the same rule in different language.'' 2° ° The gov-
ernment contended that the relevant product markets were nine different
188. Id. at 438-41.
189. Id. at 440-41.
190. 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
191. The case involved a licensing arrangement that was treated as an acquisition under Sec-
tion 7. Id. at 156, 158-59, 181-83.
192. Id. at 183-84.
193. Id. at 185.
194. Id,
195. Id. at 185-92.
196. 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
197. Id. at 350, 354-55. The merger was challenged under both Section 7 of the Clayton Act
and the Sherman Act. The district court found no violation under either statute. Id. at 353, 364,
368-69.
198. Id. at 361.
199. The Supreme Court's treatment of this case on appeal is discussed in detail below. See
infra notes 296-99, 310-16 and accompanying text.
200. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. at 362.
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categories of banking services, such as "commercial and industrial loans"
and "demand deposits" (checking).201 The defendants proposed similar
markets, but they emphasized that institutions other than commercial
banks (such as insurance companies) produced substitute goods that should
be included in these various markets. 20 2 The court held that the relevant
product market was "commercial banking," stating:
It is the conglomeration of all the various services and functions that
sets the commercial bank off from other financial institutions. Each
item is an integral part of the whole, almost every one of which is
dependent upon and would not exist but for the other. The Court
can perceive no useful purpose here in going any further than
designating commercial banking a separate and distinct line of com-
merce within the meaning of the statute.20 3
The government contended that the relevant geographic market was the
four-county area around Philadelphia. The court rejected this on the basis
of defendants' evidence that these counties accounted for as little as 49%
and no more than 83.1% of their business for particular services. °4
D. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States205 and
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.z0 6
Two nonmerger Supreme Court decisions rendered in the late 1950s and
early 1960s also are relevant. International Boxing Club addressed allega-
tions of conspiracy in, and monopolization of, the promotion and broad-
casting of championship boxing contests.20 7 Relying on Cellophane,
defendants challenged the district court's determination of the relevant
market-promotion of championship boxing contests-and argued that the
market should include all boxing contests.208 The Court found that differ-
ences in revenues, television ratings, and the like were sufficient to sustain
the narrower market under the Cellophane standard,0 9 thus making it clear
that broad markets are not the inevitable result of the test. The Court also
found that the narrow market could be based on the du Pont-General Mo-
201. Id. at 361.
202. Id. at 361-63.
203. Id. at 363.
204. Id. at 363-64. The court did not find that any particular area was the relevant geo-
graphic market but indicated that it would include the greater part of the northeastern United
States. Id. at 364.
205. 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
206. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
207. 358 U.S. at 244-49.
208. Id. at 249.
209. Id. at 250-52.
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tors test,210 suggesting that the two tests were consistent and that the du
Pont-General Motors test was not a special test applicable only under Sec-
tion 7.
Tampa Electric concerned a requirements contract211 challenged under
Section 3 of the Clayton Act.2 12 The Court held that the contract would
violate the statute only if it foreclosed "competition in a substantial share of
the line of commerce affected."21 3 The Court then proceeded to consider in
general terms the scope of the relevant market, or "area of effective compe-
tition ''214 as the court termed it, by examining the "area in which the seller
operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.22 15
The Court found that this area was quite large and reversed the lower
court's determination that the contract was unlawful.21 6 The Supreme
Court shortly thereafter adopted this vague dictum as the test for determin-
ing geographic markets in merger cases,21 7 and lower courts continue to
invoke this dictum.218
E. Other Commentary on Market Delineation, 1956-62
Several additional scholarly works on market delineation during the pe-
riod are worthy of note. Irston Barnes was the first economist in a govern-
ment enforcement agency to commit to print a substantial discussion on
210. d at 252 n.8.
211. 365 U.S. at 321-25.
212. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988), prohibits certain contracts that
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. See
Tampa Electric 365 U.S. at 325-27.
213. 365 U.S. at 327.
214. Id at 328.
215. Id. at 327. The Court cited a similar dictum in an earlier Clayton Section 3 case. See
Standard Oil of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949).
216. Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 330-35.
217. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1983).
218. Since the issuance of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, eight of the twelve regional courts of
appeals have invoked this dictum. See Baxley-DeLamar Monuments, Inc. v. American Cemetery
Ass'n, 938 F.2d 846, 851 (8th Cir. 1991); Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d
1566, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. deniedsub nom. DeKalb Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Thompson, 113
S. Ct. 295 (1992); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990); Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co., 805 F.2d 490, 495 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987); Jayco Sys., Inc. v. Savin Business Machs. Corp., 777
F.2d 306, 319 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986); Wyoming Bancorporation v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, 729 F.2d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 1984); White & White, Inc.
v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 1983); Borough of Lansdale v.
Philadelphia EIec. Co., 692 F.2d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 1982).
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market delineation. 219 He argued that a "market is not adequately de-
scribed for the purpose of analyzing the effects of a merger until the princi-
pal firms on the demand and supply sides of the market have been identified
and their positions with respect to competition in the market have been
understood."22 This statement is notable in two respects. First, it incorpo-
rates supply as well as demand substitutability, as many courts had refused
to do in this era. Second, it is extraordinarily vague-far less precise than
Cellophane. Barnes went on to elaborate usefully on the pitfalls of delineat-
ing markets that are too narrow and too broad,221 but he did not indicate
how to avoid those pitfalls. Finally, Barnes posed the questions as to
whether different price ranges of a product might be relevant markets and
whether imperfect substitutes should be combined into a single market,222
but again, he offered no guidance as to how to answer them.
The economist-lawyer team of Hale and Hale, assessing the case law as
of 1958, argued: "[T]here is no disguising the fact that the legal tests ap-
plied in most of the reported decisions are basically irrational, arbitrary and
hopelessly confused. It is also clear that economic theory offers little in the
way of a scientific method upon which the law could be reconstructed. 223
In 1960, Betty Bock 224 summarized the merger decisions after the Cel-
ler-Kefauver amendment to the Clayton Act in 1950.225 Part of her sum-
mary was a categorization of the "tests" courts had applied for product
market delineation.226 Bock identified nine tests in all: (1) "Peculiar char-
acteristics and uses" used in du Pont-General Motors, Bethlehem Steel, Erie
Sand & Gravel, Reynolds Metals, and Spalding; (2) "[d]istinguishing physi-
cal characteristics" used in Crown Zellerbach, Bethlehem Steel, Reynolds
Metals, and Spalding; (3) "[d]istinct customers" used in Bethlehem Steel,
Crown Zellerbach, Erie Sand & Gravel, and Reynolds Metals; (4) "[d]istinct
prices" used in Reynolds Metals and Spalding; (5) "[s]tandardization" used
in Bethlehem Steel; (6) "[i]nterchangeability" used in du Pont-General Mo-
tors, American Crystal Sugar, Bethlehem Steel, and Brown Shoe; (7)
"[s]ensitivity to price changes" used in American Crystal Sugar; (8) "[large
and specialized investment" used in Bethlehem Steel; and (9) "[r]ecognition
219. Irston R. Barnes, Markets, Competition, and Monopolistic Tendencies in Merger Cases,
40 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 143-45, 157-58 (1956). At the time, Barnes worked for the FTC. He
had previously worked for the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. See id. at 141 n.
220. Id. at 144.
221. Id. at 144-45.
222. Id. at 157-58.
223. HALE & HALE, supra note 25, at 111.
224. BOCK (1960), supra note 137, at 42-67.
225. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
226. BOCK (1960), supra note 137, at 38-42.
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as a separate industry" used in Bethlehem Steel and Spalding.227 The first
and sixth tests were essentially those the Supreme Court established in du
Pont-General Motors and Cellophane, and the second and seventh tests are
difficult to distinguish from the first and sixth. The fifth and eighth tests
were quite cryptic and derived from a single case.22 8 The third test, distinct
customers, was largely a misnomer. Under that rubric, Bock included pri-
marily reasons that had been cited by courts for not broadening markets on
the basis of supply substitutability.2
29
The remaining two tests were important criteria not taken from
Supreme Court precedent but applied by several courts. Industry recogni-
tion had been used to justify broad, industrywide markets, consisting of the
aggregation of many smaller markets. Distinct prices had been used in two
ways. In Spalding, different price and quality categories were found to be
separate markets, and, in Reynolds Metals, price discrimination according
to end use was the basis for holding a particular end use to constitute a
relevant market.
In 1962, Mark Massel comprehensively reviewed antitrust market de-
lineation. 23 0 He found in the case law ten criteria for product market de-
lineation: physical characteristics of products, end uses of products,
attractiveness to buyers, cross-elasticity of demand, influences of sellers'
costs, relative prices of goods, stages of marketing, integration and stages of
manufacture, methods of production or origin, and actual and potential
competition. 231  The second and third criteria were closely related to the
first, 23 2 so the first four criteria were essentially those the Supreme Court
established in du Pont-General Motors and Cellophane.
The fifth criterion, differences in costs, related to the possibility that a
substitute, which otherwise would be in the relevant market, would not be if
its cost was significantly higher than those products included in the mar-
ket.2 33 The sixth criterion, relative prices of goods, related to the delinea-
tion of markets on the basis of price and quality differences among
227. Id. at 27-35. Bock also compiled such a list of tests for geographic market delineation.
Id. at 38-42. In a second edition published in 1962, Bock added a couple of cases, but made only
one significant change, the deletion of the eighth test. See BOCK (1962), supra note 137, at 58-68.
228. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
229. BOCK (1960), supra note 137, at 30-31.
230. MASSEL, supra note 36, ch. 8.
231. Id. at 241-51.
232. Id. at 242-44.
233. Id. at 245-46. As the sole example, Massel cited United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co.,
234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919). MASSEL, supra note 36, at
245-46; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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functionally similar products.2 3 4 The seventh and eighth criteria related to
the fact that relevant markets may be different depending on the point at
which competition is considered (manufacturing, wholesaling, or retail-
ing).235 Finally, "actual and potential competition" referred to supply sub-
stitutability. 236 Massel also argued, as Turner had,2 37 that it is appropriate
to consider both broad and narrow markets in merger cases.238
III. SUPREME COURT CASES ON ANTITRUST MARKET DELINEATION
BETWEEN 1962 AND 1970 AND THE 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES
A. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 239 was the first horizontal merger case
brought under the amended Section 7 to reach the Supreme Court on its
merits, and was thus destined to be important for reasons having nothing to
do with market delineation. Its impact on market delineation, however,
would be especially important because the Court had an opportunity to re-
solve the conflicting lower court interpretations of the market delineation
test set forth in du Pont-General Motors and Celephane. Moreover, the
Court's opinions in du Pont-General Motors and Cellophane each had the
support of just four Justices. 2" For this reason, Brown Shoe offered the
prospect of the first true majority decision on market delineation.
In its 1962 opinion in Brown Shoe, the Court241 held that du Pont-Gen-
eral Motors, Cellophane, and a host of lower court precedents on market
delineation were all correct. In the Court's words:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand
between the product itself and substitutes for it. However, within
this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in
themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes. [cit-
ing du Pont-General Motors] The boundaries of such a submarket
may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry
or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity,
the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production
234. MASSEL, supra note 36, at 246.
235. Id. at 247-49.
236. Id. at 250.
237. See Turner, supra note 25, at 315 n.80; see also supra text accompanying note 107.
238. MASSEL, supra note 36, at 240, 273-74.
239. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
240. See supra note 73; see also supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
241. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion, which was joined by Justices Black, Bren-
nan, Douglas, and Stewart. Justice Clark filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Harlan filed a
dissenting opinion. Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the consideration of the case.
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facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price
changes, and specialized vendors.242
This dictum gave birth to the submarket concept as an explanation for
the delineation of markets within markets and resolved the seeming incon-
sistency between du Pont-General Motors and Cellophane by holding that
the former involved such a submarket, while the latter involved "outer
boundaries" of the market. This resolution suggested that market delinea-
tion in Section 7 cases was, indeed, different than that in Section 2 cases. 243
The "practical indicia" dictum also sanctioned essentially every eviden-
tiary criterion that had been applied by the lower courts. Five of the
Court's seven indicia were virtually identical to those of Betty Bock.2 " The
two not in Bock's list were unique production facilities and specialized ven-
dors. The former was relied on by the district court in Brown Shoe,245 in
which the Court endorsed such a practice. The latter had no application to
Brown Shoe,246 and there is little indication as to how the Court came to
include it.247
Appended to the first sentence of this dictum was a footnote stating that
"cross-elasticity of production facilities may also be an important factor in
defining a product market within which a vertical merger is to be
viewed.""24 It is doubtful, however, that the Court meant to limit the rele-
vance of supply substitutability to vertical mergers. The Court considered
the vertical aspects of the merger first, so it initially considered market de-
lineation in that context. In addition, the practical indicium of unique pro-
duction facilities seems to go to the issue of supply substitutability. On the
other hand, the Court did not enlarge the relevant market on the basis of
supply substitutability.
242. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 (footnotes omitted).
243. See David D. Martin, The Brown Shoe Case and the New Antimerger Policy, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 340, 348 (1963); Upshaw, supra note 25, at 467. Several economists were prompted
by Brown Shoe to argue that markets should not be delineated differently under Section 7 and
Section 2; see also Bryce J. Jones, The Brown Shoe Case and the New Antimerger Policy: Comment,
54 Am. ECON. REv. 407, 408 (1964); H.O. Stekler, Market Definitions and the Antitrust Laws, 9
ANTITRUST BULL. 741 (1964).
244. BOCK (1960), supra note 137, at 27-35; see also supra note 227 and accompanying text.
The district court found that the retail establishments sometimes were specialized and sometimes
were not. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 729 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff'd, 370
U.S. 294 (1962). The Supreme Court repeated this finding. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336.
245. Brown Shoe, 179 F. Supp. at 731.
246. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 n.43.
247. The submarket concept and the Court's practical indicia dictum are considered in
greater detail below. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 343-78.
248. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 n.42. The court cited United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1948), which had a similar holding. See supra notes 28-30 and accompany-
ing text.
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The Court then turned to the issue at hand:
Applying these considerations to the present case, we conclude that
the record supports the District Court's finding that the relevant
lines of commerce are men's, women's, and children's shoes. These
product lines are recognized by the public; each line is manufactured
in separate plants; each has characteristics peculiar to itself render-
ing it generally noncompetitive with the others; and each is, of
course, directed toward a distinct class of customers. 249
Although one of the practical indicia was distinct prices, the Court
agreed "with the District Court that in this case a further division of prod-
uct lines based on 'price/quality' differences would be 'unrealistic.' ",250
The Court conceded that price and quality differences "may be of impor-
tance in determining the likely effect of a merger," but explained that "the
boundaries of the relevant market must be drawn with sufficient breadth to
include the competing products of each of the merging companies and to
recognize competition where, in fact, competition exists. '21l The Court's
rationale is difficult to understand. It appears that the essential problem
was that there is always competition at the margin, no matter how the lines
are drawn. The Court held that it "would be unrealistic to accept Brown's
contention that, for example, men's shoes selling below $8.99 are in a differ-
ent product market from those selling above $9.00. " 252 Thus, the Court
seems to have adopted Joan Robinson's position that market boundaries
could be drawn only at marked gaps in the chain of substitutes. 253
Defendants also argued that products within the district court's markets
were not necessarily substitutable. In particular, it was argued that chil-
dren's shoes should be further divided into sex and age groups. The Court
held: "Further division does not aid us in analyzing the effects of this
merger." '254 The Court's reason was that the market shares would be about
the same in each of the smaller markets, so the competitive analysis of the
smaller markets would be the same as that of the larger ones.2 55
As to the geographic market the Court held:
249. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 326.
250. Id.
251. Id. The record evidence has been read to suggest that there actually was very little
competition between the merging firms. See John L. Peterman, The Brown Shoe Case, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 81, 97 (1975).
252. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 326. This reasoning was rightly criticized by 2 AREEDA &
TURNER, supra note 90, at 420-21.
253. ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 17; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
254. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 327.
255. Id. at 327-28.
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The criteria to be used in determining the appropriate geographic
market are essentially similar to those used to determine the relevant
product market. Moreover, just as a product submarket may have
§ 7 significance as the proper "line of commerce," so may a geo-
graphic submarket be considered the appropriate "section of the
country." Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the
definition of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one.
The geographic market selected must, therefore, both "correspond
to the commercial realities" of the industry and be economically
significant.2
56
This was a fairly reasonable statement, but it provided precious little
guidance.
Slightly more revealing was the Court's treatment of defendants' argu-
ment that the geographic markets delineated by the district court for retail-
ing were too narrow in some instances and two broad in others.2 5 7 The
Court affirmed the district court, holding that its markets were "large
enough to include downtown shops and suburban shopping centers in areas
contiguous to the city, which are the important competitive factors, and yet
are small enough to exclude stores beyond the immediate environs of the
city, which are of little competitive significance." '2 58 Certainly, it makes
sense to exclude from a relevant market products or areas that are of "little
competitive significance." The Court could have, but did not, cite to Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States25 9 for this proposition.26"
Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment but declined to join the
Court's opinion. Writing separately, he strongly argued that the Court had
ignored substitutability in supply. "[T]aking into account the interchangea-
bility of production," he argued, "the complete wearing-apparel shoe mar-
ket... would seem a more realistic gauge of the possible anticompetitive
effects" of the merger.
261
Justice Harlan also warned against the use of relevant markets deline-
ated for the purpose of exaggerating the competitive effects of mergers:
256. Id at 336-37 (citations omitted).
257. Id at 338.
258. Id at 339.
259. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
260. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
261. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 367 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The
most extensive factual discussion of the case in the economic or legal literature makes a similar
argument for retailing, going even further to argue that the relevant market may have been all
retailing. See Peterman, supra note 251, at 96. In a concurring opinion, Justice Clark argued that
the relevant market included all shoes, but was not so clear as to the reasons. Brown Shoe, 370
U.S. at 356 (Clark, J., concurring).
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The fact that § 7 speaks of the lessening of competition "in any line
of commerce" (emphasis added) does not, of course, mean that the
product market on which the effect of the merger is considered may
be defined as narrowly or as broadly as the Government chooses to
define it.... If the government were permitted to choose its "line of
commerce" it could presumably draw the market narrowly in a case
that turns on the existence vel non of monopoly power and draw it
broadly when the question is whether both parties to a merger are
within the same competitive market.262
Brown Shoe and its submarket concept was not well received by most
commentators.263 Economists George Hall and Charles Phillips termed the
submarket concept "an intellectual monstrosity" with "little economic jus-
tification. ' ' 264 Lawyer William Upshaw argued that "the 'product sub-mar-
ket' thesis" is based on a "subtle and deep-rooted error. ' 265 Economist
Bryce Jones argued:
It is within the broad market, not the submarket, that the stuff of
price determination and competitive rivalry is found.... If the mar-
ket definition in merger cases excludes some substitute products or if
the market is defined so narrowly that it includes only those firms
which happen to be selling in a given area, we cannot reasonably
know whether the merger will damage competition; for the sub-
market approach will restrict us to an examination of only a segment
of the market and only a part of the forces which determine price
and firm behavioral patterns.266
The economist-lawyer team of Hale and Hale stated:
What is objectionable is the broadening and narrowing of product
definitions in order to achieve desired results in calculating market
shares, and in that connection it must be remarked that the notion of
a submarket is an odd one: either there is or there is not a market in
which competition may be affected. Enlarging and reducing the
market concept, like opening and closing the iris of a camera over a
concentric area, merely indicates indecision. If the line of commerce
is men's shoes, it should not also be men's golf shoes: if one bound-
ary is right, the other must be wrong.267
262. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 367-68 & n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
263. One exception was David D. Martin, The Brown Shoe Case and the New Antimerger
Policy: Reply, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 413, 414 (1964); see also Martin, supra note 243, at 356.
264. George R. Hall & Charles F. Phillips, Antimerger Criteria: Power, Concentration, Fore-
closure and Size, 9 VILL. L. REV. 211, 219-20 (1964).
265. Upshaw, supra note 25, at 461-62.
266. Jones, supra note 243, at 408.
267. G.E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale, A Line of Commerce: Market Definition in Anti-Merger
Cases, 52 IOWA L. REV. 406, 426 (1966).
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Finally, economist Irston Barnes made two very important points in
commenting on the case. First, market delineation is not really the first step
in the competitive analysis of mergers. Before markets are delineated, it is
essential to consider the nature of the competitive effects a merger might
have in order to be able to sensibly delineate markets.268 Second, the vari-
ous dimensions of markets are interrelated, so it is inappropriate to define
separately product and geographic markets entirely.269
B. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America and United States v.
Continental Can Co.
In 1964, the Supreme Court applied Brown Shoe in two merger cases.
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,270 the government chal-
lenged Aluminum Company of America's ("Alcoa") acquisition of Rome
Cable. Alcoa was a large producer of bare (uninsulated) aluminum conduc-
tor and a significant producer of insulated aluminum conductor. Rome
Cable was a minor producer of insulated aluminum conductor and a trivial
producer of bare aluminum conductor.271 For overhead electric power
transmission, utilities at the time were buying bare aluminum conductor
almost exclusively, and there was no dispute that it was a relevant market.
The major dispute was over whether all aluminum conductor also was a
relevant market.272
The district court had found that insulated copper conductor was a
good substitute for insulated aluminum conductor, so all aluminum con-
ductor was not a relevant market.2 73 The Supreme Court acknowledged
"competition between insulated aluminum conductor and its copper coun-
terpart" but held that the "degree of competitiveness does not preclude
268. Irston R. Barnes, The Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision, 51 GEo. L.
J. 706, 726-27, 729-30 (1963). For a recent expansion on this point, see Gregory J. Werden, Four
Suggestions on Market Delineation, 37 ANTrrRusT BULL. 107, 108-12 (1992), which discusses
two fairly recent cases in which courts failed to take this preliminary step and produced erroneous
market delineations: United States v. Syufy Enters., 712 F. Supp. 1386, 1396-1400 (N.D. Cal.
1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990); FTC v. Coca Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1132-33,
1140 (D.D.C. 1986), vacated without op., 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The former case was
affirmed on appeal, but the court noted the error in market delineation. Syufy Enters, 903 F.2d at
665-66 n.9.
269. Barnes, supra note 268, at 727-28.
270. 377 U.S. 271, reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964). Justice Douglas delivered the opinion
of the Court, which was joined by Justices Black, Brennan, Clark, White, and Chief Justice War-
ren. Justice Stewart filed a dissent, which was joined by Justices Harlan and Goldberg.
271. Id. at 273-74.
272. IdM at 274-75.
273. I d; United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 214 F. Supp. 501, 509-10 (N.D.N.Y. 1963),
rev'd, 377 U.S. 271, reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964).
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their division for purposes of § 7 into separate submarkets. ' 274 The Court
argued that insulated aluminum conductor is a poor substitute for insulated
copper conductor in most applications, but in electric power distribution,
aluminum was rapidly displacing copper because of its far lower price, and
"the District Court found [that] aluminum and copper conductor prices do
not respond to one another. 2 75 This, according to the Court, justified sepa-
rating insulated aluminum and insulated copper conductor.2 76 The Court
distinguished its refusal in Brown Shoe to delineate separate markets for
various price ranges of shoes on the grounds that the price difference was
larger and "to ignore price in determining the relevant line of commerce is
to ignore the single, most important, practical factor in the business. '"277
The Court then proceeded to hold that the "combination of bare and
insulated aluminum conductor products into one market or line of com-
merce seems to us proper," explaining only that "[b]oth types are used for
the purpose of conducting electricity and are sold to the same customers,
electric utilities. '278 The Court made no finding of competition between the
two products.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart criticized the Court's exclu-
sion of copper conductor from the market as contrary to the findings of fact
made by the district court,2 7 9 and he rightly criticized lumping together
bare and insulated aluminum conductor as illogical and based on a "non-
sequitur.' ' 21 In addition, Justice Stewart argued that "there is complete
manufacturing interchangeability between copper and aluminum," so "sup-
ply flexibility... exerts a profound restraint upon an aluminum cable man-
ufacturer's power to achieve any sort of market advantage." '281
In United States v. Continental Can Co.,282 the government challenged
the acquisition by Continental Can, a leading producer of metal containers,
of Hazel-Atlas Glass, a leading producer of glass containers.283 The gov-
ernment sought divestiture, alleging a substantial lessening of competition
274. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. at 275.
275. Id. at 276.
276. Id. at 275-76; see also Aluminum Co. of Am., 214 F. Supp. at 509.
277. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. at 276.
278. Id. at 275-76. For a useful discussion of the market delineation issue in this case, see
Upshaw, supra note 25, at 469-77.
279. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. at 284-86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 286.
281. Id. at 285; see also Aluminum Co. of Am., 214 F. Supp. at 509.
282. 378 U.S. 441 (1964). Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined
by Justices Black, Brennan, Clark, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren. Justice Goldberg filed a
concurring opinion and Justice Harlan filed a dissent, which was joined by Justice Stewart.
283. Id. at 443-47.
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in relevant markets for containers of beer, soft drinks, and several other
individual products.284 Although the district court found that there was
competition among metal, glass, and plastic containers in these various
uses, it held that it was not "the type of competition between products with
reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand which
has Clayton Act significance.
2 85
The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that there currently was, or had
been, significant competition between metal and glass containers for baby
food, soft drinks, beer, and other products.286 It held:
Interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand are not to be
used to obscure competition but "to recognize competition where, in
fact, competition exists." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.,
at 326. In our view there is and has been a rather general confronta-
tion between metal and glass containers and competition between
them for the same end uses which is insistent, continuous, effective
and quantitywise very substantial.... In differing degrees for differ-
ent end uses manufacturers in each industry take into consideration
the price of the containers of the opposing industry in formulating
their own pricing policy. Thus, though the interchangeability of use
may not be so complete and the cross-elasticity of demand not so
immediate as in the case of most intraindustry mergers, there is over
the long run the kind of customer response to innovation ... that
brings competition between these two industries within § 7's compe-
tition-preserving proscriptions.28
Consequently, the Court held that a relevant market for analyzing the com-
petitive effects of the merger was metal and glass containers.2 88
Of course, there were containers other than those made of metal and
glass, but the Court had no difficulty in excluding them from the relevant
market:
284. Id. at 443-44, 447; see also United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761,
778-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964). The Government had unsuccessfully tried to
enjoin the merger in the first place. Id. at 765.
285. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. at 781-82.
286. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. at 450-52. Dictum in two later cases reinforced the
Court's rationale: "[S]ubmarkets are not a basis for the disregard of a broader line of commerce
that has economic significance." United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 554
(1971); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360 (1970).
287. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. at 453-55 (footnotes omitted).
288. Id. at 457. The Court seems to have felt that the merger would escape the prohibition of
Section 7, despite its anticompetitive effects, unless metal and glass containers were combined into
a single market. See id. at 449. The statute, of course, does not necessitate that conclusion. For a
suggested competitive analysis that does not involve combining the markets, see Gregory J. Wer-
den, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Analysis of "Semihorizontal" Mergers, 27 ANTITRUST
BULL. 135 (1982).
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Nor are we concerned by the suggestion that if the product market is
to be defined in these terms it must include plastic, paper, foil and
any other materials competing for the same business. That there
may be a broader product market made up of metal, glass and other
competing containers does not necessarily negative the existence of
submarkets of cans, glass, plastic or cans and glass together, for
"within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist
which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust
purposes.
' 289
Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, correctly argued that the
Court's analysis was a "travesty of economics"2 9 that "simply reads the
'line of commerce' element out of § 7, and destroys its usefulness as an aid
to analysis."
29 1
Not surprisingly, these two cases produced sharp commentary. The
Harvard Law Review's account of the term concluded that "the Court ap-
pears to have taken a result-oriented approach to definition of the market,
gerrymandering the boundaries 'so as to maximize the prospect of invalidat-
ing the challenged acquisition.' ",292 William Upshaw argued that, in these
cases, the submarket concept was "a kind of universal solvent to be used to
dissolve all forms of corporate consolidation. '293 Current treatises simi-
larly disapprove.294
C. The Cluster Market Concept
As noted above,29 5 the district court in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank 296 dealt with the argument that various banking products
and services face competition from nonbank financial institutions by hold-
ing that interdependencies among these products and services make com-
mercial banking the relevant product market.2 97  The Supreme Court
affirmed in 1963,298 but did so in confusing language suggesting that the
289. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. at 457-58 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 325 (1962)). For a useful discussion of the issues, see Upshaw, supra note 25, at 477-84.
290. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. at 472 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 468.
292. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 274-75 (1964).
293. Upshaw, supra note 25, at 425.
294. See 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 90, at 421-24, 429; SULLIVAN, supra note 90, at
608-09.
295. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
296. 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
297. Id. at 363; see also supra text accompanying note 203.
298. United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Justice Brennan deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by Justices Black, Clark, Douglas, and Chief
Justice Warren. Justice Harlan filed a dissent, which was joined by Justice Stewart. Justice
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nonbank financial institutions were not sufficiently competitive for the indi-
vidual services. In the Court's words:
[T]he cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such
as checking accounts and trust administration) denoted by the term
"commercial banking" composes a distinct line of commerce. Some
commercial banking products or services are so distinctive that they
are entirely free of effective competition from products or services of
other financial institutions .... Others enjoy such cost advantages
as to be insulated within a broad range from substitutes furnished by
other institutions .... Finally, there are banking facilities which,
although in terms of cost and price they are freely competitive with
the facilities provided by other financial institutions, nevertheless en-
joy a settled consumer preference .... In sum, it is clear that com-
mercial banking is a market "sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful
in terms of trade realities. 299
In using the word "cluster," the Court created a new market concept in
antitrust: a market consisting of various nonsubstitutable products. The
Court's rationale for clustering, however, was obscure. The Court clarified
the concept to some extent in two later cases.
In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,3°° the Court held that the relevant
market consisted of accredited central station alarms services such as cen-
tral station burglar alarms and fire alarms.3" 1 While the individual services
were not competitive with each other, the Court held that they were in a
single relevant market because "[c]entral station companies recognize that
to compete effectively, they must offer all or nearly all types of service."302
The point of this observation seems to be that complementarities in the
production process for central station alarm services justified combining
them into a single market.
Grinnell was a Sherman Act case, but the Court relied on its holding in
Philadelphia National Bank because it saw "no reason to differentiate be-
Goldberg filed a separate memorandum. Justice White took no part in the consideration of the
case.
299. Id at 356-57.
300. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
301. Id. at 571.
302. Id. at 572. This clustering was unimportant to the disposition of the case in that the
market shares would have been roughly the same in markets for individual services. See The
Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. Rnv. 91, 241 (1966).
On the other hand, the clustering may have been a device to justify limiting the market to
central station alarm services, despite competition from other sorts of services (such as noncentral
station alarms and night watchmen). Dissenting Justices Fortas and Stewart argued that there
were good substitute services that should have been included in the market. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at
584-85, 590-94 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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tween 'line' of commerce in the context of the Clayton Act and 'part' of
commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act. ' 30 3 The Court held, as it had
pointedly not done three years earlier in Brown Shoe, that the same princi-
ples of market delineation were applicable under the two statutes. Since
this holding, market delineation precedents in Section 7 and Section 2 cases
have been used interchangeably. 3°
Additional clarification was provided by United States v. Phillipsburg
National Bank & Trust Co. 305 The district court in that case had analyzed
the effects of the merger on competition in individual banking products and
services markets.3 0 6 The Supreme Court held this to be error, despite the
availability of the submarket concept.30 7 The Court then proceeded to
explain:
Commercial banks are the only financial institutions in which a wide
variety of financial products and services-some unique to commer-
cial banking and others not-are gathered together in one place.
The clustering of financial products or services in banks facilitates
convenient access to them for all banking customers. For some cus-
tomers, full-service banking makes possible access to certain prod-
ucts or services that would otherwise be unavailable to them .... In
short, the cluster of products and services termed commercial bank-
ing has economic significance well beyond the various products and
services involved.30 8
While not entirely clear, the point of this discussion seems to be that com-
plementarities on the purchasing of banking products and services justified
combining them in a single market. 30 9
303. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 573.
304. See, e.g., Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1375 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1989); American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 943, 949 n.13 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). Also note that none of the cases cited infra note 517 invoking
the Brown Shoe practical indicia were Section 7 cases. The only post-Brown Shoe case that distin-
guished market delineation under Section 7 from that under Section 2 appears to be United States
v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220, 230 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
305. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
306. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645, 648-51 (D.N.J.
1969), rev'd, 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
307. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. at 360.
308. Id. at 360-61.
309. See Ian Ayres, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J. 109, 120-21
(1985).
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D. Geographic Market Delineation
The bank merger cases discussed in the previous section also are inter-
esting for their holdings on the geographic scope of the relevant market.
The district court in Philadelphia National Bank rejected the government's
four-county market as overly narrow.3 10 The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding:
The proper question to be asked in this case is not where the parties
to the merger do business or even where they compete, but where,
within the area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on
competition will be direct and immediate.... In banking, as in most
service industries, convenience of location is essential to effective
competition. Individuals and corporations typically confer the bulk
of their patronage on banks in their local community; they find it
impractical to conduct their banking business at a distance. The fac-
tor of inconvenience localizes banking competition as effectively as
high transportation costs in other industries.3"
Applying the dictum of Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,3 12 the
Court adopted the four-county area as the relevant geographic market.31 3
In a footnote, the Court recognized that distant banks may compete for
the business of some large customers, but held that the four-county area
was "a valid geographical market in which to assess the anticompetitive
effect of the proposed merger upon banking facilities available to the
smaller customer.1 314 The Court added that there was "artificiality in
deeming the four-county area the relevant 'section of the country' so far as
businessmen located near the perimeter are concerned. But such fuzziness
would seem inherent in any attempt to delineate the relevant geographical
market." 3
15
In the text, the Court acknowledged that competition was far more lo-
calized for some services and some customers than for others, and held in
effect that the four-county area was the proper market for "bank customers
310. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 363-64 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
311. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 357-58 (citations and footnotes omitted). To hold
that the geographic market is the area in which "the effect of the merger on competition will be
direct and immediate" suggests an abandonment of the market concept altogether. That, how-
ever, does not appear to be what the Court actually did. The factor of convenience certainly was a
proper focus of the analysis, and the result was sensible. For a useful discussion of the issue, see
Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 15, at 56-59, 62-64, 69.
312. 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); see also supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
313. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 359-61.
314. Id. at 360 n.37.
315. Id.
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that are neither very large nor very small."'3 16 This reasoning was quite
sensible and perhaps even insightful, but it does seem rather inconsistent
with the Court's holding that the relevant product market was the cluster of
commercial banking services.
In Phillipsburg National Bank, the Court followed its lead in Philadel-
phia National Bank and again applied the Tampa Electric dictum.317 The
Court again stressed the factor of convenience and reversed the district
court's market delineation.318 The one notable difference is that, in this
case, the Court concentrated on the small customer: "[T]he small borrower
frequently cannot 'practicably turn for supplies' outside his immediate com-
munity; and the small depositor-because of habit, custom, personal rela-
tionships, and, above all, convenience-is usually unwilling to do so."
319
The Court also rejected defendants' contention that the Phillipsburg-Easton
area, found to be the relevant geographic market by the court, was too
small to be "economically significant. '3
20
In United States v. Grinnell Corp., the Court affirmed the lower court's
determination that the relevant market for accredited central station alarm
services was national, even though the "activities of an individual station
are in a sense local as it serves, ordinarily, only that area which is within a
radius of 25 miles.13 21 The Court opted for the national market because of
various multistate or national activities by defendants,322 but the Court in
no way suggested that there was any competition between one city and the
next.
323
In United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,324 the Court reversed a district
court decision 325 dismissing a government merger challenge for failure to
316. Id. at 360-61.
317. United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 362 (1970).
318. Id. at 362-65.
319. Id. at 364.
320. Id. at 365.
321. 384 U.S. 563, 575 (1966).
322. Id. at 575-76.
323. The Court's rationale was persuasively challenged by Justices Fortas and Stewart, the
dissenting Justices in this case. Id. at 587-90 (Fortas, J., dissenting). It seems unlikely, however,
that the issue was material to the outcome of the case. The evidence presented in the district
court's opinion indicates that Grinnell was the only provider of central station alarm services in
most of the local markets and faced limited competition from such providers in others. United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 249-50 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
384 U.S. 563 (1966).
324. 384 U.S. 546 (1966). Justice Black delivered the opinion for the Court, which was joined
by Justices Brennan, Clark, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren. Justices Fortas, Harlan, and
White filed concurring opinions. Justice Harlan was joined by Justice Stewart.
325. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Wis. 1964), rev'd, 384 U.S.
546 (1966).
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prove the relevant geographic market in which to assess the merger of two
breweries. The Court chided the district court for requiring too much from
the government, noting that the statute "does not call for the delineation of
a 'section of the country' by metes and bounds as a surveyor would lay off a
plot of ground. '326 The Court also held that market delineation is subsidi-
ary to the purpose of the statute-the prohibition of mergers that substan-
tially lessen competition.327 Without specifically finding any relevant
markets, the Court held that the evidence of concentration was sufficient to
establish a Section 7 violation in any of several areas.328 In a concurring
opinion, Justices Harlan and Stewart argued that the Court had "emascu-
late[d] the statutory phrase 'in any section of the country.' "329 They con-
curred in the result, however, because they thought that the government
had made the necessary prima facie showing on the geographic market.330
If the Court did what Harlan and Stewart alleged,33' it certainly was an
aberration.
E. Market Delineation Under the 1968 Merger Guidelines
In 1966, Justice Stewart remarked that "in litigation under § 7, the
Government always wins.",332 He could have said the government always
wins on market delineation in merger cases, and, given the central role of
market delineation, that is largely what he must have had in mind. Against
this background, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, under
the leadership of Donald Turner, drafted the first Merger Guidelines. They
were years in the making and finally released in 1968.
As a general matter, the 1968 Guidelines stated:
A market is any grouping of sales (or other commercial transac-
tions) in which each of the firms whose sales are included enjoys
some advantage in competing with those firms whose sales are not
326. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. at 549.
327. Id at 549-50.
328. Id. at 550-52.
329. Id at 555 (Harlan, J., concurring).
330. Id at 557-58. For a useful discussion of the market delineation issue in this case, see
Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 15, at 52-56, 61-62, 64-67, 69-72.
331. Many commentators have argued that the Court did just that. See 2 AREEDA & TUR-
NER, supra note 90, at 414-15; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PER-
SPECTIVE 130 (1976); SULLIVAN, supra note 90, at 611; Robert W. Cook, Comment, "'Relevant
Market" Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts as Affected by Recent Decisions of the Supreme
Court, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 1094; Russell J. Guglielmino, Note, Section of the Country as a Subsidi-
ary Issue in Litigation Brought Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 600 (1967);
Note, United States v. Von's Grocery Co. and United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.-Competition
and the Geographic Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 58 (1967).
332. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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included. The advantage need not be great, for so long as it is signif-
icant it defines an area of effective competition among the included
sellers in which the competition of the excluded sellers is, ex hy-
pothesi, less effective. The process of market definition may result in
identification of several appropriate markets in which to test the
probable competitive effects of a particular merger.333
Elaborating on the "product dimension" of the market, the 1968 Guidelines
stated:
The sales of any product or service which is distinguishable as a
matter of commercial practice from other products or services will
ordinarily constitute a relevant product market, even though, from
the standpoint of most purchasers, other products may be reason-
ably, but not perfectly, interchangeable with it in terms of price,
quality, and use. On the other hand, the sales of two distinct prod-
ucts to a particular group of purchasers can also appropriately be
grouped into a single market where the two products are reasonably
interchangeable for that group in terms of price, quality, and use. In
this latter case, however, it may be necessary also to include in that
market the sales of one or more other products which are equally
interchangeable with the two products in terms of price, quality, and
use from the standpoint of that group of purchasers for whom the
two products are interchangeable.334
Elaborating on the "geographic dimension" of the market, the 1968 Guide-
lines stated:
The total sales of a product or service in any commercially signifi-
cant section of the country (even as small as a single community), or
aggregate of such sections, will ordinarily constitute a geographic
market if firms engaged in selling the product make significant sales
of the product to purchasers in the section or sections. The market
need not be enlarged beyond any section meeting the foregoing test
unless it clearly appears that there is no economic barrier (e.g., sig-
nificant transportation costs, lack of distribution facilities, customer
inconvenience, or established consumer preference for existing prod-
ucts) that hinders the sale from outside the section to purchasers
within the section; nor need the market be contracted to exclude
some portion of the product sales made inside any section meeting
the foregoing test unless it clearly appears that the portion of sales in
question is made to a group of purchasers separated by a substantial
economic barrier from the purchasers to whom the rest of the sales
are made.335
333. 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.
334. Id. § 3(i).
335. Id. § 3(ii).
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The 1968 Merger Guidelines were a responsible effort to enunciate prin-
ciples for market delineation in light of the recent Supreme Court precedent
at the time. They insisted that the products and areas included in a market
have some tangible competitive advantage over those excluded from it.
They also resisted the temptation to use the submarket concept for the
arbitrary grouping of products. Instead, they placed imperfect substitutes
in the same relevant market only if equally good substitutes were included.
Perhaps most notably, the 1968 Merger Guidelines did not mention the
practical indicia.
On the other hand, requiring only some advantage for the included
products or areas over those excluded is dubious, and for that the 1968
Guidelines were criticized. The first such criticism came from the Task
Force on Productivity and Competition, a small group of economists and
lawyers chaired by George Stigler, which submitted a report to President
Nixon in 1969.336 The Task Force termed market delineation under the
1968 Guidelines "so loose and unprofessional as to be positively embarrass-
ing.",337 The Stigler Task Force cited an example of a local area that had a
delivered price advantage over another of only one-half of one percent, and
argued that the area with the small advantage is not a "meaningful local
market," even though there is a barrier to competition from outside it.
338
The Stigler Task Force concluded by stating that it would "be a decided
improvement if the Guidelines were revised (at a minimum) to explain that
a distant seller of a product must be included in the local market if a modest
price increase in the local area-a price increase unrelated to his costs-
would bring him in forthwith.
339
Richard Posner, a member of the Stigler Task Force, repeated its major
point, applied it to the delineation of the product dimensions of markets,
and proposed a more specific addendum to solve the problem. 34 Posner
suggested that distant sellers should be excluded from a market only if they
are forbidden by law from selling there or if they are at a delivered price
disadvantage exceeding some specific threshold. For the threshold, Posner
suggested "5 or more percent, depending on the absolute size of the market
336. Report of the Task Force on Productivity and Competition, reprinted in 1 J. REPRINTS
FOR ANTITRusT L. & ECON. 827 (1969). The report carries a date of Feb. 18, 1969, implying that
it was commissioned before President Nixon took office. Other members of the Task Force were
Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Ronald Coase, Roger Cramton, Kenneth W. Dam, Raymon H. Mulford,
Richard A. Posner, Peter 0. Steiner, and Alexander L. Stott.
337. Id. at 846-47.
338. Id. at 847-48.
339. Id at 848.
340. POSNER, supra note 331, at 131, 132-33; Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust
Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1598-1600 (1969).
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in question."' 341 Posner also criticized the 1968 Guidelines for failing to
take into account supply substitutability.342
IV. MARKET DELINEATION IN THE LOWER COURTS AND THE
SCHOLARLY LITERATURE, 1962-82
A. Application of Brown Shoe by the Lower Courts, 1962-82
In the two decades following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States,343 the submarket concept and the practical indi-
cia dominated thinking on market delineation in the lower courts. A com-
prehensive treatment of those cases is beyond the scope of this Article,3 "
but a cursory review suffices to demonstrate the application of the sub-
market concept and the practical indicia.
To a considerable extent, the submarket concept was a tool used by
plaintiffs, particularly government enforcement agencies, to narrow the
market and facilitate a finding that a merger was unlawful. A case that
illustrates this concept is United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co.,34 5 a merger
case in which the government alleged that the relevant submarket was fro-
zen dessert pies. The parties and the court agreed that there were many
good substitutes. The government argued, however, that there was a rele-
vant submarket consisting of just frozen dessert pies within the broader
market including the substitutes as well. The court agreed.346
On occasion, Brown Shoe also proved useful to the government when it
needed to broaden the relevant market. Illustrative is United States v.
Times Mirror Co. ,347 a merger case involving the merger of a major daily
newspaper in Los Angeles with a small local daily in the same general area.
Defendants argued that the merging newspapers were totally different and
simply not in competition. They contended that, under the cross-elasticity-
of-demand test used in Brown Shoe to delineate the outer boundaries of the
market, the two papers were in separate markets.348 Incredibly, the court
341. POSNER, supra note 331, at 133; Posner, supra note 340, at 1600.
342. POSNER, supra note 331, at 132.
343. 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see also supra notes 239-69 and accompanying text.
344. The most comprehensive treatments are 4 EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW 367-403 (1984); 3 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULA-
TION § 18.02[2] (1991).
345. 440 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
346. Id. at 228; see also United States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 74,873 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (artificial Christmas trees not a market, but a submarket); Elco
Corp. v. Microdot Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 747 (D. Del. 1973) (metal plate connectors may not be a
market, but they are a submarket).
347. 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 712 (1968).
348. Id. at 615.
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rejected this argument as inconsistent with Brown Shoe's submarket dictum
and the practical indicia.349
The mechanical way in which the practical indicia typically were ap-
plied is graphically demonstrated by one court's own words: "It is clear
that these seven criteria are litmus paper tests that must be held up against
the proposed submarket in order to determine whether a relevant sub-
market exists. If a sufficient number of those indicia are present, a valid
submarket has been established. '350
The application of the individual practical indicia also is of interest.3 5 1
The first of the practical indicia was industry or public recognition. Pre-
Brown Shoe cases had used this factor as a justification for considering a
broad, industry-wide market, generally in addition to narrower markets,
despite a lack of competition among the products in the broader group-
ing.352 Brown Shoe, of course, turned things around by adopting industry
or public recognition as a criterion for delineating submarkets. Thus, after
Brown Shoe, industry or public recognition tended to be invoked to justify a
narrow market. 3  One exception appears to be the Times Mirror case, in
which the recognition of a daily newspaper industry was critical in produc-
ing a relevant market broad enough to encompass both merging firms.351
The principal types of evidence held relevant under the rubric of indus-
try or public recognition were: the use of a product grouping for statistical
purposes by the government or the industry;355 the existence of a trade asso-
349. Id at 615-17.
350. Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd without
opinion, 624 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1979).
351. Recall that, in Brown Shoe, the Court set forth practical indicia for delineating the
boundaries of a submarket: (1) industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate
economic entity, (2) the products peculiar characteristics and uses, (3) unique production facili-
ties, (4) distinct customers, (5) distinct prices, (6) sensitivity to price changes, and (7) specialized
vendors. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); see also text accompany-
ing note 242.
352. See supra notes 128-29, 170, 189 and accompanying text.
353. See cases cited infra notes 355-59.
354. See United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 617 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'dper
curiam, 390 U.S. 712 (1968).
355. See, eg., Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 308-09 (7th Cir. 1976) (Census
compiled data for paint brushes and rollers together); United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440
F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (statistics on frozen dessert pies compiled for industry use); United
States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 87 (D. Colo. 1975) (Census compiled data for ready-mix
concrete); United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 985-86 (D. Ariz. 1968)(Census compiled data for newspapers), aff'd, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); United States v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. 439, 453 n.17 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (Census compiled data for fine and
coarse paper products); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 99 (S.D.N.Y.
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ciation limited to sellers of a particular grouping of products;3 6 and refer-
ences to a particular product grouping in the merging firm's documents,
industry publications, or industry participants' testimony or everyday
speech. 357 Some courts, however, seemingly invoked industry or public rec-
ognition merely as an incantation, citing no evidence at all, and one in-
voked industry or public recognition with regard to evidence that would
seem to have nothing to do with anyone's recognition of anything.359
All of the foregoing types of evidence on industry or public recognition
have little, if anything, to do with the potential for market power. How-
ever, evidence that is relevant to the potential for market power occasion-
ally was considered under the rubric of industry or public recognition. The
1964) (industry trade association compiled data for paper insulated power cable), aff'd per
curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965).
Throughout this period it was well known that Census industries leave much to be desired as
antitrust markets, because Census classification serves a very different purpose than antitrust mar-
ket delineation and applies very different principles. See JoE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA-
TION 110-19 (1959); Maxwell R. Conklin & Harold T. Goldstein, Census Principles of Industry
and Product Classification, Manufacturing Industries, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE
POLICY 15 (National Bureau of Economic Research 1955). More recently, it has become known
that the divergence between Census industries and antitrust markets is quite substantial. See Rus-
sell W. Pittman & Gregory J. Werden, The Divergence of SIC Industries from Antitrust Markets:
Indications from Justice Department Merger Cases, 33 ECON. LETrERs 283 (1990); Gregory J.
Werden, The Divergence of SIC Industries from Antitrust Markets: Some Evidence from Price
Fixing Cases, 28 ECON. LETTERS 193 (1988).
356. See, e.g., M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 87 (ready-mix concrete has its own trade associa-
tions); Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. at 985-86 (newspapers have their own trade associa-
tions); Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. at 617 (daily newspaper business has its own trade
association); cf. United States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
74,873, at 95,873 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (artificial Christmas tree firms not in trade association for
natural trees).
357. See, e.g., RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1979) (industry distinguishes
between primary and secondary lead), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Blue
Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 544 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (documents, advertising materials, and re-
marks of industry persons treat the sale of industrial rental garments as distinct); Bowl Am. Inc.
v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080, 1089 (D. Md. 1969) (industry publications and annual
reports consider modem bowling establishments to be different from older ones); Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 264 F. Supp. at 453 (industry catalogs and industry witnesses treat coarse paper as
distinct).
358. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 714 (7th Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1094 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 738 (D. Md. 1976); United
States v. Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258, 260-61, 265 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 535
F.2d 1243 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 972-73 (W.D. Pa.
1965).
359. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("[B]oth producer
and consumer recognition of the florist foil submarket as a definite economic entity is clearly
demonstrated by what appears to have been the election of other decorative foil converters not to
serve the florist industry.").
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best example is General Foods Corp. v. FTC,36 a merger case involving
household steel wool. As evidence that this product was recognized "as a
separate economic entity," the court cited "testimony of several household
steel wool producers stating that they only looked to other steel wool pro-
ducers in setting prices and in reaching marketing decisions." '361 While not
dispositive, evidence of perceptions about competition certainly is highly
probative.
The third of the practical indicia, unique production facilities, was ap-
plied by the courts in a fairly straightforward, literal manner. In justifying
a particular market delineation, many courts have cited the fact that pro-
duction of the putative relevant product requires facilities distinct from
those used to produce substitutes. 62 Such evidence certainly is relevant to,
though far from dispositive of, the issue of supply substitutability. How-
ever, by invoking this factor as one of many practical indicia, the courts
apparently were oblivious to the fact that unique production facilities are
immaterial if there are substitute goods in demand. Worse still, one court
cited under the rubric of unique production facilities, the fact that machin-
ery used to produce ready-mix concrete had no other uses, rather than the
fact that other machinery cannot be used to produce ready-mix concrete.3 6
The fact actually cited by the court has nothing to do with whether supply
substitutability would prevent producers of ready-mix concrete from exer-
cising market power.
The fourth of the practical indicia, distinct customers, was used by the
courts basically to identify whether the product filled a special demand.3"
360. 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
361. Id. at 941; see also United States v. Acorn Eng'g Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) t64,197,
at 73,712 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (merging firms view each other, and only each other, as competitors);
Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. at 544 (discussing firms' perceptions of their competitors).
362. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d. 303, 308 (7th Cir. 1976) (production of
aerosol and spray painting equipment is very different from the production of brushes and rollers);
Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928, 932 (6th Cir.) (sintered metal breaks involve technology en-
tirely different from that for organic friction breaks), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970); General
Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir. 1967) (steel wool production is unlike that of any
household substitutes and requires machinery that must be custom made), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
919 (1968); United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220, 222-23 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(making frozen dessert pies requires freezing equipment); United States v. Kennecott Copper
Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (specialized machines and technical know-how are
needed to make paper insulated cable), aff'd per curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965).
363. United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 87 (D. Colo. 1975).
364. See, eg., Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 228-29 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (florists
are distinct consumers of florist foil); Acorn Eng'g Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 73,712 (pris-
ons are distinct customers for vandal resistant plumbing fixtures); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151, 1156-57 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd without opinion, 624 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1979)
(surface miners and very heavy earth moving contractors are distinct customers for large mining
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
This has some relevance to the issue of market power, but not necessarily a
great deal. If all of a particular product is consumed by customers that
have a strong preference for that particular product given the available sub-
stitutes and their prices, then there is ample reason for considering that
product to be in a separate market. The same, however, could not be said if
just some customers had the strong preference unless those customers could
be discriminated against. Failing to appreciate this distinction, one court
held:
Where an identifiable class of purchasers of a product has particular
requirements for the product involved which differentiate that class
from others purchasers of the product, it follows that an acquisition
involving suppliers of that product will have a unique impact on that
class of purchasers. Accordingly, their requirements for the product
may delineate a market under Section 7.365
This is simply mistaken. Unless sellers can discriminate against the cus-
tomers with the particular requirements, the existence of other customers,
who can substitute, likely will protect from exploitation those who cannot.
It seems that courts routinely assumed that price discrimination was possi-
ble without examining the facts.
The fifth of the practical indicia, distinct prices, was used very mechani-
cally by the lower courts. Many courts used the fact that the putative rele-
vant product sold for a higher price than substitutes as a basis for holding it
to be in a distinct market.366 Other courts cited the fact that the putative
relevant product sold for a lower price than substitutes as a basis for hold-
ing it to be in a distinct market.367 Both sorts of cases are troubling. The
excavator loaders); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 728, 739 (D. Md.
1976) ("weekend warriors" are distinct customers for gasoline powered chain saws for occasional
use); Kennecott Copper, 231 F. Supp. at 99 (electric utilities are distinct customers for paper insu-
lated power cable).
365. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. at 542-43.
366. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (distinguishing drive-through photo processing from other photo
processing on the basis of its higher price); Abex Corp., 420 F.2d at 930, 932 (distinguishing
sintered metal breaks from others on the basis of their much higher cost); United States v. Ameri-
can Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 74,873, at 95,873 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (distin-
guishing artificial Christmas trees from natural ones on the basis of their far higher price); United
States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 972-73 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (distinguishing Pennsylvania
grade crude oil from other crude oil partially on the basis of its higher price); United States v.
Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (distinguishing low-sudsing detergents
from high-sudsing detergents partly on the basis of the former's higher price).
367. See, e.g., RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing secon-
dary lead from primary lead partially on the basis of its 10% lower price), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
927 (1980); Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70, 72, 77 (7th Cir. 1975) (distinguishing used automo-
tive electrical units from new ones on the basis of their lower price), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833
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fact that consumers select one product over another demonstrates a prefer-
ence for the selected product at prevailing prices. That the preferred prod-
uct has a higher or lower price than substitutes does not, in general, indicate
anything about the intensity of the preference. Consumers may view the
two products to be good substitutes precisely because of a particular price
difference. Consider for example, milk selling for 50o a quart and $1 a half
gallon. This specific difference in price is likely to cause many consumers to
substitute freely between quarts and half gallons. Moreover, the prices that
prevail in the market may be the result of substitution possibilities by con-
sumers. If the price of half gallons is more than twice that of quarts, con-
sumers can be expected to buy quarts instead.
However, the fact that the putative relevant product sells for a lower
price than substitutes can be decisive under limited circumstances. Suppose
that consumers of the putative relevant product would freely switch to a
substitute if, and only if, its price were lower than that of the putative rele-
vant product. Further suppose that the substitute actually sells at a price
twice that of the putative relevant product and is purchased only by con-
sumers unable for some reason to use the putative relevant product. In this
case, the price difference is precisely what makes the putative relevant prod-
uct an actual relevant market. A monopolist over this product would be
able to raise the price up to a hundred percent without any loss of sales to
the substitute. This is the sort of scenario invoked by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica,368 but it does not appear to have
been the relevant scenario in any of the lower court cases.
A higher price for the putative relevant product can also be decisive if
what it signifies is that supposed substitutes would not be acceptable at any
price. Two products that perform basically the same function may be so
different that the users of one would never use the other. For example,
brakes designed to stop cars and brakes designed to stop heavy equipment
or large airplanes are very similar in function, but they are not freely substi-
tutable. This is the scenario some of the courts surely had in mind, and in
rare cases, it was even the relevant scenario.
369
(1975); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir. 1967) (distinguishing household
steel wool from substitutes partially on the basis of its lower price, but refusing to compare on the
basis of price per use), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 1088, 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (distinguishing glassware for everyday use from fine glassware
on the basis of its lower price); Black & Decker, 430 F. Supp. at 738 (distinguishing chain saws
designed for occasional use from professional models partially on the basis of their lower price).
368. 377 U.S. 271, reh'g denied, 377 U.S. 1010 (1964). This case is commonly known as the
"Rome Cable" decision; see also supra notes 270-77 and accompanying text.
369. Eg., Abex Corp., 420 F.2d at 930, 932.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The existence of more than one price for a single product may be impor-
tant because it may signify price discrimination. This was likely the case for
the florists foil in the Reynolds Metals case, 37 ° but there is no indication that
it was in any of the other cases decided between 1962 and 1982.
It is also interesting to note that the presence of distinct prices generally
did not move the courts to delineate separate markets on the basis of price
and quality differences. The Supreme Court refused to do this in Brown
Shoe, and many lower courts followed suit, providing little explanation.3
71
This is rather curious in light of the courts' tendency to delineate narrow
submarkets based on the practical indicia.
The last, and decidedly least, of the practical indicia, specialized ven-
dors, also was cited by the courts with some frequency, 372 but the point of
the exercise was never apparent. The idea may have been that products
sold next to each other in the same stores are more likely to be good substi-
tutes than products sold in different stores.
The foregoing has skipped over two of the practical indicia-peculiar
characteristics and uses and sensitivity to price changes. These are basically
the tests of du Pont-General Motors3 73 and Cellophane,374 and as such they
were considered above.3 75 It should be noted, however, that when lower
courts did not just mechanically apply the practical indicia, they tended to
rely on one of these factors. The rubric of peculiar characteristics and uses
was invoked to highlight special aspects of a product that separated it in the
370. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
371. See, ag., Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 840-41 (2d Cir.
1980) (refusing to consider brand-name and private-label waffles to be in separate markets); Lig-
gett & Myers, Inc. v. FTC, 567 F.2d 1273, 1275-76 (7th Cir. 1977) (refusing to consider premium
and economy dog food to be in separate markets); Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303,
309-10 (7th Cir. 1976) (refusing to consider brushes and rollers for professional use and those for
do-it-yourself use to be in separate markets); United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F.
Supp. 129, 145-46 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966) (refusing to consider pre-
mium and nonpremium beer to be in separate markets).
372. See, e.g., United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220, 229 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(frozen dessert pies are distributed through frozen food brokers and fresh dessert pies are not);
United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 728, 740 (D. Md. 1976) (occasional user
chain saws are distributed through hardware stores and mass merchandisers, and professional
chain saws are not); United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 546 (M.D. Tenn. 1975)
(industrial rental garments are distributed through specialized warehouses); United States v.
Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y.) (dental equipment and sundries are distrib-
uted through specialized dealers), aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1243 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. American Technical Indus., Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 74,873, at 95,873 (M.D.
Pa. 1974) (artificial Christmas trees sold through department stores, discount stores, etc., and
natural Christmas trees sold through nurseries, garden stores, etc.).
373. 353 U.S. 586 (1957); see supra text accompanying note 97.
374. 351 U.S. 377 (1956); see supra text accompanying note 78.
375. See supra notes 62-117 and accompanying text.
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minds of consumers from would be substitutes.37 6 The rubric of sensitivity
to price changes was invoked to make the essential point that consumers
would not readily substitute away from the putative relevant product.3 7 7
Sensitivity to price changes appears also to have been invoked by courts
focusing on a lack of correlation between the price of the putative relevant
product and that of a would-be substitute.378
B. Supreme Court Merger Cases of the Early 1970s
Only one of the Supreme Court cases discussed above was decided after
1968. 371 Three additional relevant cases were decided in 1974, at which
time the composition of the Court had changed considerably. Chief Justice
Warren had been replaced by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Black,
Clark, Fortas, and Harlan had been replaced by Justices Blackmun, Mar-
shall, Powell, and Rehnquist. The net effect was a significant shift to the
right both in the Court's general jurisprudential approach and on antitrust
matters. The government no longer always won. Indeed, in 1974, the gov-
ernment lost three out of three, all with five-Justice majorities consisting of
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and
Stewart.
376. See, eg., Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 1972) ("There is
no practical substitute for portland cement."); Abex Corp. v. FTC, 420 F.2d 928, 930-31 (6th
Cir.) (sinerated metal breaks are uniquely capable of dealing with heavy loads and high tempera-
tures), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970); FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,974, at 76,043 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,263 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("There are
no realistic substitutes for corrugating medium."); United States v. Acorn Eng'g Co., 1981-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,197, at 73,712 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (only vandal resistant plumbing fixtures
are adequate for certain uses); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 87 (D. Colo. 1975)
(ready-mix concrete is exclusively used for various purposes); American Technical, 1974-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) at 95,875 (artificial Christmas trees are fire resistant and have a useful life of four
years or more); United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 890-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (low
sudsing detergents perform better in home use).
377. One clearly relevant example is SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056,
1063-64 (3d Cir.) (absence of significant cross-elasticity of demand considered under rubric of
sensitivity to price changes), cert denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978). Other less clear examples are:
Acorn Engg Co., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 73,712 (prices of merging firms sensitive to each
other but not other firms); United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220, 229 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (prices of frozen dessert pies are not sensitive to the prices of other dessert products).
378. See, eg., RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1979) (secondary lead prices
vary with trucking costs, and presumably primary lead prices do not), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980); Avnet, Inc. v. FTC, 511 F.2d 70, 77 (7th Cir.) (noting the "absence of any substantial
price interaction in price between" reconditioned and new parts), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833
(1975); American Technical, 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 95,873 ("no close alignment between
price fluctuations" of artificial Christmas trees and price fluctuations of natural Christmas trees).
379. United States v. Phillipsburg Natl Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.380 and United States v.
Connecticut National Bank 381 were similar cases decided on the same day.
In both cases, the merging firms did not operate at the same locations.
Therefore, an expansive geographic market was necessary to bring the
merging firms into direct competition. The government argued that a rele-
vant market in which to evaluate the merger was the state in which the
merging firms in each case were located.382 In both cases, the Supreme
Court rejected this argument. Instead, the Court held that banking was
local and so too were the relevant markets for it.383
The two cases also eliminated any uncertainty that the Court's decision
in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.3 84 may have created as to the role of
market delineation. In Marine Bancorporation, the Court exploded the no-
tion that geographic market delineation was no longer necessary by holding
that: "Determination of the relevant product and geographic markets is 'a
necessary predicate' to deciding whether a merger contravenes the Clayton
Act. ' 385 In Connecticut National Bank, the Court clarified its earlier state-
ment that the government is not required to delineate the geographic
market by metes and bounds: "To the extent that this means that such
markets need not-indeed cannot-be defined with scientific precision, it is
accurate. But it is nevertheless the Government's role to come forward
with evidence delineating the rough approximation of the market
boundaries." '386
In Marine Bancorporation, the Court also rejected the government's
contention that Section 7's reference to a "section of the country" could
mean anything other than a "relevant geographic market." '387 And in Con-
necticut National Bank, the Court also reinforced its earlier pronounce-
ments that the relevant product market was the cluster of commercial
380. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
381. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
382. In Connecticut National Bank, the district court had held that the state of Connecticut
was a relevant market. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240, 281-83 (D.
Conn. 1973), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 1127, and vacated, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); see also Connecticut
Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 666. In Marine Bancorporation, the district court had found that the
relevant market was local. The Government disagreed and argued before the Supreme Court that
the state was also a relevant "section of the country" even though it was not a market. United
States v. Marine Bancorporation, 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CC-) 74,496, at 94,244 (W.D. Wash.
1973), aff'd, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); see also Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 619-20.
383. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 667-69; Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 618-19.
384. 384 U.S. 546 (1966); see also supra notes 324-31 and accompanying text.
385. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 618.
386. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 669.
387. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 620-22.
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banking services. It held to be erroneous the district court's determination
that savings banks were in the relevant market.
38 8
The third Supreme Court merger decision in 1974 was in United States
v. General Dynamics Corp.,389 in which the district court had held the rele-
vant market for analyzing the merger of two coal producers included gas,
oil, uranium, and other fuels as well as coal.390 The Supreme Court af-
firmed the district court's finding that the merger did not violate Section 7
on other grounds391 without considering market delineation. 392 In a dis-
senting opinion, Justice Douglas did consider market delineation, arguing
that the relevant market should be limited to coal because of its significant
price advantage as an electric utility fuel.39 3
C. Other Lower Court Cases on Market Delineation, 1962-82
A fitting summary of the lower court decisions on market delineation
between 1962 and 1982 was provided by one district court: "Reported
cases have largely been limited to governmental concerns for protection of
competition where courts have narrowed and broadened the product mar-
ket without real criteria or consistency. '394 The courts' treatment of sev-
eral specific matters, nevertheless, is worth mentioning. 395
One notable event occurred in Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., in which the gov-
ernment attempted to demonstrate that frozen dessert pies were a relevant
market by introducing elasticity of demand estimates. The court rejected
this evidence because it had "no basis for evaluating what a particular elas-
ticity coefficient means., 396 So much for the cross-elasticity-of-demand test
from Cellophane.
388. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. at 660-66.
389. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
390. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 545-50, 555-56 (N.D. Ill.
1972), aff'd, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
391. The Court held that the proper measure of market share was uncommitted coal reserves
rather than coal production, and one of the merging firms had very little uncommitted coal
reserves. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 506-10.
392. Id. at 510-11.
393. d at 513-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
394. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606, 617 (C.D. Cal. 1972),
remanded, 532 F.2d 674, 691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
395. Useful discussions of the cases are provided by KINTNER, supra note 344, chs. 37-38;
Joseph E. Fortenberry, Definition of Markets in Merger Cases: Developments Since the 1968 De-
partment of Justice Merger Guidelines, 25 How. L.J. 595 (1982); Gertrude S. Rosenthal, Conti-
nental Can Revisited: Limits upon the Breadth of a Line of Commerce in a Section 7 Case, 14
Hous. L. REv. 973 (1977).
396. United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 220, 227-28 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The widespread use of cluster markets in industries other than banking
also merits note.397 The rationale for clustering was not necessarily appar-
ent. One case rejected a cluster proposed by the government as underinclu-
sive because it failed to include all of the nonsubstitutable tools a user likely
would need. 98 In another case, the court rejected a defendant's argument
that the market should be limited to shampoos and conditioners rather than
include the entire cluster of beauty products on the grounds that manufac-
tures and distributors "tend to deal in the entire range of beauty
products.,
39 9
With respect to the delineation of the product dimensions of markets,
the most notable aspect of the lower court cases was their inconsistent treat-
ment of supply substitutability. Several circuits, most notably the Ninth
Circuit, held that supply substitutability had to be considered in market
delineation.' The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to do so." One
doubtful case from each group is instructive.
In Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,4 2 a private vertical
merger case, plaintiff argued for a market limited to Volkswagen air condi-
tioners and defendant argued for a market consisting of all automotive air
conditioners on the grounds that plaintiffs' facilities could be shifted from
the production of Volkswagen air conditioners to the production of other
automotive air conditioners. 4°3 The district court sided with plaintiff but
397. See, e.g., JBL Enters., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 357, 366-69 (N.D.
Cal. 1981), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.) (relevant market is beauty products sold to professional
outlets), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088,
1093-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (relevant market is "cluster of machine-pressed and machine-blown
moderately-priced soda-lime glassware"); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637,
639-41 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (relevant market is "cluster of specialized surface rotary drilling tools");
United States v. Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258, 260-61 (S.D.N.Y.) (relevant markets are dental
equipment and dental sundries), aff'd without opinion, 535 F.2d 1243 (2d Cir. 1975); Science
Prods. Co. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 384 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (relevant market is products
that "affect plant or insect life in and around the home").
398. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. at 640.
399. JBL Enters., Inc., 509 F. Supp. at 368-69.
400. See Equifax, Inc. v. FTC, 618 F.2d 63, 66 (9th Cir. 1980); Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beck-
man Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 280-81 & n.79 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939
(1979); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 303 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1122 (1977); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 691 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d
1264, 1271-73 (9th Cir. 1975), appeal after remand, 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1009 (1982).
401. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1330-32 (7th Cir. 1981);
L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1971).
402. 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972), remanded, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 940 (1976).
403. Id. at 617-18.
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the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.' The court of ap-
peals' conclusion may have been correct,"5 but its reasoning was not.
Whether current producers of Volkswagen air conditioners could exercise
market power might depend a great deal on whether current producers of
air conditioners for other cars could substitute in supply to Volkswagen air
conditioners, but it could not depend at all on whether the current produ-
cers of Volkswagen air conditioners could substitute in supply to air condi-
tioners for other cars.
In L. G. Balfour Co. v. FTC," a nonmerger case, petitioners argued that
the relevant market should not be limited to national college fraternity in-
signia-bearing goods because makers of other emblematic jewelry could
produce fraternity products. The Seventh Circuit rejected this plausible ar-
gument, holding that substitution in supply was not a relevant factor in
market delineation.' 7 This holding is particularly curious in light of the
court's recognition of the fact that products bearing the insignia of one fra-
ternity were not good demand substitutes for products bearing the insignia
of another fraternity." 8 The obvious rationale for combining these prod-
ucts into a single market would be supply substitutability, but the court
chose to combine them without any cogent rationale." 9
Between 1962 and 1982, there was little new in the lower court decisions
on the delineation of the geographic dimensions of relevant markets. The
lower courts frequently delineated markets within markets in the earlier
part of this period,41 but there was a tendency not to do so in the latter
part.411  On the product side, markets-within-markets were uncommon
throughout the period. One explanation for the decline in the court's de-
lineation of markets-within-markets is that a court only needed to find a
404. Calnetics Corp., 532 F.2d at 618, 691.
405. The appeals court's decision is supported by 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 90, at
429-30.
406. 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
407. Id. at 9, 11.
408. Id. at 11.
409. Id. at 10-11.
410. See, eg., United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 596 (6th Cir. 1970) (delineat-
ing as relevant geographic markets for portland cement the Northeastern United States and the
New York metropolitan area); United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117, 121
(E.D. Mich. 1972) (delineating as relevant geographic markets for beer an eight-state area and any
state or combination of states among the eight); United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F.
Supp. 439, 455 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (delineating as relevant geographic markets for paper products a
six-state area and the entire United States); United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp.
129, 146-47 (N.D. Cal.) (delineating as relevant geographic markets for beer an eight-state area
and California alone), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 1021 (1967).
411. See Fortenberry, supra note 395, at 609-11.
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merger unlawful in a single market, so the courts tended just to pick a single
market with which they felt comfortable about both the market and the
finding of illegality. This explanation, however, may not be entirely
satisfactory.
There was little indication that the courts were attempting to articulate
criteria for the delineation of the geographic boundaries of markets. Many
cases sensibly cited transportation costs as a basis for delineating geo-
graphic market boundaries.' 12 On the other hand, a number of cases fell
back on the practical indicia, citing industry recognition of a geographic
market,4 13 or relied on otherwise dubious reasoning.414
In 1980, Donald Turner summed up the state of the case law on market
delineation by stating that "this whole area is a bloody mess. ' ' 415 What
more can one say.
D. Scholarly Literature, 1962-82
Some of the commentary on the Supreme Court cases between 1962 and
1982 was noted above.4 16 Much of the remaining legal and economic litera-
ture on antitrust market delineation between 1962 and 1982 repeated famil-
iar themes without contributing new ideas.4 17 Several works elaborating on
412. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847, 864 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 829 (1968) (citing prohibitive costs of transporting scrap metal long distances); FTC v. Wey-
erhaeuser Co., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,974, at 76,044 (D.D.C.) (citing the cost of trans-
porting corrugating medium); Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. at 455 (citing high freight rates
for paper products); M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. at 87 (citing high transportation cost of ready-mix
concrete); G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. at 121 (citing the cost of transporting beer).
413. See, e.g., F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 817 (2d Cir.
1979) (two metropolitan areas treated separate by the beer industry and defendants); Weyerhaeu-
ser, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 76,044 (defendant's documents treat the West Coast separately,
and industry compiles statistics for the West Coast), aff'd, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCII) t 64,263
(D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Federal Co., 403 F. Supp. 161, 164 (W.D. Tenn. 1975) (flour
industry statistical studies treat Southeast separately); Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264 F. Supp. at 455
(citing industry recognition without explanation).
414. See, e.g., RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1321 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding a national
market for secondary lead for no apparent reason despite finding that transportation costs drasti-
cally limit range of competition), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); ICM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot &
Forbes Land Trust, 378 F. Supp. 918, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding a national market for certain
real estate financing because both parties do business throughout the United States).
415. Donald F. Turner, The Role of the "Market Concept" in Antitrust Law, 49 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1145, 1150 (1980).
416. See supra notes 263-69, 292-93, 331 and accompanying text.
417. This certainly was the case for what were three of the most widely read works written
and published by economists during this period. See DOUGLAS NEEDHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE ch. 5 (1978); F.M. SCHERER, INDUS-
TRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 60-62 (2d ed. 1980); Peter 0.
Steiner, Markets and Industries, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
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earlier ideas are worth a brief mention. A law review comment418 argued
that the interchangeability of market delineation between Section 7 and Sec-
tion 2 applied to the geographic dimensions of markets as well as to their
product dimensions addressed in Grinnell.419 Two law review notes argued
that supply substitutability should play an important role in delineating the
product dimensions of markets,420 and much the same was said by other
literature during the period.42 1 One economist also argued at length against
the use of cross-elasticities of demand to measure closeness of substitutes.422
A chronological review of the more notable contributions begins in 1973
with the work of Kenneth Elzinga and Thomas Hogarty. They were the
first economists to argue that the definition of a market offered by classical
economists can and should be used in the antitrust context.4 2 3 They also
were the first to propose and apply a specific method for using data to delin-
eate markets.4 24 Their test used shipments data to delineate the geographic
575 (David L. Sills ed., 1968). Most legal works of the era simply summarized the confused case
law; see, eg., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 7, MERGER STANDARDS UNDER
U.S. ANTITRUST LAwS 25-46 (1981); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS 48-52, 65-70 (1975).
418. Glenn W. Brown, Jr., Comment, Relevant Geographic Market Delineation: The Inter-
changeability of Standards in Cases Arising Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1152 (1979).
419. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 573 (1966); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 303.
420. Robert L. Hubbard, Note, Potential Production: A Supply Side Approach for Relevant
Product Market Definitions, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1199 (1980); Bruce A. Karsh, Note, The Role
of Supply Substitutability in Defining the Relevant Product Market, 65 VA. L. REv. 129 (1979).
421. See, eg., 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 90, at 374-76, 426-31; NEEDHAM, supra
note 417, 112-13; POSNER, supra note 331, at 126, 132; SCHERER, supra note 417, at 60-62;
Corwin D. Edwards, Economic Concepts and Antitrust Litigation: Evolving Complexities, 19 AN-
TrrRUST BULL. 295, 303-05 (1974). Alone in dissenting from the view that supply sub-
stitutability should be considered in market delineation was Michael L. Glassman, Market
Definition as a Practical Matter, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1155, 1158 (1980).
422. See Klaus Stegemann, Cross Elasticity and the Relevant Market, 94 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
WIRTSCHAFTS-& SOZIALNVISSENSCHAFTEN 151 (1974). The main point of the critique was that
cross-elasticities of demand are overly sensitive to the initial quantities of two products. The fact
that a 10% increase in the price of Product A would cause half of the consumers to switch to
Product B is consistent with both a large and a small cross-elasticity of demand because the
quantity of Product B consumed may be much larger or much smaller than that of Product A.
423. Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 15, at 47-50.
424. The idea of using price correlations to delineate antitrust markets certainly goes back
further. See infra note 555 and accompanying text. However, there was no earlier published
work in the economic literature that proposed a specific test and applied it to real data.
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boundaries of markets,4 2 5 and they applied it to the facts of Pabst Brew-
ing426 and another beer merger.427
In his 1976 book, Richard Posner made three points of particular inter-
est on market delineation. First, Posner stated that "[i]t is only because we
lack confidence in our ability to measure elasticities, or perhaps because we
do not think of adopting so explicitly economic an approach, that we have
to define markets instead." '428 The important aspect of this statement is
that it makes the fundamental connection between market delineation and
market power that had been made in the Cellophane case, but rarely since
then. 29 Second, Posner explained:
The Cellophane fallacy does not arise in a merger case, where the
issue is not whether the current price exceeds the competitive level
but whether the merger might result in a further deterioration of
competitive conditions. If there are good substitutes in consumption
or production at the current price, it is a detail whether that price is
competitive or monopolistic; the important point is that a merger is
unlikely to lead to a further price increase. Thus the criteria of rele-
vant market should be different in monopolization and merger cases,
although the Supreme Court has said that they are the same.430
Finally, he argued:
The "submarket" approach is unsound. If the "outer boundaries"
of the market include only the product's good substitutes in both
consumption and production-which seems a fair reading of Brown
Shoe's reformulation of the cellophane test-then a submarket
would be a group of sellers from which sellers of good substitutes in
consumption or production had been excluded, and these exclusions
would deprive any market-share statistics of their economic
significance.431
425. Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 15, at 72-76; Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty,
The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revisited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST BULL.
1, 2-3 (1978); see infra notes 544-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of their test.
426. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
427. Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 15, at 76-80.
428. POSNER, supra note 331, at 125. Essentially the same point was made by 2 AREEDA &
TURNER, supra note 90, at 330. In a later article with a coauthor, Posner repeated this point and
added the argument that markets can be delineated almost arbitrarily if the relevant elasticities are
known and properly considered. Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 962.
429. Posner most likely had the Section 2 context in mind in making this statement, and he
certainly is correct in that context. On the other hand, market delineation plays an important role
in most merger cases, and there are no good substitutes for market delineation in that role. See
supra note 19.
430. POSNER, supra note 331, at 128-29 (footnote omitted).
431. Id. at 129.
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In 1977, Lawrence Sullivan published his popular treatise. He prefaced
the discussion of the cases on market delineation with an insightful
overview:
Market definition is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, or an issue hav-
ing its own significance under the statute; it is merely an aid for
determining whether power exists. To define a market in product
and geographic terms is to say that if prices were appreciably raised
or volume appreciably curtailed for the product within a given area,
while demand held constant, supply from other sources could not be
expected to enter promptly enough and in large enough amounts to
restore the old price or volume. If sufficient supply would promptly
enter from other geographic areas, then the "defined market" is not
wide enough in geographic terms; if sufficient supply would
promptly enter in the form of products made by other producers
which had not been included in the product market as defined, then
the market would not be wide enough in defined product terms. A
"relevant market," then, is the narrowest market which is wide
enough so that products from adjacent areas or from other produ-
cers in the same area cannot compete on substantial parity with
those included in the market.43 2
Like Posner, Sullivan made the critical connection between market delinea-
tion and market power. He also suggested in vague terms a means for
bounding a unique relevant market, although he then went on to argue that
several concentric markets may be appropriate.433
The first three volumes of the extraordinary Areeda and Turner treatise
appeared in 1978, and they contained one of the most extensive discussions
of market delineation ever published. They began by stating: "In economic
terms, a 'market' embraces one firm or any group of firms which, if unified
by agreement or merger, would have market power in dealing with any
group of buyers. '4 34 They then explained that this concept immediately
leads "to the critical but vexing question of degree: What quantum of mar-
ket power is an appropriate subject of concern? Deciding the boundaries of
the market, and often the legal outcome of a case, will hinge on the an-
swer." 435 In an illustrative example, they phrase the threshold for concern
about market power in terms of the price increase that a monopolist would
432. SULLIVAN, supra note 90, at 41 (footnote omitted).
433. Id at 42-43.
434. 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 90, at 347.
435. Id This important observation also was made by SCHERER, supra note 417, at 549
n.111.
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impose, and they opine that a one percent price increase is too slight, five
percent probably is enough and ten percent clearly is more than enough.436
Areeda and Turner also argued that the critical data for market delinea-
tion is that relating to price relationships and shipment patterns, discussing
in some detail the interpretation of various specific price relationships and
shipment patterns. 437 They also discussed several other relevant considera-
tions in market delineation.438 Areeda and Turner summarized, and com-
mented on, many of the leading cases as well.439 In discussing Brown Shoe,
they criticized a literal interpretation of the submarket concept for basically
the same reasons as Posner, but they then concluded that the Court could
not have intended such an interpretation. They argued that the Brown Shoe
dictum "meant merely to recognize that fine distinctions may sometimes be
necessary and other times not."'
In 1979, Kenneth Boyer suggested that the unique relevant market for
any particular firm was the "ideal collusive group" centered on that firm." 1
The idea of this definition is that adding additional firms to a cartel tends to
increase the market power of the cartel; but some firms are more important
than others, and beyond some point, adding additional firms does not in-
crease the average profitability of cartel members. In a later work, Boyer
proposed a specific criterion for determining which firms should be in-
cluded in a firm's relevant market." 2
In 1981, this author proposed the following definition: "A market for
antitrust purposes is any product or group of products and any geographic
area in which collective action by all firms (as through collusion or merger)
would result in a profit maximizing price that significantly exceeded the
436. 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 90, at 347.
437. Id. at 351-58.
438. See id. at 358-76 (discussing transportation costs, customer convenience, substitution in
use, and substitution in production).
439. See id. at 406-31.
440. Id. at 421. Writing alone two years later, Turner interpreted Brown Shoe more literally
and termed the notion that there could be meaningful submarkets within a meaningful market "an
absolute contradiction in terms." Turner, supra note 415, at 1151.
441. Kenneth D. Boyer, Industry Boundaries, in EcONOMIc ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
LAW 70, 73-74 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d ed. 1988). In the same article, Boyer also
criticized the use of cross-elasticities of demand for market delineation. Id. at 74-76.
442. See Kenneth D. Boyer, Is There a Principle for Defining Industries?, 50 S. EcON. J. 761
(1984). While Boyer's basic idea has considerable merit, his specific formalization suffers from
several serious problems: Markets may be lopsided or have holes or be far too small, and they may
include firms that would not be in any realistic cartel because of high coordination costs. See
Gregory J. Werden, Is There a Principle for Defining Industries? Comment, 52 S. ECON. J. 532
(1985).
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competitive price."'  As to what is significant, a ten percent to twenty
percent increase was suggested. 4 " The phrase "for antitrust purposes" was
italicized to emphasize the fact that the meaning of the term "market" was
not that ascribed by classical economists.' 5 I went on to explain that this
definition will yield markets within markets and argued that "the relevant
market in any particular case is the smallest group of products and geo-
graphic area that constitutes a market.""' 6
The view that market delineation must be based on the underlying con-
cern with market power was spreading rapidly in the early 1980s but cer-
tainly was not universal. Two papers published by economists in 1981
dissented." 7
Finally, in his 1981 presidential address to the American Economic As-
sociation, George Stigler contended that economists had contributed little
to antitrust market delineation:
My lament is that this battle on market definitions, which is fought
thousands of times what with all the private antitrust suits, has re-
ceived virtually no attention from us economists. Except for a cas-
ual flirtation with cross elasticities of demand and supply, the
determination of markets has remained an undeveloped area of eco-
nomic research at either the theoretical or empirical level." 8
This statement may no longer have been accurate by the time it was made,
but the point is well taken.
443. Gregory J. Werden, The Use and Misuse of Shipments Data in Defining Geographic Mar-
kets, 26 ANTrrRusT BULL. 719, 721 (1981). I developed the definition from insights learned from
George Hay in 1977, and the article was written in mid-1978. Thus, the similarity to the work of
Areeda and Turner probably was coincidence.
444. Ia at 721.
445. Ido at 721 & n.7. This point was elaborated in Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation
and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.L 514, 514-16. Others have made
a similar point. See David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Geographic Market Definition Under
the US. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 30 J.L. & ECON. 123, 127-28 (1987); Pablo T.
Spiller & Cliff J. Huang, On the Extent of the Market: Wholesale Gasoline in the Northeastern
United States, 35 . INDus. EON. 131, 132-33 (1986).
446. Werden, supra note 443, at 721.
447. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, Defining Geographic Market Boundaries, 26 ANTITRUST BULL.
739, 751 (1981); Ira Horowitz, Market Definition in Antitrust Analysis: A Regression-Based Ap-
proach, 48 S. EON. J. 1, 1-2 n.2 (1981).
448. George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 1,
9 (1982); see also Horowitz, supra note 447, at 2 ("Curiously enough, economists have had com-
paratively little to say about how to delineate markets. Instead, their principal contributions have
been to call attention to the single-price characteristic of a (competitive) market, once that market
has been identified.").
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V. MARKET DELINEATION UNDER THE 1982 AND 1984
MERGER GUIDELINES
A. The Guidelines' Treatment of Supply Substitutability
On June 14, 1982, the Department of Justice released drastically revised
Merger Guidelines, which themselves were slightly revised exactly two
years later." 9 These Merger Guidelines state, as their unifying theme,
"that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market
power."'450 The Guidelines offer a complete analytical paradigm designed
to identify mergers that would create or enhance market power.451
The Guidelines452 identify three factors that could constrain the ability
of even a monopolist to exercise market power over a particular group of
products in a particular area: demand substitutability, supply sub-
stitutability, and entry. Demand substitutability refers, of course, to the
ability of consumers to substitute other products or the same product pro-
duced in other areas. Supply substitutability and entry both refer to the
ability of producers not currently selling a particular product to begin doing
so. The Guidelines' distinction between supply substitution and entry is
that entry entails significant new investment in production or distribution
or requires more than one year to accomplish while supply substitution
does not.45
3
These disciplining factors as well as market structure and conduct can
be addressed in various ways through alternative analytical paradigms.
Under the Merger Guidelines' approach, each is addressed in a separate
step. Demand substitutability is addressed under the rubric of market de-
lineation, and supply substitutability is addressed under the rubric of identi-
fication of competitors. Firms that would quickly and easily substitute in
supply in response to an attempted exercise of market power are considered
to be competitors in the market and are assigned market shares even though
they do not currently sell products in the market. Contrary to some prior
449. See supra note 7.
450. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 1.0. Because of the similarity between the 1982
and 1984 Guidelines, only the latter generally are cited. While not separately discussed, the 1992
Merger Guidelines (see supra note 7) are mentioned in footnotes below to the extent that they are
different.
451. For additional discussion of this paradigm, see Werden, supra note 445, at 516-23;
Gregory J. Werden, Merger Guidelines Present Basic Analytic Paradigm, LEGAL TIMES, June 28,
1982, at 20.
452. This Section offers an interpretation of the Guidelines, rather than merely a summary.
As such, much of what follows cannot be found in the exact words of the Guidelines. In particu-
lar, many of the terms used below do not appear in the Guidelines.
453. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, §§ 2.21, 3.3.
[Vol. 76:123
1992] THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST MARKET DELINEATION 191
case law and much prior commentary, the Guidelines do not include in the
market the products currently produced by the firms that can substitute in
supply.
Although the Guidelines' treatment of supply substitutability is quite
different in concept from that of the case law, the two ultimately could yield
the same market shares. Consider, for example, the proposed merger of
two producers of metal hubcaps produced using stamping machines. Under
the Guidelines, the relevant market would include only substitutes in de-
mand for stamped metal hubcaps, but metal stamping firms not currently
producing hubcaps would be included in the market and assigned market
shares. Under some prior case law and much prior commentary, the rele-
vant market could be defined to include all products produced with stamp-
ing machines, and the market shares might work out just the same.
Nevertheless, the Guidelines' treatment has many advantages.45 4
First, the Guidelines' treatment of supply substitutability avoids a po-
tentially fatal error. Under the case law and commentary's treatment of
supply substitutability, the relevant market for a particular product could
be defined to include the products to which firms currently selling the par-
ticular product could substitute in supply,45 rather than, or in addition to,
the products produced by firms that do not currently sell the particular
product but that could begin doing so by substituting in supply. The fact
that the current sellers of a particular group of products can also produce
other products has no bearing on their ability to exercise market power over
the products they do currently produce.
Second, considering supply substitutability as part of market delineation
may make it impossible to think sensibly about market power. Consider the
problem of analyzing market power in a market for all metal stampings
when individual metal stampings differ greatly with respect to the availabil-
ity of demand substitutes. If molded plastic parts were good demand sub-
stitutes for most metal stampings but not for hubcaps, there would be no
454. The Guidelines' treatment also is preferable over the alternative of considering supply
substitutability along with entry because it is desirable to incorporate into market shares all that
practically can be incorporated so as to make them the best possible indicators of the state of
competition. Supply substitutability can be quantified and incorporated into market shares be-
cause the productive capacity available to the market through supply substitution already exists.
Such is not the case for entry that requires substantial investment in production or distribution.
In addition, firms that can easily substitute in supply and begin selling have made the investment
necessary for entry, and at least in that sense, have already entered. Moreover, such firms are
likely to vie actively for sales, so the competition that stems from supply substitutability is likely
to be actual competition, rather than potential competition.
455. See supra notes 363, 402-05 and accompanying text.
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useful sense in which there could be market power over metal stampings,
yet it would clearly be wrong to add all molded plastic parts to the market.
Third, the Guidelines' treatment is likely to produce more sensible mar-
ket shares. Shares in a market for all metal stampings would have to be
based on dollar sales or shipments because dollars provide the only avail-
able common denominator that can be used to aggregate outputs of differ-
ent metal stampings. The Guidelines' treatment leads to a measure of
market share that is likely to be superior for the purposes of evaluating the
hub cap merger-the capacity to produce hub caps.
Finally, the Guidelines' treatment makes it easier to cope with a variety
of complications. For example, suppose there are two types of stamping
machines, an expensive machine that can produce all stampings, and a
cheaper machine that can produce just some stampings, including hubcaps.
The expensive machines might be unimportant to competition in hubcaps if
there existed alternative higher valued uses for the machines. The Guide-
lines' treatment allows the assignment of shares based on any fraction of
expensive stamping machine capacity, including zero. If supply sub-
stitutability were treated as a part of market delineation, choices would be
more limited, and all products produced on the expensive machines might
end up being included just because the machines were occasionally used to
produce hubcaps.
B. The Delineation of Relevant Markets Under the Guidelines
The Guidelines define an antitrust market as follows:
[A] product or group of products and a geographic area in which it
is sold such that a hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm, not subject
to price regulation, that was the only present and future seller of
those products in that area would impose a "small but significant
and nontransitory" increase in price above prevailing or likely future
levels.456
The Guidelines' threshold for significant market power is phrased in terms
of the magnitude of the price increase that would be imposed by a hypothet-
ical monopolist.4 5 7 As a general matter, a price increase is significant if it is
456. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 2.01. The definition in the 1992 Merger Guide-
lines is slightly different. See supra note 7, § 1.0.
457. The test is whether the profit-maximizing price increase for a hypothetical monopolist
would be at least five percent. This was always the case and it has been stated quite explicitly by
the 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 7, §§ 1.11, 1.21. Several commentators have erroneously
stated it as whether a five-percent price increase would cause a net increase in profit. See, e.g.,
Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution Is Nec-
essary?, 12 REs. L. & ECON. 207, 211-19 (1989); John R. Morris & Gale R. Mosteller, Defining
Markets for Merger Analysis, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 599, 605 n.15 (1991). The difference between
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at least five percent and for at least one year, but there is some flexibility in
the five-percent figure.4 "8
The Guidelines' definition of an antitrust market reflects the separation
of demand substitutability-the concern of market delineation-from sup-
ply substitutability and entry, which are considered in later steps in the
analysis. By referring to a monopolist over a group of products and area,
the Guidelines' definition of an antitrust market excludes the possibility of
supply substitutability. By referring to a present and future monopolist, the
Guidelines' definition of an antitrust market excludes the possibility of
entry.
Antitrust markets are by no means unique under the Guidelines' defini-
tion. Typically, an infinite number of additional antitrust markets can be
constructed from any given antitrust market either by adding one or more
additional products or areas to it, or by both adding some products or areas
and also subtracting others. Thus, the concept of an antitrust market is
extremely flexible and invites the sort of gerrymandering designed to in-
crease or decrease market shares that marked Rome Cable, Continental
Can, and a host of lower court decisions since Brown Shoe.
459
The Guidelines try to avoid gerrymandering of markets and provide
meaningful guidance by introducing restrictions on the size and shape of
markets. The shape restrictions are introduced through the device of apply-
ing the definition of an antitrust market only to certain candidate mar-
these two formulations can be considerable. Compare Werden, supra note 268, at 120-21 (tables
1, 3) with Harris & Simons, supra, at 216, 218 (tables 1, 2). A five-percent price increase may be
more profitable than no price increase but less profitable than a much smaller price increase.
Therefore, a five-percent price increase would not be imposed.
458. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, §§ 2.11, 2.31. The Guidelines do not indicate
how this flexibility will be exercised. A recent statement by Assistant Attorney General James
Rill provided some clarification. A slightly higher price increase may be used if a merger would
not be horizontal using a strict five-percent price increase but would become horizontal if a
slightly higher price increase were used. A slightly lower price increase may be used if there
would appear to be no competitive concern in the market delineated using a five-percent price
increase but a serious competitive concern in the market delineated using a slightly lower price
increase. See James F. Rill, Merger Enforcement at the Department of Justice, 59 ANTITRUST L.J.
45, 49-50 (1990). The 1984 Guidelines have been interpreted as requiring that the price increase
be uniform within the candidate market. See, eg., Werden, supra note 445, at 529. The 1992
Guidelines are very different in this respect. They state that the "hypothetical monopolist will be
assumed to pursue maximum profits in deciding whether to raise the prices of any or all of the"
products in the candidate market and that price need be increased by at least the threshold
amount, e.g. five percent, only for a "group of products... including the ... product of one of the
merging firms" around which the market is delineated. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 7,
§ 1.11. This change in policy can result in dramatically smaller relevant markets, particularly in
differentiated products industries.
459. See generally supra notes 343-72 and accompanying text.
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kets.460 The Guidelines specify that the initial candidate markets for any
merger are each of the products (narrowly defined) of each of the merging
firms and each point at which they are produced. Formally, an initial can-
didate market is a point in product-geographic space that characterizes a
product of one of the merging firms. The Guidelines further specify that a
second candidate market is formed from the first by adding the "next-best
substitute. ' 461 The criterion for determining the next-best substitute is not
spelled out by the Guidelines, but it reflects an implicit measurement of
closeness of substitutes.46z Subsequent candidate markets are formed simi-
larly, by repeated application of the implicit closeness-of-substitutes mea-
sure, yielding a sequence of candidate markets. Formally, the candidate
market sequence is a sequence of elements that are regions in product-geo-
graphic space, and each element is entirely contained in every element fol-
lowing it in the sequence.
The first element of the candidate market sequence normally could not
be an antitrust market because it is already subject to the monopoly control
of one of the merging firms. Immediately subsequent elements also may not
be antitrust markets for substantially similar reasons. Nevertheless, some
of the elements in the candidate market sequence must be antitrust markets,
and they constitute what may be formally termed an antitrust market sub-
sequence, which is an infinite sequence of candidate markets each of which
actually is an antitrust market.
The Guidelines' restriction on the size of markets is the rule that there is
a single relevant market in an antitrust market subsequence, and only it is
used in the subsequent analysis. The Guidelines' Smallest Market Principle
states that the one and only relevant market for the antitrust market subse-
460. This term and several in the following paragraphs do not appear in the Guidelines. The
1982 Guidelines used the similar term "provisional market." 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note
7, § II.A. However, that term was used in a manner susceptible to a different and unfortunate
interpretation, and it was so interpreted by critics. See Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde,
Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 464, 479-81 (1983). The term was deleted in the 1984 Merger Guidelines.
461. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, §§ 2.13, 2.33. The shape restrictions perhaps
were clearer in the 1982 Guidelines than in the 1984 Guidelines. The 1982 Guidelines specified
that any product or area that is at least as good a substitute as any included in a market also must
be included. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 7, § I.A. n.12, § I.C. n.24. These footnotes were
deleted in 1984, but the statement accompanying the release of the 1984 Guidelines stated that
"no change in policy should be inferred from the deletion of a footnote." U.S. Dep't of Justice
Statement Accompanying Release of 1984 Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103,
at 20,551 (June 14, 1984).
462. This statement refers to the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines. A definition was added
in the 1992 version. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 7, § 1.11 n.9 (The next-best substi-
tute is "the alternative which, if available in unlimited quantities at constant prices, would account
for the greatest value of diversion of demand.").
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quence and the corresponding candidate market sequence "generally" is the
smallest element in the antitrust market subsequence,46 3 that is, the only
one contained in each of the others.4"' Thus, there is a unique relevant
market for every initial candidate market, that is, for every product and
point of production of each merging firm. Of course, there is not just one
relevant market for the analysis of a merger, because there are at least two
merging firms and perhaps many products, and each has its own candidate
market sequence with a relevant market. Even when the merging firms pro-
duce similar products, the relevant market delineated for one firm may be
very different from that delineated for the other, and either may be the
relevant market in which the merger is challenged.
A merger is horizontal if, and only if, either merging firm is in a relevant
market delineated for the other. The relevant market delineated for one
merging firm may be included in, and much smaller than, the relevant mar-
ket delineated for the other. The merger, nevertheless, is horizontal in such
cases. The Smallest Market Principle applies only within an antitrust mar-
ket subsequence, and not across antitrust market subsequences. Quite un-
like Koppers, Rome Cable, Continental Can, and Times Mirror, principles
for delineating relevant markets determine whether the merging firms are in
the same relevant market.465
463. It must be understood that each candidate market is a product and an area rather than a
group of firms. Thus, the smallest market is not the smallest group of firms that would find it
profitable to raise price significantly. In particular, a capacity constrained firm, which would not
be necessary for a successful cartel, is not excluded from the market through the Smallest Market
Principle. Scheffman & Spiller, supra note 445, at 126, misstate the Guidelines in this respect.
464. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, §§ 2.11, 2.31. The Guidelines do not specify
the exceptions to the general rule. I have argued that it is appropriate to go a little further in the
antitrust market subsequence, if doing so yields what I call a natural market boundary. Werden,
supra note 445, at 533. A natural market boundary could be a political boundary in geographic
space or Joan Robinson's "marked gap in the chain of substitutes." ROBINSON, supra note 17, at
17; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text. Natural market boundaries are convenient;
they sound less artificial to judges; and they are likely to form the limits of the product and
geographic space over which there is fairly direct competitive interaction.
There is likely to be significant uncertainty in estimates of the amount by which a hypothetical
monopolist over any candidate market would raise price. It is sensible from either a policy or a
litigation perspective to resolve close cases by opting for a larger market, particularly if doing so
would not substantially change market shares. See Werden, supra note 445, at 532. Allowing for
a safety margin in this way should not be considered an exception to the Smallest Market Princi-
ple. Using a price increase other than five percent (for some justifiable reason) also should not be
considered an exception to the Smallest Market Principle. The principle is applied conditionally
on the delineation of the antitrust market subsequence.
465. The flexibility in the choice of the price increase threshold translates into some flexibility
in the determination of whether a merger is horizontal. See supra note 458.
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Also unlike the prior case law, which tended to assume price discrimi-
nation,4 66 the Guidelines' approach to market delineation initially assumes
that price discrimination is not possible and delineates markets on the basis
of that assumption. Consequently, markets are delineated in geographic
space on the basis of points of production, rather than points of consump-
tion. If price discrimination is possible, the Guidelines delineate additional,
smaller markets, on the basis of arbitrage possibilities.467 In the case of
geographic discrimination, markets are delineated on the basis of the loca-
tions of consumers. If the cost of arbitrage among consumers is sufficiently
high, each consumer may be in a distinct relevant market. If the cost of
arbitrage over time is sufficiently high, each instant in time also may be in a
distinct relevant market. For custom designed goods, each unit of output
may be in a distinct relevant market.
Heretofore, the discussion has considered only substitutability. Com-
plementarity raises important issues as well, and in the prior case law, com-
plementarity was likely to result in a cluster market. The Guidelines do not
employ this concept, but address complementarities in three ways. First,
products are likely to be grouped together in an initial candidate market
and thus also in a relevant market if they are such strong complements that
they are nearly always sold bundled. Thus, a Honda Accord would be a
possible initial candidate market, rather than individual parts or collections
of parts for Honda Accords, and the relevant market for Honda Accords
would be a group of models of cars.
Second, if products are such strong complements in demand that sellers
could not profitably sell only some of them, the complementary products
would not therefore be grouped in a single market, but only firms selling all
of them could be considered as competitors in the relevant markets for the
individual complements. If, contrary to apparent fact, bank customers in-
sisted on buying all services from a single institution, then the only competi-
tors in the relevant market for each banking service would be full-service
banks.468
466. See, e.g., United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 542-43 (M.D. Tenn. 1975);
see also supra text accompanying note 365.
467. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, §§ 2.13, 2.33.
468. In the two bank merger cases litigated by the Department of Justice since the 1982
Merger Guidelines were issued, the Justice Department did not base its challenge on the cluster of
commercial banking services. United States v. Central State Bank, 621 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D.
Mich. 1985), aff'd, 817 F.2d 22 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Virginia Nat'l Bankshares, Inc.,
1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,871 (W.D. Va. 1982). In the former case, the court nevertheless
found that the relevant market was the cluster of commercial banking services. Central State
Bank, 621 F. Supp. at 1291-92.
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Finally, the Guidelines state that "nearly universal" supply sub-
stitutability among products may lead to the "use [of] an aggregate descrip-
tion of those markets as a matter of convenience. ,469 This aggregation of
markets is a mere convenience used when, because of supply sub-
stitutability, the proper measure of shares would be the same for many dis-
tinct relevant markets. Price discrimination markets are likely to be
aggregated as a matter of convenience.
Aggregation as a matter of convenience is precisely what the Supreme
Court did in Brown Shoe rather than further divide children's shoes into
age- and sex-based markets. 470 It is also what the Court did without even
thinking in aggregating various sizes of shoes into a single market. A size
eight model of a particular shoe is a poor substitute for a size ten from the
point of view of consumers, but essentially a perfect substitute from the
point of view of producers.471
C. The Guidelines' Approach and Its Predecessors
The Guidelines' approach to market delineation has been called their
"most innovative 472 aspect, and that is a reasonable characterization.
However, the Guidelines were not as original as many observers may have
believed.473 The main idea upon which the Guidelines' approach is built is
that market delineation must be closely linked to the ultimate goal of identi-
fying mergers that create or enhance market power, and that idea goes back
469. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 2.21 n.9; 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 7,
§ 1.321 n.14.
470. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 327-28 (1962); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 254-55.
471. The one difference between the Guidelines' approach on this point and that of the prior
case law is that, technically at least, the Guidelines' approach would refer to an aggregate descrip-
tion of the relevant markets, rather than to a single aggregated market. For example, in delineat-
ing the relevant market for hospital services, one might refer to many markets in an aggregate
description like "markets for inpatient, acute care services," which typically is loosely referred to
as "the market for inpatient, acute care services."
The alleged relevant market in the Justice Department's post-1982 Guidelines hospital merger
cases has been acute inpatient services. E.g., United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F.
Supp. 1251, 1260-61 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920
(1990); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 847 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 1989-2
Trade Cas. (CCII) f 68,859 (4th Cir. 1989).
472. See William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 618, 622 (1983); Lawrence A. Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines: An Afterword, 71 CAL.
L. REV. 632, 638 (1983).
473. One of my reasons for writing this Article is that I was not aware of much of the work
that preceded the 1982 Merger Guidelines when I was working on the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines.
They are not as original as I had thought either. In the following paragraphs, I generally omit
references to my own work, see supra notes 443-46 and accompanying text, which anticipated the
Guidelines' approach almost completely.
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much further than 1982. The Supreme Court may have been the first to
express it in the Cellophane case,4 74 and in 1959 Morris Adelman clearly
expressed the idea.475 By 1982 the idea was also in the two leading antitrust
treatises-those by Areeda and Turner 47 6 and by Sullivan. 4" Like the
Guidelines, Areeda and Turner478 and Boyer479 even phrased the issue in
terms of a hypothetical monopolist or cartel.
The idea of translating market power into a price increase test also was
not new. It was at least implicit in the recommendations of the Stigler Task
Force concerning the 1968 Guidelines, 480 and it was quite explicit in the
works of Posner481 and Areeda and Turner.482 In fact, Posner and Areeda
and Turner even suggested a significance threshold of about five percent.
The idea of delineating a market centered on a particular firm went back
to the monopolistic competition literature and the Mason-Bain-Stigler con-
ception of a market.483 In addition, Boyer brought the idea up to date and
married it with the idea of linking market delineation to market power.4 84
The idea that the relevant market should be unique was expressed by sev-
eral commentators, notably Hale and Hale485 and Adelman,486 and Adel-
man and Sullivan487 both expressed what is essentially the Smallest Market
Principle. Finally, the idea of markets delineated on the basis of price dis-
crimination was expressed by Turner and by Barnes.48 8
The one entirely novel aspect of the Guidelines' approach to market
delineation was the separation of the delineation of the market from the
identification of the competitors in the market. This distinction manifests
itself in the Guidelines' innovative treatment of supply substitutability and
in the Guidelines' conception of an antitrust market as a product and area
rather than either a group of firms or a group of customers.
The Guidelines also were innovative in offering a comprehensive ap-
proach to the problem of market delineation. The Guidelines did not just
474. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
475. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
476. See supra note 434 and accompanying text.
477. See supra note 432 and accompanying text.
478. See supra note 434 and accompanying text.
479. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
481. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 434-35 and accompanying text.
483. The idea of firm-centered market dates back to 1934. See supra note 22.
484. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
485. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 134 and 432 and accompanying text.
488. See supra note 166.
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offer suggested treatments for the various issues in merger cases, but rather
provided an integrated approach, with each step in the paradigm carefully
crafted to be used in conjunction with all the others. There was nothing
like that in the prior economic or legal literature, or in the case law.
Finally, the Guidelines were innovative in their treatment of the delinea-
tion of the geographic dimensions of markets and in their treatment of price
discrimination. The case law, especially Tampa Electric,489 and scholarly
literature delineated the geographic dimensions of a market on the basis of
the locations of consumers or the locations of both producers and consum-
ers. Under the Guidelines, markets are initially delineated under the as-
sumption that price discrimination is not possible, and in doing so markets
are delineated on the basis of points of production, rather than points of
consumption. The Guidelines approach better focuses the analysis on the
real issue of identifying the important competitors of the merging firms. If
price discrimination is possible, the Guidelines permit the delineation of
additional markets by identifying groups of customers that could be dis-
criminated against.
While not innovative in this aspect, the Guidelines notably departed
from all of the specific tests the Supreme Court had applied. This included
the practical indicia from Brown Shoe49 and the cross-elasticity-of-demand
test from Cellophane. A critical difference between the Guidelines' ap-
proach and many other tests including cross-elasticity of demand is that
those tests consider substitution possibilities only two products at a time,
while the Guidelines simultaneously consider all substitution possibilities
between the products and area in a candidate market and substitutes
outside of that market. 91 Rather than consider the individual cross-elastic-
ities of demand between the candidate market and substitutes, the Guide-
489. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
490. This point has been misunderstood. See Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Bounding Markets in
Merger Cases: Identifying the Relevant Competitors, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 733, 755 (1984) (stating
that the Guidelines place "[u]ndue emphasis on faulty Brown Shoe indicia"); Robert A. Rogow-
sky, The Justice Department's Merger Guidelines: A Study in the Application of the Rule, 6 RES.
L. & ECON. 135, 159 (1984) (stating that the Guidelines "largely incorporate the Brown Shoe
criteria").
These critics pointed to sections in the Guidelines indicating the sorts of evidence deemed
relevant. 1984 Merger Guidelines, §§ 2.12, 2.32. Although these sections did not mention the
Brown Shoe indicia, they may have suggested tests that were not actually used, and they were
deleted in the 1992 revisions.
491. This point has also been misunderstood. See Kenneth D. Boyer, Is There a Principle for
Defining Industries? Reply, 52 S. EON. J. 542, 542 (1985) (stating that "[t]he guidelines are based
on bilateral substitutabilities"). The Guidelines are based on bilateral substitutabilities only in the
very limited sense that they consider next-best substitutes one at a time, unless several are equally
good.
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lines consider the elasticity of demand for the candidate market; rather than
ask how much substitution there would be to particular alternatives as price
in the candidate market is increased, the Guidelines ask how much sales in
the candidate market would fall. Many not-especially-good substitutes
could cause a candidate market not to be an antitrust market even though
there is no one particularly good substitute.4 92 In addition, factors other
than demand elasticities may be vitally important in determining the profit-
maximizing price increase for a candidate market, and they are considered
as well under the Guidelines.493
D. Application of the Guidelines' Approach
Although the Guidelines' approach to market delineation has been
called their "most important contribution"4 94 and their "noteworthy intel-
lectual feat,""49 it also has been subject to considerable criticism. Particu-
larly between 1982 and 1985, a common criticism was that the Guidelines'
approach to market delineation was purely theoretical and not very use-
ful.496 It is certainly true that the Guidelines' approach to market delinea-
tion lacks practicality in the sense that it is neither simple nor mechanical.
The Guidelines provided a way of thinking about the issue and evaluating
492. If any significant increase above prevailing prices would cause very large numbers of
consumers to simply do without, rather than switch to substitutes, the Guidelines' approach may
lead to the odd conclusion that the relevant market encompasses all consumer goods. While odd,
this conclusion leads to the proper policy conclusions about mergers. In practice, the conclusion
that a merger would not increase prices likely would be reached without formally delineating the
relevant market.
493. For further elaboration on these points, see Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden,
Residual Demand Estimation for Market Delineation: Complications and Limitations, 6 REv. IN-
DUS. ORGANIZATION 33, 35-36 (1991) (deriving a formula incorporating elasticity of demand and
all other factors affecting the amount by which a monopolist over a candidate market would
increase price); Werden, supra note 445, at 572-74 (comparing the Guidelines' approach to the
cross-elasticity-of-demand test); Gregory J. Werden, A Closer Analysis of Antitrust Markets, 62
WASH. U. L.Q. 647, 656-57 (1985) (comparing the Guidelines' approach to any approach based
on a pairwise assessment of substitution possibilities); Werden, supra note 268, at 115-17 (empha-
sizing the importance of the premerger gap between price and marginal cost in delineating mar-
kets under the Guidelines).
494. Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71
CAL. L. REv. 311, 322 (1983).
495. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, The 1982 Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines: An Economic Assessment, 71 CAL. L. REv. 535, 539 (1983).
496. See Dunfee et al., supra note 490, at 754-55 (stating that the Guidelines' approach is
"impractical."); Harris & Jorde, supra note 460, at 481 (same); Stigler & Sherwin, supra note 15,
at 582 (stating that the Guidelines' definition of an antitrust market is "completely nonopera-
tional" because "[n1o method of investigation of data is presented, and no data, even those pro-
duced by coercive process, are specified that will allow the market to be determined empirically");
Joe Sims & William Blumenthal, New Merger Guidelines Provide No Real Surprises, LEGAL
TIMEs, June 21, 1982, at 17 (stating that the Guidelines do not provide a "useful practical test").
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evidence, and the importance of that contribution cannot be overstated. It
was an especially significant accomplishment given the state of the prior
case law.49 7
An excellent illustration of the potential power of the Guidelines' ap-
proach comes from United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,4 9 8 a recent
merger case that involved high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), a liquid sweet-
ener made from corn. In 1982, ADM took long-term leases with options
for renewal and Purchase from Nabisco on its HFCS facilities. The Depart-
ment of Justice filed suit,49 9 challenging the transaction under Section 7,
and, after several years of discovery, both sides moved for summary judg-
ment on the question of whether the relevant market for HFCS included
sugar.
Since HFCS became a commercial product in the early 1970s, it had
always been substantially cheaper than sugar on a sweetness equilavency
basis, largely because the price of sugar had been inflated by government
price supports. Data published by the Department of Agriculture indicate
that the price of sugar was ten percent to fifty percent higher than that of
the most common form of HFCS.S° Although HFCS is not a good alterna-
tive to sugar in all uses, by the end of 1984 HFCS had replaced sugar in
those uses (notably soft drinks) in which price on a sweetness equivalency
basis is the criterion for selection of a sweetener. Applying the Guidelines,
the Department of Justice argued that an HFCS monopolist would be able
to raise price significantly without inducing significant substitution to sugar,
so sugar is not in the relevant market. The district court rejected this argu-
ment,501 but the court of appeals accepted it.502
Few cases have facts as simple and tailor-made for application of the
Guidelines as Archer-Daniels-Midland. The Guidelines' approach to mar-
ket delineation can be implemented nevertheless, using the information that
is available. Given transportation cost and F.O.B. price data, it is possible
to simulate the effects of various price increases for a group of sellers on
497. See Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1805, 1822 (1990).
498. 695 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1987), rev'd, 866 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 809 (1989).
499. Although it seems clear that the government was correct in its position that HFCS was
the relevant market when the case was decided, it is less clear that the Department of Justice was
correct in its assessment at the time the merger was challenged.
500. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, SUGAR AND SWEETENER: SITUATION AND OUT-
LOOK REPORT (1989). The data are for HFCS 55, which is 55% fructose and the HFCS product
primarily used by the soft drink companies-the most important users of HFCS.
501. See Archer-Daniels-Midland, 695 F. Supp. at 1017-21.
502. See Archer-Daniels-Midland, 866 F.2d at 244-46.
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their sales area. In this way, it is possible to estimate the profit effects of the
price increases and delineate geographic market boundaries.5 °3 As dis-
cussed below, econometric techniques, particularly residual demand estima-
tion, also can be used to delineate both the geographic and product
boundaries of markets."°
It also should be understood that the practical application of the Guide-
lines' approach inevitably lacks the mathematical rigor of the description in
the previous section. When particular issues arise in market delineation,
the rigorous approach is there to provide a theoretical basis for their resolu-
tion; however, there is no attempt to follow precisely each step of the pro-
cess as described. Moreover, the available information may necessitate
crude judgments rather than precise calculations.
E. Continuing Criticisms of the Guidelines' Approach
A widespread and continuing criticism of the Guidelines' approach to
market delineation has been that the Guidelines commit the Cellophane fal-
lacy5"5 by considering the profit-maximizing price increase above prevailing
levels. As Posner explained,5" 6 the Cellophane fallacy does not normally
arise in merger cases, because the issue is not whether market power is be-
ing exercised, but whether the merger would create or enhance market
power. There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. Consider the
following scenario.
As a result of some form of unstable collusion, price in a candidate mar-
ket has risen significantly (demonstrating that the candidate market was an
antitrust market) and to a point at which a monopolist over that market
would increase price less than five percent. A merger would increase the
stability of the ongoing collusion, and a merger to monopoly would solidify
it completely. In either case, the merger would cause prices (at least, ex-
pected prices) to be higher than they otherwise would be. This effect on
price may constitute sufficient grounds for prohibiting the merger, depend-
ing on its magnitude and any efficiency effects the merger may have.
503. This can be done simply, by drawing sellers on a map and plotting the points of equali-
zation for delivered prices from competing sellers. It can also be done through the use of compli-
cated models. For example, the Department of Justice delineated relevant markets for the
Western coal industry using a consulting firm's model of the coal and electric utilities industries.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 24-47 (1978).
504. See infra text accompanying notes 561-66.
505. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
506. POSNER, supra note 331, at 128-29; see also Baxter, supra note 472, at 623-24 n.35;
Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Merger Policy: A Review and Critique, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 13, 15
(1987); supra text accompanying note 430.
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Invoking some version of the scenario, many critics have contended that
the Guidelines are guilty of the Cellophane fallacy.5 0 7 They argue that the
Guidelines would base market delineation on the prevailing price and delin-
eate an overly broad market, potentially resulting in the failure to challenge
a significantly anticompetitive merger. This unfortunate result could be
avoided, the argument goes, by using the competitive price as the base price
for market delineation rather than the prevailing price. Indeed, implicit in
the arguments made by many of these critics is the proposition that the
competitive price should always be the base price for market delineation.0 8
This argument fundamentally misstates the Guidelines' analysis of the
postulated scenario. If it were determined that prices would likely fall but
for the merger, then the level to which prices would likely fall is the level of
"likely future prices," which would serve as the bench mark for assessing
the merger's effects on market power. Thus, if the facts indicate that the
postulated scenario is the relevant one, the Guidelines do exactly what the
critics assert they should do.
The only real issue is what should be done when the facts do not indi-
cate that the postulated scenario is the relevant one. The critics argue for
the use of the competitive price, but the Guidelines do not use it. The
Guidelines' approach certainly is preferable if the relevant scenario is not
collusion at all, but rather any number of stable oligopoly equilibria. 0 9 Us-
ing the competitive rather than the prevailing price could lead to either of
two serious errors. Mergers among firms in the same relevant market using
the competitive base price may be challenged even though good substitutes
at the prevailing price prevent such mergers from raising prices. Mergers
involving one firm in the relevant market using the competitive base price,
and one firm not in that market but in the relevant market using the pre-
vailing price as the base, may not be challenged even though they would
507. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 477-79 (Supp.
1990); Fisher, supra note 19, at 28-30; Harris & Jorde, supra note 460, at 483-84; Ordover &
Willig, supra note 495, at 542-43; Pitofsky, supra note 497, at 1823 -24; Schaerr, supra note 91, at
683-89; Richard Schmalensee, Horizontal Merger Policy: Problems and Changes, 1 J. EcoN.
PERSP. 41, 47-48 (1987).
508. If the Guidelines' approach to market delineation were to be applied in a Section 2
context, it would be necessary, of course, to use the competitive price as the bench mark. In
addition, it may make sense to use a higher threshold for significant market power in a Section 2
context because of the differing implications of imposing liability in Section 2 and Section 7 cases.
The market delineation principles would be the same, although the result would be different.
509. The 1992 Guidelines specify that the prevailing price will be used "unless premerger
circumstances are strongly suggestive of coordinated interaction." 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra
note 7, § 1.1 1.
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raise price. Moreover, having to determine the competitive price would in-
troduce additional complications and uncertainties into the process.
A second continuing criticism of the Guidelines' approach to market
delineation is that it was designed and is applied to produce overly broad
markets and thereby weaken antitrust enforcement.51 0 Apart from several
misunderstandings,"11 there appear to be two basic contentions. One is that
"the Guidelines quickly pass over evidence of real events such as past prices
and shipment patterns, and emphasize instead hypothetical estimates." '12
The argument seems to be that one should not look beyond historical data
or actual experience in delineating markets. 13 If so, it is simply wrong.
The task of merger analysis is to peer into the future and determine whether
a proposed merger would create or enhance market power. Historical data
are always the best place to start, but as explained more fully below,51 '
historical data cannot really tell us what we want to know. If one refuses to
look beyond the historical data, one is likely to overlook critically impor-
tant information.
A second contention is that the five-percent criterion for significance is
too "generous" in the sense that it allows too much scope for market
power.5 1 5 This argument erroneously treats the five-percent criterion as a
tolerance level for market power. Under the Guidelines, five percent is the
minimum amount by which merger to monopoly would raise price. Merg-
ers that actually are proposed and challenged under the Guidelines typi-
cally would be far from merger to monopoly and would increase price far
less than merger to monopoly. If it works out that using a four-percent test
510. See Harris & Jorde, supra note 460, at 486; Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General, § 4 n.31 (1987), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCII)
V13,405, No. 256 (Mar. 30, 1993) [hereinafter NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines]; Pitofsky,
supra note 497, at 1808, 1822-23.
511. See Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation Under the NAAG Merger Guidelines: Reali-
ties or Illusions?, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 403, 410-22 (1987) (explaining that the criticisms of
Harris & Jorde, supra note 460, at 486, are largely based on several misunderstandings).
512. Pitofsky, supra note 497, at 1823.
513. This is precisely the point made in the 1993 edition of the NAAG Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, which insist on "empirical evidence" of substitution, "as contrasted with expert opin-
ion, speculation, or economic theories." NAAG Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 510,
§ 3 and n.20.
514. See infra notes 541-42.
515. See Pitofsky, supra note 497, at 1839-40. Pitofsky argued that a five-percent price in-
crease would, on average, lead to over a fifty-percent increase in profits, and that would entail too
much market power. The factual predicate of this argument is dubious at best. More impor-
tantly, Pitofsky offers no basis for associating profit increases with amounts of market power that
should, or should not, be tolerated-amounts that would be determined by a complicated welfare
calculation considering, in addition to market power, likely efficiencies from mergers, deterrence
effects, and administrative costs.
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for market delineation would lead to the conclusion that a merger is seri-
ously anticompetitive, while a five-percent test would lead to a very differ-
ent conclusion, the four-percent test would be used under the Guidelines. 16
Moreover, if a much lower threshold were substituted for five percent, the
result would be smaller markets in all cases. Many mergers that would be
horizontal under the five-percent criterion would not be horizontal under a
much lower threshold. Lowering the threshold, thus, could weaken en-
forcement in precisely the way the critics want to avoid.
VI. MARKET DELINEATION IN THE LOWER COURTS SINCE 1982, AND
EMPIRICAL METHODS FOR MARKET DELINEATION
4. Market Delineation in the Lower Courts, 1982-92
The lower courts did not suddenly change their approach to market
delineation when the Merger Guidelines were released in 1982, but the case
law on market delineation since the Guidelines bears little resemblance to
that of the prior two decades. Courts have continued to cite the Brown
Shoe practical indicia,517 but they generally have cited them without actu-
ally applying them."1 ' Two circuits have held that the practical indicia are
merely "evidentiary proxies for direct proof of substitutability," '519 and one
of them has reinterpreted the practical indicia in market power terms.5 2°
516. See supra note 458.
517. Since the 1982 Merger Guidelines were issued, eight of the twelve regional circuit courts
of appeals have recited the practical indicia. Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715,
723 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 1125 S. Ct. 3034 (1992); T. Harris Young & Assoc., Inc. v.
Marquette Elecs., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 658 (1991); Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 891 F.2d 1127, 1140 n.6 (4th
Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991); Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay 'N Pak
Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 1989); H.J., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867
F.2d 1531, 1540 (8th Cir. 1989); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d
210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Jayco Sys., Inc. v. Savin Business
Machs. Corp., 777 F.2d 306, 319 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986); White &
White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 1983).
518. The practical indicia actually were applied in two cases, however. FTC v. Warner Com-
munications Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 1984); Ansell, Inc. v. Schmid Lab., Inc., 757 F.
Supp. 467, 472-74 (D.N.J.), aff'd without opinion, 941 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1991).
519. HJ., Inc., 867 F.2d at 1540; Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 218; cf White &
White, Inc, 723 F.2d at 500 ("[A] submarket analysis incorporates, but does not replace, the
standard market test.").
520. In Rothery Storage & Van Company, the D.C. Circuit stated its reinterpretation of the
practical indicia as follows:
The first group of indicia mentioned in Brown Shoe relates to the ability of the con-
sumer to obtain substitutes for a product and, therefore, goes directly to the economic
criteria that make one market distinct from another. One factor is "unique production
facilities." If a product requires unique production facilities, and the producer raises the
price above the competitive level, the ability of other producers to shift resources to make
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While not explicitly criticizing Brown Shoe, two district courts have held
that "the personal preferences of a distinct group of consumers does not
suffice for defining a separate product market,"52 effectively rejecting dis-
tinct customers as a criterion for market delineation. Finally, one circuit
has essentially banished the submarket concept:
The use of the term "submarket" is to be avoided; it adds only con-
fusion to an already imprecise and complex endeavor. For antitrust
purposes a product group or geographic area either meets the listed
criteria, in which case it is a relevant market; or it does not, in which
case it is irrelevant for purposes of analysis. No fiddling with no-
menclature will change the analysis or result. 22
Since 1982, courts also have frequently looked beyond Supreme Court
precedent for authority on market delineation. A substantial portion of the
language quoted above from Sullivan523 has been quoted or paraphrased by
four circuit courts5 24 and district courts in four other circuits.5 25 It may be
the product would be limited, and the market definition should be likewise limited.
"[D]istinct prices" and "sensitivity to price changes" also relate directly to the economic
definition of a market. The first suggests that cross-elasticity of demand is low, the second
that it is high.
The second set of indicia bear less directly upon the economic definition of a market,
representing observations about what one ordinarily observes when a market is distinct.
The "industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic" unit matters
because we assume that economic actors usually have accurate perceptions of economic
realities. The "product's peculiar characteristics" refers to the general truth that substi-
tutes in a market often have a strong physical and functional relationship. Both "distinct
customers" and "specialized vendors" may indicate unique product attributes, which re-
fers again to the fact that products with distinct physical and functional attributes tend to
be priced differently. These factors may be helpful where the other indicia are ambiguous.
792 F.2d at 218 n.4. The idea of this exercise would seem to be that the practical indicia really did
make sense, but they had been misunderstood by the lower courts for over 20 years.
521. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 69,697, at
67,180 (D.N.H. 1992), aff'd, 986 F.2d 589, (1st Cir. 1993); FTC v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,239, at 64,854 (D.D.C. 1990).
522. Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of Va., Inc.,
714 F.2d 351, 355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984); cf. In re Air Passenger
Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1454 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1988) ("The
term submarket will not be used in this memorandum because the prefix 'sub' merely creates
confusion and is superfluous."). There remain, however, occasional decisions that find a sub-
market that is not a market. E.g., Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1993);
Hendricks Music Co. v. Steinway, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1501, 1534-39 and n.7 (N.D. Il. 1988).
The Merger Guidelines also prompted a law review article that argued for the abandonment of
the submarket concept. See Lawrence C. Maisel, Submarkets in Merger and Monopolization
Cases, 72 GEO. L.J. 39 (1983).
523. SULLIVAN, supra note 90, at 41; see also supra text accompanying note 432.
524. See Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 218; see also Dimmitt
Agri Indus., Inc. v. CDC Int'l Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 526 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
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coincidence, but no reported circuit court opinion and only one reported
district court opinion did so before the 1982 Guidelines were released.526 In
addition, two circuits527 and one district court528 that have not quoted the
Sullivan passage have quoted a passage from a supplement to the Areeda
and Turner treatise that is even closer to the Guidelines' approach. That
passage defines a market as "any grouping of sales whose sellers, if unified
by hypothetical cartel or merger, could raise prices significantly above the
competitive level."' 529 In addition, one circuit court has paraphrased, and
one district court has quoted the similar language in the original treatise.530
The Guidelines' approach has been applied by several courts. The best
example is probably the Archer-Daniels-Midland case. As explained
above,531 the case involved HFCS and the issue presented for summary
judgment was whether sugar was in the relevant market. The defendants
argued, and the district court found, that the proper tests for market de-
lineation were "interchangeability of use, cross-elasticity of demand, and
price correlation," and these tests were found to place sugar in the relevant
1082 (1983) (quoting only the beginning of the passage); Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Provi-
dence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274, 280 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983); Satellite
Television & Associated Resources, Inc., 714 F.2d at 356.
525. Three different district courts in the Third Circuit have cited the passage. Bascom Food
Prods. Corp. v. Reese Finer Foods, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 616, 627 (D.N.J. 1989); Kalmanovitz v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co., 576 F. Supp. 922, 927 (D. Del. 1983); Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F.
Supp. 1352, 1365 (W.D. Pa. 1982). A single district has quoted the passage in the Second, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits. Midwest Radio Co. v. Forum Publishing Co., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,082, at 63,959 (D.N.D. 1989); E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 692 F.
Supp. 1331, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 1987); New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable
TV, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 802, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
526. The Sullivan treatise was published in early 1977. The Guidelines were released on June
14, 1982. The first reported circuit court opinion to quote the passage from Sullivan was issued on
June 18, 1982. Home Placement Sery., Inc., 682 F.2d at 280. The first reported district court
opinion to quote the passage from Sullivan was issued on August 31, 1981. Robinson v. McGov-
ern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 877 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
971 (1982).
527. Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 957 F.2d 1318, 1325 (6th Cir. 1992);
HJ., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1540 (8th Cir. 1989).
528. See In re Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443,
1457 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
529. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 507, at 463. The courts actually cited to the 1987
version of this work, but the quoted passage has remained the same since.
530. Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co, 805 F.2d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The penulti-
mate question, towards which this preliminary inquiry into market definition is directed, is
whether the defendant has market power; the ability to raise prices above levels that would exist in
a perfectly competitive market."), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
669 F. Supp. 998, 1018 (E.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct.
617 (1991).
531. See supra notes 498-502 and accompanying text.
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market for HFCS.132 Applying the Guidelines, the Government argued on
appeal that sugar was not in the relevant market because there would be no
significant substitution from HFCS to sugar unless the prices of the two
were the same on a sweetness equivalency basis, and that the price of HFCS
could be increased significantly and still be below that of sugar on a sweet-
ness equivalency basis. The court of appeals agreed:
[A] monopolist of HFCS will be able to raise the price of HFCS to
just below the supported price of sugar before being constrained by
the competitive forces of sugar. In other words, the HFCS monopo-
list is able to exercise excess market power.... The price differential
between sugar and HFCS... is sufficient to show that sugar is not
reasonably interchangeable with HFCS and thus does not belong in
the same relevant product market with HFCS.533
In addition, a district court applied the Guidelines' test when it ruled in
favor of the Government on market delineation,5 34 and three district courts
applied the Guidelines' test when they ruled against the Government on
market delineation.135 The Guidelines' approach to market delineation also
has been referred to or quoted approvingly when not actually applied. One
circuit court and several district courts have quoted extensively from the
Guidelines' discussion of market delineation, and two other circuits have
referred to the Guidelines approach, if only briefly. 36 The Guidelines' ap-
proach to market delineation also has been adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission537 and in large part by the Canadian antitrust enforcement
532. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 695 F. Supp. 1000, 1010-11 (S.D. Iowa
1987), rev'd, 866 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989).
533. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland, Co., 866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989); see also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Heathsource, Inc. 986 F.2d 589, 599
(1st Cir. 1993) (applying the Guidelines' hypothetical monopolist paradigm but not citing the
Guidelines).
534. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1259, 1261, 1277
(N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
535. See United States v. Rank Org. PIC, 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,257, at 64,948 (C.D.
Cal. 1990); United States v. Country Lake Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 669, 672-73, 675-76 (D.
Minn. 1990); FTC v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,239, at 64,854
(D.D.C. 1990).
536. See Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1993); Ansell, Inc. v.
Schmid Lab., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 467, 475 (D.N.J.), aff'd without opinion, 941 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir.
1991); FTC v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27, 34 n.17, 38 n.32 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot,
850 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Drs. Steuer and Latham, P.A. v. National Medical Enters., Inc.,
672 F. Supp. 1489, 1510 n.16 (D.S.C. 1987); Consolidated Gas Co. of Fla. v. City Gas Co. of Fla.,
665 F. Supp. 1493, 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd, 880 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1989), vacated, 889 F.2d
264 (1lth Cir. 1989) (en banc), reinstated, 912 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), cert.
granted and remanded, 11 S. Ct. 1300, vacated as moot, 931 F.2d 710 (11th Cir. 1991).
537. On April 2, 1992, the FTC and the Department of Justice issued joint Merger Guide-
lines. Before that, the FTC had begun to follow the 1984 Merger Guidelines. See Owens-Illinois,
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agency.53 8 All this is particularly notable in light of the prediction made by
two commentators in 1982 that "no one (including the Antitrust Division)
really will use" the Guidelines' approach to market delineation. 3 9
B. An Overview of Empirical Methods for Market Delineation
Before the issuance of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, the economic litera-
ture on empirical methods for market delineation was rather sparse. Since
the Guidelines, more than a dozen papers have appeared. There seems little
doubt that the Guidelines helped to spur interest in this area of research. A
detailed review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper,5" but the
major themes are instructive. Before doing so, however, it is important to
consider the inherent limitations of historical data.
The antitrust analysis of a proposed merger is a predictive exercise-an
attempt to gauge the likely effects of the merger on prices or other aspects
of market performance. This is essentially true as well for the market de-
lineation step in the analysis. We must attempt to judge the extent to which
a price increase in a candidate market would induce substitution. Only in
very rare instances will history have performed the critical experiment of
raising prices in the candidate market. Thus, the data available for analysis
normally cannot directly inform us about the critical substitution issues.
For this reason, all empirical methods for market delineation have signifi-
cant limitations.
Many of these limitations are unique to particular methods; however,
two are completely general. 4 ' First, any reliance on historical data nor-
mally will require an extrapolation beyond the data because we must pre-
Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 23,162, at 22,812-21 (1992); Olin Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) t 22,857, at 22,543-44 (1990).
The FTC issued a Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers (reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) % 13,200) the same day as the 1982 Merger Guidelines were released, and (in § VI) it
contained a rather different approach to market delineation. Consequently, the FTC was hesitant
in adopting the Guidelines' approach. In In re Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 361, 466
(1985) and In re Weyerhaeuser Co., 106 F.T.C. 172, 274 (1985), the FTC endorsed the basic idea
of the Guidelines' approach-the linkage between markets and market power. In B.F. Goodrich
Co., 110 F.T.C. 207, 289-90 (1988), the FTC quoted the Guidelines' test for market delineation
but did not adopt it over alternative formulations.
538. BUREAU OF COMPETITION POLICY (Canada), MERGER ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES
pt. 3 (March 1991).
539. Sims & Blumenthal, supra note 496, at 17.
540. For such a review, see Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Correlation, Causality, and
All that Jaz The Inherent Shortcomings of Price Tests for Antitrust Market Delineation, 8 REV.
INDUS. ORGANIZATION 329 (1993); Werden, supra note 443.
541. These points are elaborated by Froeb & Werden, supra note 493, at 38-40. As it hap-
pens, the pre-1984 data yield estimates similar to those based on post-1984 data. Werden &
Froeb, supra note 540, at 345-46.
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dict the behavior of consumers at relative price levels significantly different
from those prevailing in a given market. While there are statistical and
other methods for making the extrapolation, they necessarily entail a sub-
stantial margin for error. Second, changes in important underlying market
conditions can undermine the relevance of historical data. Innovations in
production technology, new product introductions, changes in input prices,
and a host of other factors may make past consumer choices poor
predictors of future consumer choices. The Archer-Daniels-Midland case
provides an illustration. The HFCS industry changed considerably between
the filing of the complaint and the filing of motions for summary judgment
on market delineation, so the available data at the time of the motions
might have presented a misleading picture. 42
C. Shipments Tests
The first empirical method for market delineation to be extensively dis-
cussed and applied in the antitrust context is the Elzinga-Hogarty test.5 43 It
delineates the geographic boundaries of markets on the basis of two per-
centages-LIFO ("little in from outside") and LOFI ("little out from in-
side"). Both percentages are calculated by division, with the numerator
being the quantity of the relevant product both produced and consumed
within the candidate market. The denominator for the LIFO percentage is
the quantity of the relevant product that is consumed in the candidate mar-
ket, from whatever source, and the denominator for the LOFI percentage is
the quantity of the relevant product that is produced in the candidate mar-
ket, whatever the point of consumption. Under the Elzinga-Hogarty test, a
candidate market is deemed to be a market only if the LIFO and LOFI
percentages exceed particular thresholds; that is, only if the area has rela-
tively little imports and relatively little exports. Elzinga and Hogarty origi-
nally suggested cutoffs of at least seventy-five percent for both
percentages. 544 Later they preferred a ninety-percent cutoff for the average
of the two percentages.145
542. See supra text accompanying notes 498-502.
543. The test was first proposed and applied by Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 15. The test
was refined an reapplied by Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 425.
In a personal communication, Morris Adelman informed me that he advocated the test now
known as the Elzinga-Hogarty test while working on the Pabst Brewing case. Brief for Appellee at
16, 24, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (No. 404) does suggest the test
and presents a data table like that used to apply the test.
544. See Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 15, at 73-75.
545. See Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 425, at 2.
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The Elzinga-Hogarty test has been applied in numerous antitrust cases,
but has not generally been relied on by the courts."' The test is now partic-
ularly popular for hospital mergers, 47 and has been relied on in that con-
text to some extent by both the FTC 54 8 and the courts.5 49
Shipments data certainly can be of value in delineating markets, particu-
larly as a first cut. Moreover, the fact than an area has significant imports
suggests that local production is insufficient to satisfy local consumption
and it relies on imports for the balance. If that is the case, the area is
smaller than the relevant market. An area also cannot be a relevant market
if transportation costs are so low that sellers outside the area can sell there
with no significant locational disadvantage. Imports may be due to very
low transportation costs. On the other hand, the absence of imports into,
and exports from, an area does not indicate that local sellers could exercise
market power. Imports could flood into the area as soon as price is in-
creased a small amount.
The existence of significant exports from an area also does not imply
that the area is not a relevant market. For example, sellers in a particular
area may make substantial exports to points at which local sellers have a
significant production cost disadvantage. It is quite plausible under these
circumstances that a monopoly over the particular area would raise the
price significantly even though exports would fall, perhaps to zero. The
cost advantage would protect local sales from import competition, and the
extra profit on local sales may more than offset the lost profit on the fore-
gone exports.5 50 The analysis is similar for an area producing a higher qual-
ity product than sellers in areas to which it exports.55 ' Thus, relevant
markets actually may be far larger or smaller than they would appear under
the Elzinga-Hogarty test.
D. Price Tests
Prices within a market are closely linked by arbitrage possibilities, so
they will move toward equality and will tend to move together. On this
546. See White & White, Inc., 540 F. Supp. at 992-93.
547. The test was advocated in that context by Michael A. Morrisey et al., Defining Geo-
graphic Markets for Hospital Mergers, 51 LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS. 165 (1988).
548. See In re Hospital Corp. of Am., 106 F.T.C. 207, 396-97, 401-02 (1985) (initial deci-
sion); see also id at 509 n.7 (opinion).
549. See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1266-75 (N.D.
Ill. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990).
550. See Werden, supra note 443, at 727-30, for both a theoretical and actual example.
551. See Gregory J. Werden, The Limited Relevance of Patient Migration Data in Market
Delineation for Hospital Merger Cases, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 363 (1989).
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basis, classical economists offered a definition of the term "market," '5 5 2 and
over the past decade many economists have explored ways in which to ap-
ply this definition in the antitrust context. Some of the proposed tests are
based on price equality,55 3 but tests based on similarities of price move-
ments have been more popular.
George Stigler and Robert Sherwin proposed that "the similarity of
price movements" as measured by some form of price correlation be the test
for market delineation in both product and geographic space. In illustrat-
ing their proposal, Stigler and Sherwin correlated price data itself, data on
the logarithms of prices, and data on price changes. However, they did not
propose a criterion for determining when a correlation was large enough to
place two products in the same markets.554 Price correlations have been
used in several cases, although not ultimately relied upon by the courts.555
Price correlation evidence can be of interest in market delineation, but
neither the presence nor the absence of a high price correlation is disposi-
tive. High price correlations may be induced by common influences, such
as trends (including trends from mere inflation) and especially common
costs. Particularly in the context of the delineation of geographic market
boundaries, prices often would be highly correlated even if two regions were
separate markets. The reason is that many of the same cost factors deter-
mine prices in both areas. A good illustration is petroleum products. Re-
tail gasoline prices in two distant cities are likely to be highly correlated
552. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. It should be observed that arbitrage will
hold prices within limits even for products not in the same market; it is just a matter of degree.
Thus, to make this definition implementable it is necessary to specify how closely arbitrage must
hold prices together. For empirical implementation along these lines not intended for use in anti-
trust, see Spiller & Huang, supra note 445.
553. For empirical methods based on price equality, see Horowitz, supra note 447; Stephen
A. Mathis et al., An Approach to the Delineation of Rural Banking Markets, 60 AM. J. AGRIC.
ECON. 601 (1978). For critiques of these methods, see Werden & Froeb, supra note 540, at
338-41.
554. See Stigler & Sherwin, supra note 15. They certainly were not the first to have the idea.
The underlying notion that movements in the price of a product will induce corresponding price
movements for substitutes traces back at least to W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE PRINCIPLES OF ECO-
NOMICS 148-49 (1905). An early proponent of the use of price correlations in an antitrust context
was Frank J. Kottke, Simultaneous Price Fluctuations as a Test of the Significance of Product
Substitution, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 627 (1960). 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 90, at 351-57
advocate reliance, though not exclusive reliance, on price correlations.
555. In one merger case in which George Stigler testified as an expert, he based market de-
lineation conclusions on price correlations, and the court rejected his position. Marathon Oil Co.
v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 322 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir.
1981). In another notable case, defendants relied in part on price correlations, and the district
court agreed. The court of appeals, however, reversed. United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland
Co., 866 F.2d 242, 243 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989); see also cases cited supra
note 378 and accompanying text.
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because they respond to world crude oil price shocks, yet the two cities
could not possibly be in the same relevant market for gasoline retailing." 6
In addition, the prices of two products can have a very low correlation
because the two products are not good substitutes at current prices, but the
attempted exercise of market power over one may fail nevertheless because
a small price increase would make the products good substitutes. Perhaps
more importantly, good substitutes at current prices can have a low price
correlation if elasticities of supply are high and common influences do not
induce a correlation. A high supply elasticity prevents a high elasticity of
demand from inducing a high price correlation. As the price of one product
rises, many consumers may switch to another, reflecting the high elasticity
of demand, but if the elasticity of supply for the second product is high,
little movement in price will result. If supply is completely elastic, the price
correlation will be zero. Low elasticities of supply for substitutes tend to
inflate price correlations, but they also enhance market power in the candi-
date market by limiting the ability of the substitutes to accommodate the
increased demand when a price increase in the candidate market leads to
substitution. Thus, it can work out that price correlations are high when
products are not in the same market and low when products are in the same
market. 5
57
Price correlations involve the use of the most elementary of statistical
techniques. More sophisticated techniques can be, and have been, used as
well.5 58 In a nutshell, these techniques consider not just whether the prices
of two products move together, but whether, over time, the prices of either
product help explain those of the other. The problems with these
556. The fact that prices may be highly correlated because of common influences has often
been noted in the literature. See, eg., 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 90, at 353; JONATHAN B.
BAKER, WHY PRICE CORRELATIONS Do NOT DEFINE ANTITRUST MARKETS: ON
ECONOMETRIC ALGORITHMS FOR MARKET DEFINITION 37 (Bureau of Economics, Federal
Trade Comm'n Working Paper No. 149, 1987); SHELDON KIMMEL, PRICE CORRELATION AND
MARKET DEFINITION 6 (Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Economic Analysis Group
Discussion Paper, EAG 87-8, 1987). The specific problem of common costs is emphasized by
Werden & Froeb, supra note 540.
557. See Werden & Froeb, supra note 540, at 332-38 (forthcoming 1993).
558. See Phillip A. Cartwright et al., Price Correlation and Granger Causality Tests for Mar-
ket Definition, 4 REV. INDUS. ORGANIZATION 79 (1989); Chris Klein et al., A Note on Defining
Geographic Markets, 15 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 109 (1985); Margaret E. Slade, Exogeneity
Tests of Market Boundaries Applied to Petroleum Products, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 291 (1986); Noel
D. Uri & Edward J. Rifkin, Geographic Markets, Causality and Railroad Deregulation, 67 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 422 (1985); Noel D. Uri et al., On Defining Geographic Markets, 17 APPLIED
ECON. 959 (1985).
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techniques, however, are essentially, the same as those with simple
correlations. 9
E. Residual Demand Estimation
A final empirical method worthy of note is residual demand estima-
tion.560 The conventional demand curve used in economic analysis indi-
cates the amount consumers are willing to purchase at various prices,
holding the prices of all other products constant. A residual demand curve
indicates the amount consumers are willing to purchase at various prices,
with the prices of all other products adjusting in accord with prevailing
economic forces to the various prices of the product for which the demand
curve is constructed. Arguably, residual demand elasticities are the more
relevant ones in assessing issues relating to market power, and they also
turn out to be easier to estimate.561
Residual demand estimation provides an estimate of the elasticity of de-
mand that would be faced by a hypothetical monopolist over a candidate
market. While the elasticity of demand alone is not sufficient for market
delineation, it can be used along with other information to estimate the
amount by which the hypothetical monopolist would increase price. 62
While this technique has considerable merit, it is not without serious limita-
tions as well. These limitations include the problem of extrapolation dis-
cussed above, and technical problems in constructing reliable estimates.563
The most important limitation may be that there is a tendency to over-
estimate the extent by which a hypothetical monopolist actually would raise
price. The problem is the mirror image of the Cellophane fallacy and has
been termed the "reverse Cellophane fallacy." 5" The amount by which a
hypothetical monopolist over the candidate market would raise price is de-
termined not by the demand elasticity at the competitive or prevailing price,
but rather by the elasticity of demand at the monopoly price. On the other
559. See Werden & Froeb, supra note 540, at 341-44.
560. Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in
Product-Differentiated Industries, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 427 (1985). The technique was developed
by Baker and Bresnahan but was first applied to the problem of market delineation by Scheffman
and Spiller. Scheffman & Spiller, supra note 445.
561. See Froeb & Werden, supra note 493, at 34-35. The 1992 Guidelines specify that the
market delineation exercise is to be performed "assuming the terms of sale of all other products
are held constant." 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 7, § 1.0. Since price is a term of sale, this
provision would appear to preclude the use of residual demand estimation for market delineation.
562. See Froeb & Werden, supra note 493, at 35-36.
563. See id. at 38-46.
564. See Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, The Reverse Cellophane Fallacy in Market
Delineation, 7 REv. INDUS. ORGANIZATION 241 (1992).
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hand, all that can be reliably estimated are elasticities of demand at prevail-
ing prices. If estimated elasticities are used to infer amounts by which hy-
pothetical monopolists would raise price, a significant overestimate is likely,
resulting in overly narrow markets. The reason is that there is a tendency
for demand to be more elastic at higher prices. The potential error is quite
substantial if a price increase would cause one or more products to become
good substitutes. 65
CONCLUSION
The history of market delineation continues to be made, so there can be
no real conclusion. I simply offer three interesting perspectives on history.
President Truman was reported to have said: "The only new thing in the
world is the history you don't know. 51 66 Sir Walter Scott wrote: "A law-
yer without history or literature is a mechanic, or mere mason; if he pos-
sesses some knowledge of these, he may venture to call himself an
architect. 5 6 In an interview Henry Ford is reported to have said: "His-
tory is more or less bunk. '5 65 Perhaps they were all right.
565. For an example of the phenomenon from an actual antitrust case, see id. at 243-46.
566. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 655 (16th ed. 1992) (citing MARK MILLER,
PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN (1974)).
567. Quoted in id. at 379 (from Guy MANNERIN (1815)).
568. Quoted in id at 499 n.2 (interview with Charles N. Wheeler, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 1916).

